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Full-Text Articles in Law

Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott Jan 2017

Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

Although officers are crucial to corporate operations, scholarly and theoretical accounts tend to slight officers and amalgamate them with directors into a single category, "managers." This essay anchors officers within the common law of agency-as does black-letter law-which crisply differentiates officers from directors. Understanding that agency is central of the legal account of officers' positions and responsibilities is crucial to seeing why, like directors, officers are fiduciaries, but distinctively so, not as instances of generic "corporate fiduciaries." Officers, like directors, owe duties of loyalty, but also particularized duties of care, competence, and diligence. Additionally, officers' duties of performance encompass two ...


Reflections On Teaching Business Associations: The Case For Teaching More Agency And Unincorporated Business Entity Law, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 2015

Reflections On Teaching Business Associations: The Case For Teaching More Agency And Unincorporated Business Entity Law, Mark J. Loewenstein

Articles

This paper argues for increased coverage of the law of agency and alternative entities in business associations courses.


Imputation, The Adverse Interest Exception, And The Curious Case Of The Restatement (Third) Of Agency, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 2013

Imputation, The Adverse Interest Exception, And The Curious Case Of The Restatement (Third) Of Agency, Mark J. Loewenstein

Articles

The imputation doctrine in the common law of agency provides that knowledge of an agent acquired in the course of the agency relationship is imputed to the principal. An important exception to the imputation doctrine, known as the adverse interest exception, provides that knowledge is not imputed if it is acquired by the agent in a course of conduct that is entirely adverse to the principal. These doctrines play an important role in sorting out liability when senior management of a corporation engages in a financial fraud that harms the company. Typically, new management is brought in and it sues ...


Agency And Partnership Law [2010], Pearlie Koh, Stephen Bull Jan 2011

Agency And Partnership Law [2010], Pearlie Koh, Stephen Bull

Research Collection School Of Law

No abstract provided.


Corporate Ethics, Agency, And The Theory Of The Firm, Robert J. Rhee Jan 2008

Corporate Ethics, Agency, And The Theory Of The Firm, Robert J. Rhee

Faculty Scholarship

This conference paper suggests that the problem of corporate ethics cannot be reduced to the autonomous person. Although the greatest influence on action and choice is one's moral constitution, it does not follow that the agent's behavior is the same within or without the firm. Ethics is a function of corporate form. The theory of agency cannot dismiss the firm as a fiction or metaphorical shorthand since that which does not exist should not be able to cause ethical breakdowns in corporate action. Thus, the theory of the firm, which emphasizes profit and wealth maximization, should incorporate a ...


Corporate Ethics, Agency, And The Theory Of The Firm, Robert J. Rhee Jan 2008

Corporate Ethics, Agency, And The Theory Of The Firm, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

This conference paper suggests that the problem of corporate ethics cannot be reduced to the autonomous person. Although the greatest influence on action and choice is one's moral constitution, it does not follow that the agent's behavior is the same within or without the firm. Ethics is a function of corporate form. The theory of agency cannot dismiss the firm as a fiction or metaphorical shorthand since that which does not exist should not be able to cause ethical breakdowns in corporate action. Thus, the theory of the firm, which emphasizes profit and wealth maximization, should incorporate a ...


A Bridle, A Prod And A Big Stick: An Evaluation Of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals And The Ultra Vires Doctrine As Methods For Controlling Corporate Behavior, Adam Sulkowski, Kent Greenfield Jun 2005

A Bridle, A Prod And A Big Stick: An Evaluation Of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals And The Ultra Vires Doctrine As Methods For Controlling Corporate Behavior, Adam Sulkowski, Kent Greenfield

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

Written for the recent conference at St. John’s University Law School on “People of Color, Women, and the Public Corporation,” this paper evaluates recently applied methods of influencing corporate behavior on employment practices and recommends that a dormant legal doctrine be revitalized and added to the “tool box” of activists and concerned shareholders. The methods of influencing corporate behavior that are evaluated include class action lawsuits and shareholder proposals to amend corporate policy. In both contexts, there are procedural hurdles to achieving success. Even when success is achieved, there are limits to the actual changes in organizational behavior that ...


Facilitating Auditing’S New Early Warning System: Control Disclosure, Auditor Liability And Safe Harbors, Lawrence A. Cunningham Apr 2004

Facilitating Auditing’S New Early Warning System: Control Disclosure, Auditor Liability And Safe Harbors, Lawrence A. Cunningham

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

This Article considers the interplay between new auditing standards governing audits of internal control over financial reporting and pre-existing legal standards governing auditor liability for audit failure. The interplay produces skewed liability incentives that, if unadjusted, threaten to impair the objective of this new control-audit regime. The regime’s objective is, in part, to provide an early warning to financial statement users when current financial statements are reliable but control weaknesses indicate material risk of a company’s future inability to produce reliable financial statements. To be meaningful, auditor disclosure of material weaknesses and potential effects is necessary. While liability ...


A New Product For The State Corporation Law Market: Audit Committee Certifications, Lawrence A. Cunningham Mar 2004

A New Product For The State Corporation Law Market: Audit Committee Certifications, Lawrence A. Cunningham

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

Audit committees of corporate boards of directors are central to corporate governance for many corporations. Their effectiveness in supervising financial managers and overseeing the financial reporting process is important to promote reliable financial statements. This centrality suggests that it is likewise important for investors and others to have a basis for justifiable confidence in audit committee effectiveness. At present, there is no such mechanism. This Article explains why, considers a way states can provide it and assesses as low the likelihood that states will do so. In the swirling corporate governance reforms led by SOX, the SEC, SROs and PCAOB ...


An Experimental Test Of Fairness Under Agency And Profit Constraints (With Notes On Implications For Corporate Governance), Kent Greenfield, Peter Kostant Mar 2003

An Experimental Test Of Fairness Under Agency And Profit Constraints (With Notes On Implications For Corporate Governance), Kent Greenfield, Peter Kostant

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

Building on the scholarship using ultimatum game experiments to explore the presence of fairness norms in bargaining exchanges, the authors test whether such norms are affected by agency relationships alone or agency relationships linked with a duty to maximize returns to the principal. The findings are dramatic. The study, the first of its kind, indicates a significant decrease in a concern for fairness (defined as a willingness to share a pot of money) when a participant in a bargaining transaction acts as an agent for another and owes a duty to maximize the return to the principal. We find no ...


Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities And The Agency Problem, Jayne W. Barnard Jan 1997

Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities And The Agency Problem, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Freedom Of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, And Partnerships: The Bargain Principle And The Law Of Agency, J. Dennis Hynes Jan 1997

Freedom Of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, And Partnerships: The Bargain Principle And The Law Of Agency, J. Dennis Hynes

Articles

No abstract provided.


Cooperative Implementation Of Federal Regulations, Douglas C. Michael Jul 1996

Cooperative Implementation Of Federal Regulations, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Professor Michael examines regulatory programs in which the federal government leaves many compliance decisions up to the regulated entities themselves. Drawing on prior research and theory in the area, he concludes that such "cooperative implementation" is feasible if three principles are observed: (1) regulatory standards are written to leave discretion in methods of compliance and that discretion is within the competence of the regulated entities; (2) there are economic incentives to offset the additional costs to these entities; and (3) the entities self-report their own compliance, the agency closely monitors the program, and the agency maintains a residual program of ...


Emerging Markets In The Age Of Mechanical Reproduction, Manuel A. Utset Oct 1995

Emerging Markets In The Age Of Mechanical Reproduction, Manuel A. Utset

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


Removal Of The Corporate Director During His Term Of Office, Arthur H. Travers, Jr. Jan 1967

Removal Of The Corporate Director During His Term Of Office, Arthur H. Travers, Jr.

Articles

The traditional rules governing the removal of corporate directors have evolved so as to insulate the board of directors from the shareholders who elect them. Professor Travers in his article examines initially the interests being advanced by protecting the board members from removal by their electorate. He then critically analyzes the law as it relates to these interests in order to suggest a more rational approach.


Book Review. Cases On Business Organization By R. Magill And R. P. Hamilton, Robert C. Brown Jan 1935

Book Review. Cases On Business Organization By R. Magill And R. P. Hamilton, Robert C. Brown

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.