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2000

Columbia Law School

Securities Law

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Sticks And Snakes: Derivatives And Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, David M. Schizer Jan 2000

Sticks And Snakes: Derivatives And Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

Complex "derivative" financial instruments are often used in aggressive tax planning. In response, the government has implemented mark-to-market type reforms, but only partially. Considered in isolation, these incremental reforms are likely to seem well advised in measuring income more accurately. However, there is an important "second best" cost, emphasized in this Article: the ability of well-advised taxpayers either to avoid the new rule or to turn it to their advantage (here called "defensive" and "offensive" planning options, respectively). This Article uses two case studies to identify how these effects arise and to suggest ways of combating them. The first case ...


The Rise Of Dispersed Ownership: The Role Of Law In The Separation Of Ownership And Control, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2000

The Rise Of Dispersed Ownership: The Role Of Law In The Separation Of Ownership And Control, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Deep and liquid securities markets appear to be an exception to a worldwide pattern in which concentrated ownership dominates dispersed ownership. Recent commentary has argued that a dispersed shareholder base is unlikely to develop in civil law countries and transitional economies for a variety of reasons, including (1) the absence of adequate legal protections for minority shareholders, (2) the inability of dispersed shareholders to hold control or pay an equivalent control premium to that which a prospective controlling shareholder will pay, and (3) the political vulnerability of dispersed shareholder ownership in left-leaning "social democracies". Nonetheless, this article finds that significant ...


Convergence And Its Critics: What Are The Preconditions To The Separation Of Ownership And Control?, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2000

Convergence And Its Critics: What Are The Preconditions To The Separation Of Ownership And Control?, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Recent commentary has argued that deep and liquid securities markets and a dispersed shareholder base are unlikely to develop in civil law countries and transitional economies for a variety of reasons, including (1) the absence of adequate legal protections for minority shareholder, (2) the inability of dispersed shareholders to hold control or pay an equivalent control premium to that which a prospective controlling shareholder will pay and (3) the political vulnerability of dispersed shareholder ownership in left-leaning "social democracies." Nonetheless, this article finds that significant movement in the direction of dispersed ownership has occurred and is accelerating across Europe. To ...