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Columbia Law School

Administrative Law

President

Articles 1 - 8 of 8

Full-Text Articles in Law

Separation Of Powers In Comparative Perspective: How Much Protection For The Rule Of Law?, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2018

Separation Of Powers In Comparative Perspective: How Much Protection For The Rule Of Law?, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Writing about separation of powers with particular attention to the contrasting American and British views at the time of Trump and Brexit has been challenging and illuminating. The essay takes as its third framework the constrained parliamentarianism Prof. Bruce Ackerman celebrated in his essay, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (2000), and briefly considers its relative success in Australia, France, and Germany, and failure in Hungary and Poland, in achieving “separation of powers” universally understood ends, the prevention of autocracy and preservation of human freedoms. That courts and judges would not be political actors, that governments ...


Eroding "Checks" On Presidential Authority – Norms, The Civil Service, And The Courts, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2018

Eroding "Checks" On Presidential Authority – Norms, The Civil Service, And The Courts, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Shortly after the November elections returned control of the House of Representatives to Democrat control, twenty-one scholars of administrative law met at the Chicago-Kent College of Law to hear and discuss seven papers on the general subject of President Trump and administrative law. A number have already been posted to SSRN. This paper is a commentary on Susan Rose-Ackerman’s essay “Executive Rulemaking and Democratic Legitimacy: ‘Reform’ in the US and the UK’s Route to Brexit” which insightfully illuminates important differences between parliamentary and presidential systems of government in relation to executive bodies’ production of the large volume of ...


Politics And Agencies In The Administrative State: The U.S. Case, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2016

Politics And Agencies In The Administrative State: The U.S. Case, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The pending American presidential election, culminating a period of extreme political partisanship in our national government generally, gives point to an essay on politics and agencies in the American regulatory state. In our two-party system, it has often been the case in recent times, including the last six years, that the President comes from one of our two major political parties and one or both houses of Congress are controlled by the other. All American agencies (including, in the American case, the so-called independent regulatory bodies) are associated with the President in the executive branch, yet dependent on the Senate ...


Legislation That Isn't – Attending To Rulemaking's "Democracy Deficit", Peter L. Strauss Jan 2010

Legislation That Isn't – Attending To Rulemaking's "Democracy Deficit", Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Philip Frickey's commitment to practical legal studies won my admiration early on in his career. In this welcome celebration of his extraordinary career, it seems fitting to essay something "practical" – to attempt a constructive approach to an enduring problem – that has some bearing on his lifelong attention to the problem of "interpretation." If it will not make the problem go away, perhaps it will provide a basis for understanding its inevitable tensions, and in that way will help us step past theoretical exegeses suggesting the possibility of simple answers.


On The Difficulties Of Generalization – Pcaob In The Footsteps Of Myers, Humphrey’S Executor, Morrison And Freytag, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2010

On The Difficulties Of Generalization – Pcaob In The Footsteps Of Myers, Humphrey’S Executor, Morrison And Freytag, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s decision last June in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is torn between general principle and particularity in considering important questions of separation of powers in American constitutional law – just as had been an earlier decision that, in some respects, it both repudiated and modeled, Freytag v. Commissioner. Indeed, the same problems live in two earlier cases that are staples of the administrative law and separation of powers repertoire, Myers v. United States and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. The Supreme Court has a long history of reaching sensible results in its ...


The Role Of The Chief Executive In Domestic Administration, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2010

The Role Of The Chief Executive In Domestic Administration, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Written for an international working paper conference on administrative law, this paper sets the Supreme Court's decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in the context of general American concerns about the place of the President in domestic administration, a recurring theme in my writings.


Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2009

Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

A Constitution that strongly separates legislative from executive activity makes it difficult to reconcile executive adoption of regulations (that is, departmentally adopted texts resembling statutes and having the force of law, if valid) with the proposition that the President is not ‘to be a lawmaker’. Such activity is, of course, an essential of government in the era of the regulatory state. United States courts readily accept the delegation to responsible agencies of authority to engage in it, what we call ‘rulemaking’, so long as it occurs in a framework that permits them to assess the legality of any particular exercise ...


Overseer, Or "The Decider"? The President In Administrative Law, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2006

Overseer, Or "The Decider"? The President In Administrative Law, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

All will agree that the Constitution creates a unitary chief executive officer, the President, at the head of the government Congress defines to do the work its statutes detail. Disagreement arises over what his function entails. Once Congress has defined some element of government and specified its responsibilities, we know that the constitutional roles of both Congress and the courts are those of oversight of the agency and its assigned work, not the actual performance of that work. But is it the same for the President? When Congress confers authority on the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate various forms of ...