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Full-Text Articles in Law

Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons From The American Experience, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 2003

Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons From The American Experience, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The venture capital market and firms whose creation and early stages were financed by venture capital are among the crown jewels of the American economy. Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth and job creation, these firms have been a major force in commercializing cutting-edge science, whether through their impact on existing industries as with the radical changes in pharmaceuticals catalyzed by venture-backed firms' commercialization of biotechnology, or by their role in developing entirely new industries as with the emergence of the Internet and World Wide Web. The venture capital market thus provides a unique link between finance and …


Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, And The Liquidated Damages Rule, Eric L. Talley Jan 1994

Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, And The Liquidated Damages Rule, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

The common law practice of refusing to enforce contractual penalties has long mystified law and economics scholars. After critiquing the prevailing law and economics analyses of the common law rule, Eric L. Talley reevaluates the penalty doctrine using the game theoretic technique of mechanism design, which facilitates the analysis of multiparty bargaining situations under various assumptions. Using this technique to model the allocational consequences of various enforcement regimes that courts might adopt with respect to stipulated damages clauses, Mr. Talley finds that penalty nonenforcement can increase economic efficiency by discouraging strategic behavior by the parties, thereby inducing more efficient contract …


Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, Charles J. Goetz, Robert E. Scott Jan 1979

Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, Charles J. Goetz, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

A buyer repudiates a fixed-price contract to purchase goods, and the seller sues for damages. How should a court measure the seller's loss? The answer seems simple: The seller should be awarded damages sufficient to place it in the same economic position it would have enjoyed had the buyer performed the contract. But the seductive conceptual simplicity of the compensation principle disguises substantial practical problems in measuring seller's damages.

Contract law has traditionally minimized measurement difficulties by basing damages in most cases on the difference between the contract price and market value of the repudiated goods. The common law courts …