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Full-Text Articles in Law

Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant's Right To Control The Case, Erica J. Hashimoto Jun 2010

Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant's Right To Control The Case, Erica J. Hashimoto

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In Faretta v. California, the Supreme Court exalted the value of autonomy – the criminal defendant’s interest in presenting and controlling the defense. Over the course of the past thirty-five years, however, the Court’s enthusiasm has dissipated, and commentators have criticized courts that have given defendants any measure of control over their cases. As a result, lower courts increasingly have shifted control from defendants to their lawyers. In light of that retrenchment, this Article reevaluates the autonomy interest on its merits. This reexamination confirms that Faretta got it right, and the Supreme Court should revitalize the constitutional interest of criminal …


Suspicion And The Protection Of Fourth Amendment Values, Fabio Arcila Jr. Jan 2010

Suspicion And The Protection Of Fourth Amendment Values, Fabio Arcila Jr.

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Suspicion is perhaps the core foundational principle through which we seek to protect and vindicate Fourth Amendment values. Fourth Amendment law could not be clearer, and repeats over and over again, that it proceeds from a presumptive suspicion requirement. We are all so familiar with that proposition that we can easily incant it: a governmental search is presumptively unconstitutional unless supported by some threshold of prior suspicion. Though suspicion is thus a hallmark of Fourth Amendment black letter law, I come to critique it. I critique it because the presumptive suspicion requirement's provenance is historically questionable, both as a matter …


The Death Of Suspicion, Fabio Arcila Jr. Jan 2010

The Death Of Suspicion, Fabio Arcila Jr.

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This article argues that neither the presumptive warrant requirement nor the presumptive suspicion requirement are correct. Though representative of the common law, they do not reflect the totality of our historic experience, which includes civil search practices. More importantly, modern developments - such as urban life and technological advancements, the rise of the regulatory state, and security concerns post-9/11 - have sufficiently changed circumstances so that these rules are not just unworkable now, they are demonstrably wrong. Worst of all, adhering to them has prevented us from formulating a more coherent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. A new paradigm confronts us, in …