Law Commons^™

The Dialectical Regulation Of Rule 14a-8: Intersystemic Governance In Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act - first adopted more than sixty years ago to increase shareholder participation in corporate governance - has been the subject of a flurry of litigation, scholarly analysis, and SEC rulemaking. Most recently, following several years of debate, the SEC issued a significant clarification of the rule, reversing the Second Circuit's hotly contested interpretation of it in AFSCME v. AIG. For the most part, the debates surrounding Rule 14a-8 - including in the latter case - have focused on the scope of the rule's exceptions. This paper, selected for reprinting in …

Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this traditional view, …

Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework In France, Germany, And Italy , Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca Enriques, Martin Gelter

Faculty Scholarship

All jurisdictions supply corporations with legal tools to prevent or punish asset diversion by those, whether managers or dominant shareholders, who are in control. As previous research has shown, these rules, doctrines and remedies are far from uniform across jurisdictions, possibly leading to significant differences in the degree of investor protection they provide. Comparative research in this field is wrought with difficulty. It is tempting to compare corporate laws by taking one benchmark jurisdiction, typically the US, and to assess the quality of other corporate law systems depending on how much they replicate some prominent features. We take a different …

Leo Strine's Third Way: Responding To Agency Capitalism, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

Ten years ago, Tony Blair's "New Labour" government sought an agenda that replaced ideology with a pragmatic focus on both the creation of wealth and its distribution. Not surprisingly, part of this effort involved proposals to bridge the gap between capital and labor through refraining corporate governance. A "third way" as it was then styled, would walk a fine line between privileging markets and allocational efficiency at the cost of social justice on the one hand, and accepting less for everyone as long as the distribution was fair on the other. Motivated by changes in how we save for retirement …