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Just Do It: An Antidote To The Poison Pill, Julian Velasco
Just Do It: An Antidote To The Poison Pill, Julian Velasco
Journal Articles
The poison pill is the most powerful defense against hostile takeovers. It can render a company takeover-proof, or nearly so. Efforts at developing an antidote have focused largely on shareholder-adopted bylaws, but the legality of such proposals has been questioned by many. In any event, shareholder-adopted bylaws have not been very successful in eliminating poison pills thus far. In order to effect takeovers, hostile bidders cannot rely on the courts or the target company's shareholders; they can rely only on themselves. In this article, I propose a strategy for hostile bidders to counteract the poison pill and to consummate hostile …
Focusing Failures In Competitive Environments: Explaining Decision Errors In The Monty Hall Game, The Acquiring A Company Problem, And Multiparty Ultimatums, Avishalom Tor, Max Bazerman
Focusing Failures In Competitive Environments: Explaining Decision Errors In The Monty Hall Game, The Acquiring A Company Problem, And Multiparty Ultimatums, Avishalom Tor, Max Bazerman
Journal Articles
This paper offers a unifying conceptual explanation for failures in competitive decision-making across three seemingly unrelated tasks: the Monty Hall game (Nalebuff, 1987), the Acquiring a Company problem (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985), and multiparty ultimatums (Messick, Moore, & Bazerman, 1997). We argue that the failures observed in these three tasks have a common root. Specifically, due to a limited focus of attention, competitive decision-makers fail properly to consider all of the information needed to solve the problem correctly. Using protocol analyses, we show that competitive decision-makers tend to focus on their own goals, often to the exclusion of the decisions …