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Series

Business Organizations Law

2005

Case Western Reserve University School of Law

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

The George A. Leet Business Law Symposium: Corporate Governance: Directors Vs. Shareholders? - Introduction, George W. Dent Jan 2005

The George A. Leet Business Law Symposium: Corporate Governance: Directors Vs. Shareholders? - Introduction, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

Introducation to The George A. Leet Business Law Symposium: Corporate Governance: Directors vs. Shareholders?, Cleveland, Ohio.

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The Descendants Of Fassihi: A Comparative Analysis Of Recent Cases Addressing The Fiduciary Claims Of Disgruntled Constituents Against Attorneys Representing Closely-Held Entities, Matthew Rossman Jan 2005

The Descendants Of Fassihi: A Comparative Analysis Of Recent Cases Addressing The Fiduciary Claims Of Disgruntled Constituents Against Attorneys Representing Closely-Held Entities, Matthew Rossman

Faculty Publications

Accordingly, this Article will examine three recent cases closely and then make observations about what these "descendants of Fassihi" say about the state of the law and how they should impact attorney behavior. To provide proper context for this discussion, a short summary of Fassihi and other contemporary responses to the issues raised in Fassihi follows.

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Comment: The Case For Real Shareholder Democracy, George W. Dent Jan 2005

Comment: The Case For Real Shareholder Democracy, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

Comment on presentations at The Georege A. Leet Business Law Symposium: Corporate Governance: Directors v. Shapreholders, Cleveland, Ohio, 2005.

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Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix In Sight, George W. Dent Jan 2005

Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix In Sight, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

Dissatisfaction with the governance of public companies is as old as the public company itself, but public concern about corporate governance is spasmodic. Prior reforms did not cure the ills of corporate governance, and there is little reason to think that the recent spate of reforms will be any more effective. The fundamental problem of corporate governance remains what it has always been: the separation of ownership and control. No reform can succeed unless it overcomes this contradiction. Corporate executives determined to preserve their privileges and a number of scholars deny this claim; in effect, these Panglosses consider the status …

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