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Full-Text Articles in Law
Faith And Faithfulness In Corporate Theory, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Faith And Faithfulness In Corporate Theory, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies In "Corporate Law", Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout
Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies In "Corporate Law", Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article has two goals: to praise Professor Robert Clark as a remarkable corporate scholar, and to explore how his work has helped to advance our understanding of corporations and corporate law. Clark wrote his classic treatise at a time when corporate scholarship was dominated by a principal-agent paradigm that viewed shareholders as the principals or sole residual claimants in public corporations and treated directors as shareholders' agents. This view naturally led contemporary scholars to believe that the chief economic problem of interest in corporate law was the "agency cost" problem of getting corporate directors to do what shareholders wanted …
The Fundamental Rights Of The Shareholder, Julian Velasco
The Fundamental Rights Of The Shareholder, Julian Velasco
Journal Articles
Shareholders have many legal rights, but they are not all of equal significance. This article will argue that two rights — the right to elect directors and the right to sell shares — are more important than any others, that these rights should be considered the fundamental rights of the shareholder, and that, as such, they deserve a great deal of respect and protection by law.
The history of corporate law has been one of increasing flexibility for directors and decreasing rights for shareholders. Although the law seems to have coalesced around the norm of shareholder primacy, this is not …
Controlling Shareholders And Corporate Governance: Complicating The Comparative Taxonomy, Ronald J. Gilson
Controlling Shareholders And Corporate Governance: Complicating The Comparative Taxonomy, Ronald J. Gilson
Faculty Scholarship
Corporate governance scholarship has shifted focus in recent years from hostile takeovers, which occur primarily in the widely held shareholder systems of the United States and the United Kingdom, to the comparative merits of the "controlling shareholder" systems that are the norm most everywhere else in the world. In this emerging debate, the simple dichotomy between controlling shareholder systems and widely held shareholder systems that has largely dominated the discourse is too coarse to allow a deeper understanding of the diversity of ownership structures in different national capital markets and their policy implications. In this Article, Professor Ronald Gilson seeks …