Law Commons^™

How A “Superstar” Ceo Exposes The Necessity For Third Party D&O Insurance, Angela N. Aneiros, Karen Woody

Scholarly Articles

he influence that “superstar” CEOs have over a company’s board of directors can be alarming. Among other things, Elon’s ability to skirt personal liability for seemingly obvious breaches of duty has raised concerns within the realm of corporate governance and corporate regulation. While much has been written on Elon’s influence on Tesla’s board of directors, one area of the law that often gets overlooked that has exacerbated Elon’s corporate governance issues, is that of directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance. While personally insuring board members seems like a very "Elon" move, it could have broader implications beyond Elon. Are “superstar” …

International Law In The Boardroom, Kishanthi Parella

Scholarly Articles

Conventional wisdom expects that international law will proceed through a “state pathway” before regulating corporations: it binds national governments that then bind corporations. But recent corporate practices confound this story. American corporations complied with international laws even when the state pathway broke down. This unexpected compliance leads to three questions: How did corporations comply? Why did they do so? Who enforced international law? These questions are important for two reasons. First, many international laws depend on corporate cooperation in order to succeed. Second, the state pathway is not robust, then or now. It is therefore vital to identify alternatives to …

Voting Rights In Corporate Governance: History And Political Economy, Sarah C. Haan

Scholarly Articles

Political voting rights have become the subject of sharp legal wrangling in American political elections and the focus of headlines and popular debate. Less attention has focused on American corporate elections, where something similar has been happening: the last two decades have witnessed significant unsettling of basic shareholder voting rights, including laws and practices that were mostly stable throughout the twentieth century. Today, shareholder voting rights are in flux and, increasingly, in controversy. This Article connects the current moment of instability to the last significant era of change in shareholder voting rights—the nineteenth century—and brings historical context to a new …

Why Corporate Purpose Will Always Matter, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

Business persons and lawyers (and law professors) perennially struggle over the question whether a business corporation does or should have a purpose other than advancing the interests of shareholders. After briefly setting the stage by describing the dispute over what the positive law of corporate purpose really is and the normative argument over what corporate purpose should be, this short article takes a different turn. It addresses why, in a dynamic, democratic, pluralist society, the foundational issue of corporate purpose remains so important and will not (and should not) go away. However adamantly divergent descriptive and prescriptive positions are held, …

Board Governance For The Twenty-First Century, Faith Stevelman, Sarah C. Haan

Scholarly Articles

A decade after the global financial crisis, corporate governance is in a state of flux. A conceptual shift is underway. Years ago, in "first wave" governance, boards had a cozy relationship with the company C-suite. In "second wave" governance, which took hold in the 1970s, legal academics reimagined the board's role, conceptualizing directors as monitors charged with limiting waste and abuse that can arise in agency relationships. Now, we find ourselves at the threshold of "third wave" governance, in which boards are asked to grapple immediately and candidly with both the financial aspects of business and new environmental, social, and …

Comment On The Proposed Definition Of “Eligible Organization” For Purposes Of Coverage Of Certain Preventative Services Under The Affordable Care Act, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Ronald J. Colombo, Brett Mcdonnell, Alan J. Meese, Nathan B. Oman

Scholarly Articles

In late August 2014, after suffering a defeat in the Supreme Court Hobby Lobby decision when the Court held that business corporations are “persons” that can “exercise religion,” the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) proposed new rules defining “eligible organizations.” Purportedly designed to accommodate the Hobby Lobby ruling, the proposed rules do not comport with the reasoning of that important decision and they unjustifiably seek to permit only a small group of business corporations to be exempt from providing contraceptive coverage on religious grounds. This comment letter to the HHS about its proposed rules makes several theoretical and …

Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A 'Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Articles

While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?

In …

Law And Legal Theory In The History Of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

This paper, part of a larger scholarly project, addresses one of four areas – i.e., the emergence of corporate personhood – where, historically, law has both influenced and mirrored cultural expectations concerning corporate responsibility. The other areas (treated elsewhere) are corporate purpose, corporate regulation, and corporate governance. Corporate personhood is a subject of longstanding and recurring interest that, notwithstanding it has been a settled concept since the 19th century, continues to vex and excite, as seen in the U. S. Supreme Court’s splintered 5-4 decision in the 2010 case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The decades-long debates about …

Enduring Equity In The Close Corporation, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

This Article develops the theme of change/sameness in corporate law. Written to commemorate the thirty-fifth anniversary of Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., the Article argues that the equitable fiduciary duties so central to Wilkes endure today in the close corporation precisely because equity, by its nature, is so exquisitely adaptive – under constantly changing circumstances − to the ongoing pursuit of a just ordering within the corporation. Unlike fixed legal rules – which are categorical, static, and do not take sufficient account of changes wrought by time or human arationality – equity is malleable and timely as it reckons …

Re-Enchanting The Corporation, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

This Essay begins with Max Weber’s observation that the condition of the modern world is “disenchanted” and goes on to argue that contesting the notion of disenchantment offers a promising framework for rethinking baseline issues in corporate law and corporate life more generally. After elaborating what disenchantment meant to Weber, this Essay offers two counter-observations. First, the world may not be better off as a result of disenchantment. Second, as an empirical matter the world may not really be “disenchanted” given the substantial number of people who both hold religious beliefs and consistently report that those beliefs influence how they …

Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, David K. Millon

Scholarly Articles

None available.

Individual And Collective Sovereignty In The Corporate Enterprise (Reviewing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fishel, The Economic Structure Of Corporate Law (1991) And Robert N. Bellah Et Al., The Good Society (1991), Lyman P. Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

Not available.