Law Commons^™

A Perfect Storm: Mercury And The Bush Administration, Part Ii, Rena I. Steinzor, Lisa Heinzerling

Faculty Scholarship

The Environmental Protection Agency's recent proposal to regulate mercury emissions from power plants, and its final rule on mercury emissions from chlor-alkali facilities, suffer from serious scientific, legal, economic, and distributional flaws. The first installment in this series examined the strong scientific basis for regulating mercury emissions and critiqued the agency's decisions from a legal perspective. This second (and final) installment finds that EPA's decisions also fail from the perspectives of economics and environmental justice. EPA and the Office of Management and Budget's economic analysis of the proposal to regulate mercury from power plants was shoddy and one-sided. EPA and …

Slides: Technologies To Reduce Methane Emissions From Natural Gas Production Activities, Roger Fernandez

Best Management Practices and Adaptive Management in Oil and Gas Development (May 12-13)

Presenter: Roger Fernandez, EPA Gas STAR Program

31 slides

A Perfect Storm: Mercury And The Bush Administration, Rena I. Steinzor, Lisa Heinzerling

Faculty Scholarship

In December 2003, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed a rule for mercury emissions from power plants and issued a final rule for mercury emissions from chlor-alkali facilities. Regarding power plants, EPA had previously found that mercury posed the most serious threat among the hazardous air pollutants emitted by power plants, and also that regulation of mercury from power plants was appropriate and necessary under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which requires stringent technology-based regulation for hazardous air pollutants. Despite section 112's clear rejection of emissions trading as a compliance option, EPA has proposed to allow commercial trading …

The Epa's Risky Reasoning, Cary Coglianese, Gary E. Marchant

All Faculty Scholarship

Regulators must rely on science to understand problems and predict the consequences of regulatory actions, but science by itself cannot justify public policy decisions. We review the Environmental Protection Agency's efforts to justify recent changes to its National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone and particulate matter, showing how the agency was able to cloak its policy judgments under the guise of scientific objectivity. By doing so, the EPA evaded accountability for a shifting and incoherent set of policy positions that will have major implications for public health and the economy. For example, even though EPA claimed to base …