Law Commons^™

Supreme Court Journalism: From Law To Spectacle?, Barry Sullivan, Cristina Tilley

Faculty Publications & Other Works

Few people outside certain specialized sectors of the press and the legal profession have any particular reason to read the increasingly voluminous opinions through which the Justices of the Supreme Court explain their interpretations of the Constitution and laws. Most of what the public knows about the Supreme Court necessarily comes from the press. That fact raises questions of considerable importance to the functioning of our constitutional democracy: How, for example, does the press describe the work of the Supreme Court? And has the way in which the press describes the work of the Court changed over the past several …

Electoral College: Supreme Court Decides That States May Replace Or Punish Presidential Electors Who Do Not Vote For The Candidate Who Won The Most Votes In The State, But Leaves Several Questions Unanswered, Alan Raphael

Faculty Publications & Other Works

No abstract provided.

Do Justices Time Their Retirements Politically: An Empirical Analysis Of The Timing And Outcomes Of Supreme Court Retirements In The Modern Era, Christine Chabot

Faculty Publications & Other Works

As the rampant speculation preceding Justice Kennedy's retirement made clear, it is difficult to predict when Justices will retire. Justices often defy the conventional wisdom that a Justice is more likely to retire when the president and Senate share the Justice's ideology. For example, Justice Ginsburg chose to remain on the Court rather than retire during President Obama's terms. Her choice is not unusual. Since 1954, a majority of similarly situated Justices refused to retire. In light of this behavior, it is no surprise that existing studies struggle to explain Justices' retirement decisions and disagree on whether political factors predict …

The Criminal Law Docket: A Term Of Modest Changes, Alan Raphael

Faculty Publications & Other Works

No abstract provided.

Taking Laughter Seriously At The Supreme Court, Matthew Sag

Faculty Publications & Other Works

Laughter in Supreme Court oral arguments has been misunderstood, treated as either a lighthearted distraction from the Court's serious work, or interpreted as an equalizing force in an otherwise hierarchical environment. Examining the more than nine thousand instances of laughter witnessed at the Court since 1955, this Article shows that the Justices of the Supreme Court use courtroom humor as a tool of advocacy and a signal of their power and status. As the Justices have taken on a greater advocacy role in the modern era, they have also provoked more laughter. The performative nature of courtroom humor is apparent …

He New Oral Argument: Justices As Advocates, Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi

Faculty Publications & Other Works

This Article conducts a comprehensive empirical inquiry of fifty-five years of Supreme Court oral argument, showing that judicial activity has increased dramatically, in terms of words used, duration of speech, interruptions made, and comments proffered. The Court is asking no more questions of advocates; instead, the justices are providing conclusions and rebutting their colleagues. In addition, the justices direct more of their comments and questions to the side with whom they ultimately disagree. Furthermore, “losing” justices, be it ideological camps that are outnumbered on the Court or dissenters in specific cases, use oral arguments to push back against the dominant …

Selling Chevron, Christine Chabot

Faculty Publications & Other Works

No abstract provided.

Schooling The Supreme Court, Christine Chabot

Faculty Publications & Other Works

Supreme Court Justices' uniform professional backgrounds have drawn increasing criticism. Yet it is unclear how diverse professional training would affect the Court's decisions. This Article offers the first empirical analysis of how Justices with diverse professional training vote: It examines a unique period when Justices with formal legal education sat with Justices who entered the profession by reading the law alone.

The study finds that Justices' levels of agreement and politically independent voting vary significantly according to their professional training. In cases which divided the Court, Justices who shared the benefit of formal legal education (1) voted together more often …