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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Acqui-Hiring, Gregg D. Polsky, John F. Coyle
Acqui-Hiring, Gregg D. Polsky, John F. Coyle
Scholarly Works
Facebook, Google, and other leading technology companies in Silicon Valley have been buying start-up companies at a brisk pace. In many of these transactions, the buyer has little interest in acquiring the startup’s projects or assets. Instead, the buyer’s primary motivation is to hire some or all of the startup’s software engineers. These so-called “acqui-hires” represent a novel — and increasingly common — tool by which the largest and most successful technology companies in the world satisfy their intense demand for engineering talent.
To date, the acqui-hire has attracted no attention in the academic or professional legal literature. With this …
A Conflict Primacy Model Of The Public Board, Usha Rodrigues
A Conflict Primacy Model Of The Public Board, Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
e board of directors is the theoretical fulcrum of the corporate form: Statutes task the board with managing the corporation. Yet in the twentieth century, CEOs and other executives came to dominate the real-world control of the corporation. In light of this transformation, in the 1970s Melvin E. Eisenberg proposed reconceiving the board as an independent monitor. Eisenberg’s monitoring board is now the dominant regulatory model of the board. Recently two different visions of the board of directors have emerged. Stephen Bainbridge’s “director primacy” model calls directors “Platonic guardians,” and Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s “team production model” characterizes them …
Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, Usha Rodrigues
Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
Securities law’s dirty little secret is that rich investors have access to special kinds of investments—hedge funds, private equity, private companies—that everyone else does not. This disparity stems from the fact that, from its inception, federal securities law has jealously guarded the manner in which firms can sell shares to the general public. Perhaps paternalistically, the law assumes that the average investor needs the protection of the full panoply of securities regulation and thus should be limited to buying public securities. In contrast, accredited—i.e., wealthy— investors, who it is presumed can fend for themselves, have the luxury of choosing between …
Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A "Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner
Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A "Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner
Scholarly Works
While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?
In …
Can Executive Compensation Reform Cure Short-Termism?, Gregg Polsky, Andrew C. Lund
Can Executive Compensation Reform Cure Short-Termism?, Gregg Polsky, Andrew C. Lund
Scholarly Works
There is an increasingly pervasive view among corporate governance observers that senior managers are too focused on short-term results at the expense of long-term interests. Concerns about “short-termism” have been expressed within the financial industry context and outside of it, but because of the recent financial crisis, much of the discussion has been directed at financial institutions. To combat short-termism, several commentators have advocated executive compensation reform to encourage senior managers to adopt a longer-term perspective. Yet these reforms will likely prove ineffective because of other significant pressures on managers to maintain current stock prices.