Law Commons^™

The Brennan Lecture: The Separation Of Powers And The Public, Josh Chafetz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Executive Opportunism, Presidential Signing Statements, And The Separation Of Powers, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Edward H. Stiglitz, Barry R. Weingast

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Executive discretion over policy outcomes is an inevitable feature of our political system. However, in recent years, the President has sought to expand his discretion through a variety of controversial and legally questionable tactics. Through a series of simple separation of powers models, we study one such tactic, employed by both Democratic and Republican presidents: the use of signing statements, which purport to have status in the interpretation of statutory meaning. Our models also show that signing statements upset the constitutional vision of lawmaking and, in a wide range of cases, exacerbate legislative gridlock. We argue that courts should not …

A Fourth Way?: Bringing Politics Back Into Recess Appointments (And The Rest Of The Separation Of Powers, Too), Josh Chafetz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

It sounds odd when stated forthrightly, but most separation-of-powers discussions are largely inattentive to politics. Formalist theories tend to assert that the distribution of powers is set in stone; in contrast, functionalist theories tend to focus on abstract considerations of comparative institutional competence or on ossifying past practice into a "historical gloss" binding the present. Both approaches generally ignore the live political context in which the branches continually compete with one another for decision-making power.

"Pragmatic formalist" hybrids, like that proposed by Ron Krotoszynski in his contribution to the Duke Law Journal's annual administrative law symposium, while broadening the …

Congress's Constitution, Josh Chafetz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Congress has significantly more constitutional power than we are accustomed to seeing it exercise. By failing to make effective use of its power, Congress has invited the other branches to fill the vacuum, resulting in a constitutional imbalance. This Article considers a number of constitutional tools that individual houses—and even individual members—of Congress, acting alone, can deploy in interbranch conflicts. Although the congressional powers discussed in this Article are clearly contemplated in constitutional text, history, and structure, many of them have received only scant treatment in isolation. More importantly, they have never before been considered in concert as a set …

Executive Branch Contempt Of Congress, Josh Chafetz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

After former White House Counsel Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten refused to comply with subpoenas issued by a congressional committee investigating the firing of a number of United States Attorneys, the House of Representatives voted in 2008 to hold them in contempt. The House then chose a curious method of enforcing its contempt citation: it filed a federal lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that Miers and Bolten were in contempt of Congress and an injunction ordering them to comply with the subpoenas. The district court ruled for the House, although that ruling was subsequently stayed …

Cleaning House: Congressional Commissioners For Standards, Josh Chafetz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Given the profusion of congressional ethics scandals over the past two years, it is unsurprising that the new Democratic majority in the 110th Congress has made ethics reform a priority. But although both the House and the Senate have tightened their substantive rules, the way the rules are enforced has received almost no attention at all.

This Comment argues that ethics enforcement should remain within the houses of Congress themselves. Taking enforcement power away from the houses is constitutionally questionable (under the Speech or Debate Clause), structurally unwise (given general concerns about separation of powers), and institutionally problematic (as it …

Complete Preemption And The Separation Of Powers, Trevor W. Morrison

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This is a short response, published in Pennumbra (the online companion to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review), to Gil Seinfeld's recent article, "The Puzzle of Complete Preemption."

I first sound some notes of agreement with Professor Seinfeld's critique of the Supreme Court's complete preemption doctrine. I then turn to his proposed reshaping of the doctrine around the interest in federal legal uniformity. Although certainly more satisfying than the Court's account, Professor Seinfeld's refashioning of the doctrine raises a number of new difficulties. In particular, it invites the federal courts to engage in a range of line-drawing exercises to which …

Constitutional Avoidance In The Executive Branch, Trevor W. Morrison

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

When executive branch actors interpret statutes, should they use the same methods as the courts? This Article takes up the question by considering a rule frequently invoked by the courts-the canon of constitutional avoidance. In addition to being a cardinal principle of judicial statutory interpretation, the avoidance canon also appears regularly and prominently in the work of the executive branch. It has played a central role, for example, in some of the most hotly debated episodes of executive branch statutory interpretation in the "war on terror." Typically, executive invocations of avoidance are supported by citation to one or more Supreme …

Constitutional Avoidance In The Executive Branch, Trevor W. Morrison

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

When executive actors interpret statutes, the prevailing assumption is that they can and should use the tools that courts use. Is that assumption sound? This Article takes up the question by considering a rule frequently invoked by the courts - the canon of constitutional avoidance.

Executive branch actors regularly use the avoidance canon. Indeed, some of the most hotly debated episodes of executive branch statutory interpretation in recent years - including the initial torture memorandum issued by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, the President's signing statement regarding the McCain Amendment's ban on the mistreatment of detainees, and the …

Schoolhouses, Courthouses, And Statehouses: Educational Finance, Constitutional Structure, And The Separation Of Powers Doctrine, Michael Heise

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

How Separation Of Powers Protects Individual Liberties, Cynthia R. Farina

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Compulsory Disclosure And The First Amendment - The Scope Of Judicial Review, Robert B. Kent

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Involvement of the Supreme Court of the United States with highly charged public issues understandably occasions fresh debate concerning the proper role of the Court in determining questions of ultimate governmental power, in short, debate over the doctrine of judicial review.

As it is sometimes difficult for the judge to distinguish between what is unconstitutional and what is merely unwise, so it is difficult for the critic to disassociate his reaction to the results reached in a given case from his evaluation of the competence of the particular judicial performance. For some the failure to draw such a line robs …