Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Series

Articles

Regulation

Insurance Law

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Law

Reform At Risk — Mandating Participation In Alternative Payment Plans, Scott Levy, Nicholas Bagley, Rahul Rajkumar May 2018

Reform At Risk — Mandating Participation In Alternative Payment Plans, Scott Levy, Nicholas Bagley, Rahul Rajkumar

Articles

In an ambitious effort to slow the growth of health care costs, the Affordable Care Act created the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) and armed it with broad authority to test new approaches to reimbursement for health care (payment models) and delivery-system reforms. CMMI was meant to be the government’s innovation laboratory for health care: an entity with the independence to break with past practices and the power to experiment with bold new approaches. Over the past year, however, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has quietly hobbled CMMI, imperiling its ability to generate meaningful ...


Small Change, Big Consequences — Partial Medicaid Expansions Under The Aca, Adrianna Mcintyre, Allan M. Joseph, Nicholas Bagley Sep 2017

Small Change, Big Consequences — Partial Medicaid Expansions Under The Aca, Adrianna Mcintyre, Allan M. Joseph, Nicholas Bagley

Articles

Though congressional efforts to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA) seem to have stalled, the Trump administration retains broad executive authority to reshape the health care landscape. Perhaps the most consequential choices that the administration will make pertain to Medicaid, which today covers more than 1 in 5 Americans. Much has been made of proposals to introduce work requirements or cost sharing to the program. But another decision of arguably greater long-term significance has been overlooked: whether to allow “partial expansions” pursuant to a state Medicaid waiver. Arkansas has already submitted a waiver request for a partial expansion ...


Encouraging Insurers To Regulate: The Role (If Any) For Tort Law, Kyle D. Logue Dec 2015

Encouraging Insurers To Regulate: The Role (If Any) For Tort Law, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

Insurance companies are financially responsible for a substantial portion of the losses associated with risky activities in the economy. The more insurers can lower the risks posed by their insureds, the more competitively they can price their policies, and the more customers they can attract. Thus, competition forces insurers to be private regulators of risk. To that end, insurers deploy a range of techniques to encourage their insureds to reduce the risks of their insured activities, from charging experience-rated premiums to discounting premium rates for insureds who make specific behavioral changes designed to reduce risk. Somewhat paradoxically, however, tort law ...


The Unintended Effects Of Government-Subsidized Weather Insurance, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue Oct 2015

The Unintended Effects Of Government-Subsidized Weather Insurance, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

Catastrophes from severe weather are perhaps the costliest accidents humanity faces. While we are still a long way from technologies that would abate the destructive force of storms, there is much we can do to reduce their effect. True, we cannot regulate the weather, but through smart governance and correct incentives we can influence human exposure to the risk of bad weather. We may not be able to control wind or storm surge, but we can prompt people to build sturdier homes with stronger roofs far from floodplains. We call these catastrophes "natural disasters," but they are the result of ...


How Insurance Substitutes For Regulation, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue Jan 2013

How Insurance Substitutes For Regulation, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

Legal regulation of behavior requires information. Acquiring information about the regulated party's conduct, setting benchmarks by which that conduct is measured, and establishing the correct scale of payoffs for violating or following regulation are costly and require expertise and motivation. Thus, economic theories of rulemaking are often based on the relative information advantages that different regulatory bodies have and how that information can be harnessed to enhance incentives and thereby improve welfare. Government regulators, on average, do not have informational advantages. They are not paid for performance and thus may lack adequate incentives. They are not disciplined by market ...


Under Attack: Terrorism Risk Insurance Regulation, Alexia Brunet Marks Jan 2011

Under Attack: Terrorism Risk Insurance Regulation, Alexia Brunet Marks

Articles

Scholarly debates over the September 11th attacks focus predominantly on high-profile issues, such as torture, preventive detention, interrogation, privacy, and surveillance. These debates have overshadowed the equally important and far-reaching issue of terrorism risk insurance, which not only involves billions of dollars, but provides powerful incentives to keep us safe. Developing a sound understanding of the market for terrorism risk insurance is essential to guiding the difficult determination of the appropriate balance between private and public responsibility for preventing and (when necessary) compensating for terrorism.

The attacks of September 11th represented one of the costliest insurance events in American history ...