Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Series

PDF

2000

All Faculty Scholarship

Anticompetitive

Articles 1 - 1 of 1

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel Jan 2000

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

All Faculty Scholarship

Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, "Type I" collusion is the familiar direct agreement among colluding firms (a cartel) to raise prices or, equivalently, restrict output. Alternatively, firms can collude to disadvantage rivals in ways that causes those rivals to cut output. We term this "Type II" collusion. Its indirect effect is an increase in market prices.

A number of important collusion cases neither direct manipulation of prices or output, nor direct attacks on rivals. Examples include Supreme Court cases such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, Bates v. State Bar of ...