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Full-Text Articles in Law

Good Faith In Revlon-Land, Christopher M. Bruner Jan 2011

Good Faith In Revlon-Land, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

The Delaware Supreme Court has set a very high hurdle for plaintiffs challenging directors' good faith in the sale of a company. In Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan, the court held that unconflicted directors could be found to have breached the good faith component of their duty of loyalty in the transactional context only if they "knowingly and completely failed to undertake," and "utterly failed to attempt" to discharge their duties.

In this essay I argue that the Lyondell standard effectively imports into the transactional context the exacting standard previously applied in the oversight context — a move clearly aimed …


Normative Justifications For Lax (Or No) Corporate Fiduciary Duties: A Tale Of Problematic Principles, Imagined Facts And Inefficient Outcomes, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr. Jan 2011

Normative Justifications For Lax (Or No) Corporate Fiduciary Duties: A Tale Of Problematic Principles, Imagined Facts And Inefficient Outcomes, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Corporate fiduciary duty standards are at an all-time low in this country. Ironically, the deterioration in standards has come to full maturity during the last two decades, a period of significant and notorious corporate managerial failures.

The deterioration in the standards by which we measure the appropriateness of the actions of corporate managers has been fueled by influential judges' and scholars' ("Advocates"'), who vigorously-and seemingly quite effectively-argue in favor of a lax fiduciary duty regime for corporate managers.

Normative justifications for lax corporate fiduciary duty standards, however, are weak. The justifications fail to provide a persuasive reason to abandon the …


Donahue's Fils Aîné: Reflections On Wilkes And The Legitimate Rights Of Selfish Ownership, Daniel S. Kleinberger Jan 2011

Donahue's Fils Aîné: Reflections On Wilkes And The Legitimate Rights Of Selfish Ownership, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This Article asserts that Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. should be at least as memorable as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., and is, in a practical sense, substantially more important. The assertion rests on two propositions: first, that Donahue announces admirable sentiments but provides little practical guidance; second, that Wilkes provides the best practical rule for adjudicating “oppression” claims when the alleged victim is also a miscreant or for some other reason the dispute is grey rather than black and white. In particular, this Article asserts that Wilkes’s multistep, burden-shifting rule is a nuanced and effective method for accommodating …


Fiduciary Duty And The Public Interest, Cheryl L. Wade Jan 2011

Fiduciary Duty And The Public Interest, Cheryl L. Wade

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

Professor Tamar Frankel’s excellent book, Fiduciary Law, is a thorough and comprehensive look at the fiduciary-law forest. My contribution to the Symposium on The Role of Fiduciary Law and Trust in the Twenty-First Century is one leaf on one branch of one tree in the forest that Professor Frankel so expertly navigates. In this Essay, I explore the fiduciary relationship between corporate directors and officers and the shareholders they serve. I examine how the breach of fiduciary duties owed to shareholders has the power to dramatically impact non-shareholder groups.

Professor Frankel accurately observes that “[f]iduciary duties are anchored …


Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, And Duties Of Entrustment, Donna M. Nagy Jan 2011

Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, And Duties Of Entrustment, Donna M. Nagy

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This article refutes what has become the conventional wisdom that insider trading by members of Congress and legislative staffers is “totally legal” because such congressional officials are immune from federal insider trading law. It argues that this well-worn claim is rooted in twin misconceptions based on: (1) a lack of regard for the broad and sweeping duties of entrustment which attach to public office and (2) an unduly restrictive view of Supreme Court precedents, which have interpreted Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act to impose liability whenever a person trades securities on the basis of material nonpublic information in …