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Articles 1  12 of 12
FullText Articles in Law
Surprise Vs. Probability As A Metric For Proof, Edward K. Cheng, Matthew Ginther
Surprise Vs. Probability As A Metric For Proof, Edward K. Cheng, Matthew Ginther
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this Symposium issue celebrating his career, Professor Michael Risinger in Leveraging Surprise proposes using "the fundamental emotion of surprise" as a way of measuring belief for purposes of legal proof. More specifically, Professor Risinger argues that we should not conceive of the burden of proof in terms of probabilities such as 51%, 95%, or even "beyond a reasonable doubt." Rather, the legal system should reference the threshold using "words of estimative surprise" asking jurors how surprised they would be if the fact in question were not true. Toward this goal (and being averse to cardinality), he suggests categories such ...
Law And The Art Of Modeling: Are Models Facts?, Rebecca Haw Allensworth
Law And The Art Of Modeling: Are Models Facts?, Rebecca Haw Allensworth
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In 2013, the Supreme Court made the offhand comment that empirical models and their estimations or predictions are not 'findings of fact" deserving of deference on appeal. The four Justices writing in dissent disagreed, insisting that an assessment of how a model works and its ability to measure what it claims to measure are precisely the kinds of factual findings that the Court, absent clear error cannot disturb. Neither side elaborated on the controversy or defended its position doctrinally or normatively. That the highest Court could split 54 on such a crucial issue without even mentioning the stakes or the ...
Simplicial Complexes Obtained From Qualitative Probability Orders, Paul H. Edelman, Tatiana Gvozdeva, Arkadii Slinko
Simplicial Complexes Obtained From Qualitative Probability Orders, Paul H. Edelman, Tatiana Gvozdeva, Arkadii Slinko
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The goal of this paper is to introduce a new class of simplicial complexes that naturally generalize the threshold complexes. These will be derived from qualitative probability orders on subsets of a finite set that generalize subset orders induced by probability measures. We show that this new class strictly contains the threshold complexes and is strictly contained in the shifted complexes. We conjecture that this class of complexes is exactly the set of strongly acyclic complexes, a class that has previously appeared in the context of cooperative games. Beyond the results themselves, this new class of complexes allows us to ...
Book Review: Burden Of Proof: A Review Of Math On Trial, Paul H. Edelman
Book Review: Burden Of Proof: A Review Of Math On Trial, Paul H. Edelman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In Math on Trial, Leila Schneps and Coralie Col mez write about the abuse of mathematical argu ments in criminal trials and how these flawed arguments "have sent innocent people to prison" (p. ix). Indeed, people "saw their lives ripped apart by simple mathematical errors." The purpose of focusing on these errors, despite mathematics' "relatively rare use in trials" (p. x), is "that many of the common mathematical fallacies that pervade the public sphere are perfectly represented by these trials. Thus they serve as ideal illustrations of these errors and of the drastic consequences that faulty reasoning has on real ...
When 10 Trials Are Better Than 1000: An Evidentiary Perspective On Trial Sampling, Edward K. Cheng
When 10 Trials Are Better Than 1000: An Evidentiary Perspective On Trial Sampling, Edward K. Cheng
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In many mass tort cases, separately trying all individual claims is impractical, and thus a number of trial courts and commentators have explored the use of statistical sampling as a way of efficiently processing claims. Most discussions on the topic, however, implicitly assume that sampling is a “second best” solution: individual trials are preferred for accuracy, and sampling only justified under extraordinary circumstances. This Essay explores whether this assumption is really true. While intuitively one might think that individual trials would be more accurate at estimating liability than extrapolating from a subset of cases, the Essay offers three ways in ...
Corporate Voting, Paul H. Edelman, Robert B. Thompson
Corporate Voting, Paul H. Edelman, Robert B. Thompson
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Discussion of shareholder voting frequently begins against a background of the democratic expectations and justifications present in decisionmaking in the public sphere. Directors are assumed to be agents of the shareholders in much the same way that public officers are representatives of citizens. Recent debates about majority voting and shareholder nomination of directors illustrate this pattern. Yet the corporate process differs in significant ways, partly because the market for shares permits a form of intensity voting and lets markets mediate the outcome in a way that would be foreign to the public setting and partly because the shareholders' role is ...
Will Quants Rule The (Legal) World?, Edward K. Cheng
Will Quants Rule The (Legal) World?, Edward K. Cheng
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Professor Ian Ayres, in his new book, Super Crunchers, details the brave new world of statistical prediction and how it has already begun to affect our lives. For years, academic researchers have known about the considerable and at times surprising advantages of statistical models over the considered judgments of experienced clinicians and experts. Today, these models are emerging all over the landscape. Whether the field is wine, baseball, medicine, or consumer relations, they are vying against traditional experts for control over how we make decisions. For the legal system, the takehome of Ayres's book and the examples he describes ...
A Practical Solution To The Reference Class Problem, Edward K. Cheng
A Practical Solution To The Reference Class Problem, Edward K. Cheng
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The "reference class problem" is a serious challenge to the use of statistical evidence that arguably arises every day in wide variety of cases, including toxic torts, property valuation, and even drug smuggling. At its core, it observes that statistical inferences depend critically on how people, events, or things are classified. As there is (purportedly) no principle for privileging certain categories over others, statistics become manipulable, undermining the very objectivity and certainty that make statistical evidence valuable and attractive to legal actors. In this paper, I propose a practical solution to the reference class problem by drawing on model selection ...
Law, Statistics, And The Reference Class Problem, Edward K. Cheng
Law, Statistics, And The Reference Class Problem, Edward K. Cheng
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Statistical data are powerful, if not crucial, pieces of evidence in the courtroom. Whether one is trying to demonstrate the rarity of a DNA profile, estimate the value of damaged property, or determine the likelihood that a criminal defendant will recidivate, statistics often have an important role to play. Statistics, however, raise a number of serious challenges for the legal system, including concerns that they are difficult to understand, are given too much deference from juries, or are easily manipulated by the parties' experts. In this preview piece, I address one of these challenges, known as the "reference class problem ...
On Legal Interpretations Of The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Paul H. Edelman
On Legal Interpretations Of The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Paul H. Edelman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
There has been a spate of interest in the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to issues in the law. This theorem holds that a majority vote among a suitably large body of voters, all of whom are more likely than not to vote correctly, will almost surely result in the correct outcome. Its uses have ranged from estimating the correct size of juries to justifying the voting of creditors in Chapter 11 reorganizations. While the mathematics is unassailable, the legal interpretation of the conclusion is dependent on the model of probability one uses when invoking the assumption that the ...
A Tour Of Mistakes, Paul H. Edelman
A Tour Of Mistakes, Paul H. Edelman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In these pages, Steven Lubet recently reviewed A Tour of the Calculus, by David Berlinski. Inspired by both the beauty of calculus and Berlinski's description of it, Lubet waxes poetic on the many parallels between the law and calculus. It is completely understandableeven admirable that one might be led to ruminations on the relationship between calculus and one's own discipline. There is little doubt that the subject of calculus stands as one of the great intellectual feats of Western thought. It has had profound implications for physics, engineering, economics and many other disciplinesso why not law? Alas, these ...
"Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About The Supremes As The Sultans Of Swing, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen
"Duel" Diligence: Second Thoughts About The Supremes As The Sultans Of Swing, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
We respond to Professor Lynn A. Baker's criticisms of our article, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics. Professor Baker fundamentally misunderstands our measure of Supreme Court voting power. Moreover, she erroneously presumes that the "median Justice" wields the bulk of the Court's power. Even if there were a median Justice, it is far from clear whether he would be the Most Dangerous Justice. We conclude with a clarification of the median voter theorem and its implications for the distribution of voting power within the Supreme Court.