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Resurrecting Miranda's Right To Counsel, David Rossman May 2017

Resurrecting Miranda's Right To Counsel, David Rossman

Faculty Scholarship

The regime created by Miranda v. Arizona is at this point in its history bankrupt both intellectually and in terms of practical effect. Justices who have joined the Court after Miranda have cut back its scope by stingy interpretations of the doctrine’s reach and effect. In practice, few suspects actually benefit from the way Miranda is now implemented in police stations and courtrooms. Given the failure of Miranda’s promise, can we envision an alternative? Here is one that may be politically palatable and doctrinally feasible, largely adopted from English practice:

1. Police would give the same Miranda warnings ...


Disentangling Miranda And Massiah: How To Revive The Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel As A Tool For Regulating Confession Law, Eve Brensike Primus May 2017

Disentangling Miranda And Massiah: How To Revive The Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel As A Tool For Regulating Confession Law, Eve Brensike Primus

Articles

Fifty years after Miranda v. Arizona, many have lamented the ways in which the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have cut back on Miranda's protections. One underappreciated a spect of Miranda's demise is the way it has affected the development of the pretrial Sixth Amendment right to counsel guaranteed by Massiah v. United States. Much of the case law diluting suspects' Fifth Amendment Miranda rights has bled over into the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases without consideration of whether the animating purposes of the Massiah pretrial right to counsel would support such an importation. This development is ...


The Miranda Case Fifty Years Later, Yale Kamisar May 2017

The Miranda Case Fifty Years Later, Yale Kamisar

Articles

A decade after the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, Geoffrey Stone took a close look at the eleven decisions the Court had handed down “concerning the scope and application of Miranda.” As Stone observed, “[i]n ten of these cases, the Court interpreted Miranda so as not to exclude the challenged evidence.” In the eleventh case, the Court excluded the evidence on other grounds. Thus, Stone noted, ten years after the Court decided the case, “the Court ha[d] not held a single item of evidence inadmissible on the authority of Miranda.” Not a single item. To use baseball ...


A Look Back At The "Gatehouses And Mansions" Of American Criminal Procedure, Yale Kamisar Oct 2015

A Look Back At The "Gatehouses And Mansions" Of American Criminal Procedure, Yale Kamisar

Articles

I am indebted to Professor William Pizzi for remembering—and praising—the “Gatehouses and Mansions” essay I wrote fifty years ago. A great many articles and books have been written about Miranda. So it is nice to be remembered for an article published a year before that famous case was ever decided.


A Comprehensive Analysis Of The History Of Interrogation Law, With Some Shots Directed At Miranda V. Arizona, Tracey Maclin Jul 2015

A Comprehensive Analysis Of The History Of Interrogation Law, With Some Shots Directed At Miranda V. Arizona, Tracey Maclin

Faculty Scholarship

Police interrogation is designed to convict suspects under arrest or those suspected of crime. It does not matter that the suspect may not be guilty; interrogation is instigated to obtain an incriminating statement that will help convict the suspect. While many are quick to defend what are considered the “respectable freedoms” embodied in the Constitution — freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion — few champion the Fifth Amendment’s bar against compelled self-incrimination, popularly known as the “right to remain silent,” as a basis for a suspect’s right to resist police questioning. Although it has been ...


A Rejoinder To Professor Schauer's Commentary, Yale Kamisar Jan 2013

A Rejoinder To Professor Schauer's Commentary, Yale Kamisar

Articles

It is quite a treat to have Professor Frederick Schauer comment on my Miranda article.1 Professor Schauer is a renowned authority on freedom of speech and the author of many thoughtful, probing articles in other areas as well, especially jurisprudence. I am pleased that in large measure, Schauer, too, laments the erosion of Miranda in the last four-and-a-half decades2 and that he, too, was unhappy with the pre-Miranda due process/“totality of circumstances”/“voluntariness” test.3 I also like what Schauer had to say about “prophylactic rules,” a term that has sometimes been used to disparage the Miranda rules ...


Separate But Equal: Miranda's Rights To Silence And Counsel, Steven P. Grossman Oct 2012

Separate But Equal: Miranda's Rights To Silence And Counsel, Steven P. Grossman

All Faculty Scholarship

Three decades ago, the Supreme Court created a dubious distinction between the rights accorded to suspects in custody who invoke their right to silence and who invoke their right to counsel. This distinction significantly disadvantages those who do not have the good sense or good fortune to specify they want an attorney when they invoke their right to remain silent. This article argues that this distinction was flawed at its genesis and that it has led to judicial decisions that are inconsistent, make little sense, and permit police behavior that substantially diminishes the right to silence as described in Miranda ...


The Rise, Decline And Fall(?) Of Miranda, Yale Kamisar Jan 2012

The Rise, Decline And Fall(?) Of Miranda, Yale Kamisar

Articles

There has been a good deal of talk lately to the effect that Miranda1 is dead or dying-or might as well be dead.2 Even liberals have indicated that the death of Miranda might not be a bad thing. This brings to mind a saying by G.K. Chesterton: "Don't ever take a fence down until you know the reason why it was put up."4


How Much Does It Matter Whether Courts Work Within The "Clearly Marked" Provisions Of The Bill Of Rights Or With The "Generalities" Of The Fourteenth Amendment?, Yale Kamisar Jan 2009

How Much Does It Matter Whether Courts Work Within The "Clearly Marked" Provisions Of The Bill Of Rights Or With The "Generalities" Of The Fourteenth Amendment?, Yale Kamisar

Articles

We know that it really mattered to Justice Hugo Black. As he made clear in his famous dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California] Black was convinced that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to apply the complete protection of the Bill of Rights to the states.2 And, as he also made plain in his Adamson dissent, he was equally convinced that working with the "specific" or "explicit" guarantees of the first Eight Amendments would furnish Americans more protection than would applying the generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment.3


On The Fortieth Anniversary Of The Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It--And What Happened To It, Yale Kamisar Jan 2007

On The Fortieth Anniversary Of The Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It--And What Happened To It, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Last year (the year I gave the talk on which this article is based) marked the fortieth anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona,' one of the most praised, most maligned-and probably one of the most misunderstood-Supreme Court cases in American history. It is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate Miranda without looking back at the test for the admissibility of confessions that preceded it.


Dickerson V. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics - And Then Its Supporters, Yale Kamisar Jan 2006

Dickerson V. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics - And Then Its Supporters, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

It is difficult, if not impossible, to discuss Dickerson1 intelligently without discussing Miranda whose constitutional status Dickerson reaffirmed (or, one might say, resuscitated). It is also difficult, if not impossible, to discuss the Dickerson case intelligently without discussing cases the Court has handed down in the five years since Dickerson was decided. The hard truth is that in those five years the reaffirmation of Miranda's constitutional status has become less and less meaningful. In this chapter I focus on the Court's characterization of statements elicited in violation of the Miranda warnings as not actually "coerced" or "compelled" but ...


Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar Jan 2006

Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar

Articles

June marks the 40th anniversary of one of the most praised, most maligned-and probably one of the most misunderstood-U.S. Supreme Court cases in American history, Miranda v. Arizona. The opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren conditions police questioning of people in custody on the giving of warnings about the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the waiver of those rights. 384 U.S. 436. This ruling represents a compromise of sorts between the former elusive, ambiguous and subjective voluntariness/totality-of-the-circumstances test and extreme proposals that would have eliminated police interrogation altogether. But William H. Rehnquist didn ...


Taking Miranda's Pulse, William T. Pizzi, Morris B. Hoffman Jan 2005

Taking Miranda's Pulse, William T. Pizzi, Morris B. Hoffman

Articles

No abstract provided.


Countermajoritarian Hero Or Zero - Rethinking The Warren Court's Role In The Criminal Procedure Revolution, Corinna Barrett Lain Jan 2004

Countermajoritarian Hero Or Zero - Rethinking The Warren Court's Role In The Criminal Procedure Revolution, Corinna Barrett Lain

Law Faculty Publications

With last fall marking the fiftieth anniversary of Earl Warren's appointment as Chief Justice, enough time has passed to place the criminal procedure revolution in proper historical perspective and rethink the Court's role there as countermajoritarian hero. In the discussion that follows, I aim to do that by examining five of the revolution's most celebrated decisions: Mapp v. Ohio, Gideon v. Wainwright, Miranda v. Arizona, Katz v. United States, and Terry v. Ohio. In none of these cases, I argue, did the Supreme Court act in a manner truly deserving of its countermajoritarian image. To be clear ...


Postscript: Another Look At Patane And Seibert, The 2004 Miranda 'Poisoned Fruit' Cases, Yale Kamisar Jan 2004

Postscript: Another Look At Patane And Seibert, The 2004 Miranda 'Poisoned Fruit' Cases, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Some months after I finished writing an article that, inter alia, discussed the lower court opinions in Patane and Seibert (an article that appears elsewhere in this issue of the Journa),1 the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in those cases.2 In Patane, a 5-4 majority held admissible a Glock pistol located as a result of a failure to comply with Miranda. In Seibert, a 5-4 majority agreed with the state court that a "second confession," one obtained after the police had deliberately used a two-stage interrogation technique designed to undermine the Miranda warnings, was inadmissible. 3 In ...


A Look Back On A Half-Century Of Teaching, Writing And Speaking About Criminal Law And Criminal Procedure, Yale Kamisar Jan 2004

A Look Back On A Half-Century Of Teaching, Writing And Speaking About Criminal Law And Criminal Procedure, Yale Kamisar

Articles

When I look back at my academic career, I realize that, as hard as I tried to plan things, various events often overrode my plans.


Justice White And Judicial Review, Philip J. Weiser Jan 2003

Justice White And Judicial Review, Philip J. Weiser

Articles

No abstract provided.


Miranda's Demise, Steven D. Clymer Jan 2003

Miranda's Demise, Steven D. Clymer

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Miranda v. Arizona has been a prominent fixture of the American criminal justice system, as well as police television shows and movies, for more than a third of a century. And when, amid considerable fanfare, the Supreme Court in June 2000 announced its decision in Dickerson v. United States, it appeared that Miranda would retain that status for the foreseeable future. In Dickerson, a surprisingly large 7–2 majority settled a long-standing debate about the constitutional legitimacy of Miranda, holding that the Miranda rules are firmly grounded in the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.

But now, a mere three years ...


Are Police Free To Disregard Miranda?, Steven D. Clymer Dec 2002

Are Police Free To Disregard Miranda?, Steven D. Clymer

Cornell Law Faculty Publications



Miranda And Some Puzzles Of 'Prophylactic' Rules, Evan H. Caminker Jan 2001

Miranda And Some Puzzles Of 'Prophylactic' Rules, Evan H. Caminker

Articles

Constitutional law scholars have long observed that many doctrinal rules established by courts to protect constitutional rights seem to "overprotect" those rights, in the sense that they give greater protection to individuals than those rights, as abstractly understood, seem to require.' Such doctrinal rules are typically called "prophylactic" rules.2 Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, example of such a rule is Miranda v. Arizona,' in which the Supreme Court implemented the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination4 with a detailed set of directions for law enforcement officers conducting custodial interrogations, colloquially called the Miranda warnings. 5


From Miranda To §3501 To Dickerson To...(Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Of Confession Law), Yale Kamisar Jan 2001

From Miranda To §3501 To Dickerson To...(Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future Of Confession Law), Yale Kamisar

Articles

Once the Court granted [certiorari in Dickerson] court-watchers knew the hour had come. At long last the Court would have to either repudiate Miranda, repudiate the prophylactic-rule cases [the cases viewing Miranda's requirements as not rights protected by the Constitution, but merely "prophylactic rules"] or offer some ingenious reconciliation of the two lines of precedent. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, doesn't "have to" do anything, as the decision in Dickerson once again reminds us.


Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look At The Majority And Dissenting Opinions In Dickerson, Yale Kamisar Jan 2001

Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look At The Majority And Dissenting Opinions In Dickerson, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Over the years, Miranda v. Arizona1 has been criticized both for going too far2 and for not going far enough.3 Nevertheless, on the basis of talks with many criminal procedure professors in the sixteen months between the time a panel of the Fourth Circuit upheld a statute (18 U.S.C. § 3501) purporting to "overrule" Miranda and a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court overturned that ruling in the case of Dickerson v. United States,4 I am convinced that most criminal procedure professors wanted the Supreme Court to do what it did-"reaffirm" Miranda. This is not surprising ...


"Can (Did) Congress 'Overrule' Miranda?, Yale Kamisar Jan 2000

"Can (Did) Congress 'Overrule' Miranda?, Yale Kamisar

Articles

I think the great majority of judges, lawyers, and law professors would have concurred in Judge Friendly's remarks when he made them thirty-three years ago. To put it another way, I believe few would have had much confidence in the constitutionality of an anti-Miranda provision, usually known as § 3501 because of its designation under Title 18 of the United States Code, a provision of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Crime Act or the Crime Bill), when that legislation was signed by the president on June 19 ...


Congress' Arrogance, Yale Kamisar Jan 2000

Congress' Arrogance, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Does Dickerson v. U.S., reaffirming Miranda and striking down §3501 (the federal statute purporting to "overrule" Miranda), demonstrate judicial arrogance? Or does the legislative history of §3501 demonstrate the arrogance of Congress? Shortly after Dickerson v. U.S. reaffirmed Miranda and invalidated §3501, a number of Supreme Court watchers criticized the Court for its "judicial arrogance" in peremptorily rejecting Congress' test for the admissibility of confessions. The test, pointed out the critics, had been adopted by extensive hearings and debate about Miranda's adverse impact on law enforcement. The Dickerson Court did not discuss the legislative history of §3501 ...


Joe Grano: The 'Kid From South Philly' Who Educated Us All (In Tribute To Joseph D. Grano), Yale Kamisar Jan 2000

Joe Grano: The 'Kid From South Philly' Who Educated Us All (In Tribute To Joseph D. Grano), Yale Kamisar

Articles

No serious student of police interrogation and confessions can write on the subject without building on Professor Joseph D. Grano's work or explaining why he or she disagrees with him (and doing so with considerable care). Nor is that all.


Confessions, Search And Seizure And The Rehnquist Court, Yale Kamisar Jan 1999

Confessions, Search And Seizure And The Rehnquist Court, Yale Kamisar

Articles

About the time William Rehnquist ascended to the Chief Justiceship of the United States, two events occurred that increased the likelihood that Miranda would enjoy a long life. In Moran v. Burbine,' a 6-3 majority held that a confession preceded by an otherwise valid waiver of a suspect's Miranda rights should not be excluded either (a) because the police misled an inquiring attorney when they told her they were not going to question the suspect she called about or (b) because the police failed to inform the suspect of the attorney's efforts to reach him.


The Three Threats To Miranda, Yale Kamisar Jan 1999

The Three Threats To Miranda, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) was the centerpiece of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure. Moreover, as Professor Stephen Schulhofer of the University of Chicago Law School has recently noted, a numbir of the Miranda safeguards "have now become entrenched in the interrogation procedures of many countries around the world." But Miranda is in serious trouble at home.


On The 'Fruits' Of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, And Compelled Testimony, Yale Kamisar Mar 1995

On The 'Fruits' Of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, And Compelled Testimony, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Professor Akhil Reed Amar and Ms. Renee B. Lettow have written a lively, provocative article that will keep many of us who teach constitutional-criminal procedure busy for years to come. They present a reconception of the "first principles" of the Fifth Amendment, and they suggest a dramatic reconstruction of criminal procedure. As a part of that reconstruction, they propose, inter alia, that at a pretrial hearing presided over by a judicial officer, the government should be empowered to compel a suspect, under penalty of contempt, to provide links in the chain of evidence needed to convict him.


The Warren Court And Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, Yale Kamisar Jan 1995

The Warren Court And Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Many commentators have observed that when we speak of "the Warren Court," we mean the Warren Court that lasted from 1962 (when Arthur Goldberg replaced Felix Frankfurter) to 1969 (when Earl Warren retired). But when we speak of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure we mean the Warren Court that lasted from 1961 (when the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio was decided) to 1966 or 1967. In its final years, the Warren Court was not the same Court that had handed down Mapp or Miranda v. Arizona.


Remembering The 'Old World' Of Criminal Procedure: A Reply To Professor Grano, Yale Kamisar Jan 1990

Remembering The 'Old World' Of Criminal Procedure: A Reply To Professor Grano, Yale Kamisar

Articles

When I graduated from high school in 1961, the "old world" of criminal procedure still existed, albeit in its waning days; when I graduated from law school in 1968, circa the time most of today's first-year law students were arriving on the scene, the "new world" had fully dislodged the old. Indeed, the force of the new world's revolutionary impetus already had crested. Some of the change that the criminal procedure revolution effected was for the better, but much of it, at least as some of us see it, was decidedly for the worse. My students, however, cannot ...