Law Commons^™

New Technologies And Constitutional Law, Thomas Fetzer, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Conundrum Of Cameras In The Courtroom, Nancy S. Marder

All Faculty Scholarship

In spite of a communications revolution that has given the public access to new media in new places, the revolution has been stopped cold at the steps to the U.S. federal courthouse. The question whether to allow television cameras in federal courtrooms has aroused strong passions on both sides, and Congress keeps threatening to settle the debate and permit cameras in federal courts. Proponents of cameras in federal courtrooms focus mainly on the need to educate the public and to make judges accountable, whereas opponents focus predominantly on the ways in which cameras can affect participants’ behavior and compromise the …

Cyberjuries: A New Role As Online Mock Juries, Nancy S. Marder

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Juries And Technology: Equipping Jurors For The Twenty-First Century (Symposium), Nancy S. Marder

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Sovereign Indignity? Values, Borders And The Internet: A Case Study, Eric Easton

All Faculty Scholarship

This article focuses on the publication ban issued by a Canadian court in a notorious murder trial, and the popular reaction to the publication ban, as a case study of the new global communications environment. Part I reconstructs the factual circumstances that provoked the ban, as well as the responses of the media, the legal establishment, and the public. Part II examines the ban itself, the constitutional challenge mounted by the media, and the landmark Dagenais decision. Part III reflects on the meaning of the entire episode for law, journalism, and national sovereignty.

The Dagenais decision demonstrates the continued independence …

Closing The Barn Door After The Genie Is Out Of The Bag: Recognizing A "Futility Principle" In First Amendment Jurisprudence, Eric Easton

All Faculty Scholarship

This article argues for a simple proposition: the First Amendment imposes a presumption against the suppression of speech when suppression would be futile. Suppression is futile when the speech is available to the same audience through some other medium or at some other place. The government can overcome this presumption of futility only when it asserts an important interest that is unrelated to the content of the speech in question, and only when the suppression directly advances that interest.

In Part I, the article explores the role that this unarticulated "futility principle" has played in Supreme Court and other decisions …