Law Commons^™

Are Institutional Investors Part Of The Problem Or Part Of The Solution?: Key Descriptive And Prescriptive Questions About Shareholders, Ben W. Heineman Jr., Stephen Davis

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Over the last twenty years, institutional investors have owned an increasing share of public equity markets — more than 70 percent of the largest 1,000 companies in the United States in 2009, for example. Over the past two years, in response to failures of some boards of directors and business leaders, shareholders, including institutional investors, have been given increased powers to participate in — or have disclosures about — discrete spheres of governance in publicly held corporations. Moreover, during this same period, and in multiple jurisdictions, there have been increasing calls from both the public and private sectors for institutional …

Chairmanship: The Effective Chair-Ceo Relationship: Insight From The Boardroom, Elise Walton

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

This paper examines the role of the corporate Chair in the context of one of the most important relationships the Chair has – his or her relationship with the company’sCEO. To approach the topic, the Chairmen’s Forum sponsored a research effort to interview experienced Chairs,CEOs and stakeholders. After the Forum agreed on the project, a research plan was designed and approved by the sponsors. Key interview questions and interview candidates were reviewed and approved. The main areas of the interview included: background experience with the two roles; successful situations and what worked; challenges and what didn’t work; how a relationship …

“Corporation Law Is Dead”: The Mystery Of Corporation Law At The Height Of The American Century, Harwell Wells

Studio for Law and Culture

In 1962, the corporation law scholar Bayless Manning famously wrote that “[C]orporation law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in the United States.” Looking back, most scholars have agreed with Manning, concluding that corporation law from the 1940s to the 1970s was stagnant, only rescued from its doldrums by the triumph of the theory of the firm and modern finance in the 1980s. This paper takes a new look at American corporate law during this time, asking why scholars believed corporation law was “dead” at the same time that the American corporation had seized the commanding heights of …

Corporations, Corruption, And Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

Few campaign finance cases have drawn more public attention than the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC. The Court's invalidation of a sixty-year-old federal law – and comparable laws in two dozen states – banning corporations from engaging in independent spending in support of or opposition to candidates strongly affirms the right of corporations to engage in electoral advocacy. Critics – and most, albeit not all, of both the popular and academic commentary on the decision has been critical – have condemned the idea that corporations enjoy the same rights to spend on elections as natural persons. …

A Model Of Optimal Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch

Faculty Scholarship

We analyze incentive-efficient government bailouts within a canonical model of intra-firm moral hazard. Bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard of firms and managers in two ways. First, they make them less averse to failing. Second, the taxes to fund bailouts dampen their incentives. Nevertheless, if third-party externalities from keeping the firm alive are strong, bailouts can improve welfare. Our model suggests that governments should use bailouts sparingly, where social externalities are large and subsidies small; eliminate incumbent owners and managers to improve a priori incentives; and finance bailouts through redistributive taxes on productive firms instead of forcing recipients to repay in …

Contract, Uncertainty, And Innovation, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

Contract today increasingly links entrepreneurial innovations to the efforts and finance necessary to transform ideas into value. In this chapter, we describe the match between a form of contract that “braids”1 formal and informal contractual elements in novel ways and the process by which innovation is pursued.

Economic Crisis And Share Price Unpredictability: Reasons And Implications, Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The volatility of share returns for individual companies increased sharply during the recent financial crisis. The larger part of this increase was due to a dramatic rise – five fold as measured by variance – in idiosyncratic risk. We find that this pattern repeats itself during each major economic reversal going back 85 years. Because idiosyncratic risk is what is involved, this increase cannot be explained by changes in predictions concerning the future course of the economy as a whole.

Our first goal is to explain why difficult economic times, which are defined in terms of market wide phenomena, make …

Kiobel And Corporate Immunity Under The Alien Tort Statute: The Struggle For Clarity Post-Sosa, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

In September 2010, a two-judge Second Circuit majority ruled that corporations are immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”). This statute, which grants aliens access to federal district courts, has emerged as a controversial tool for international norm enforcement in the last thirty years. The unexpected decision to foreclose corporate liability has generated a wave of criticism from human rights activists and international law scholars who claim that the decision is grounded in a fundamental misunderstanding of international law.

This commentary examines the Kiobel decision against other recent interpretations of the ATS, especially those following the Supreme Court’s …