Law Commons^™

Employee Benefits Up-Date: Coping With Chaos, Mark S. Dray

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Alternatives To Buy-Sell Agreements And Business Succession Planning, Myron E. Sildon

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Intangible Asset Depreciation: Newark And Section 197, Kenneth W. Gideon

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Buy-Sell Agreements For The Family Owned Business: Practical Considerations And Planning Opportunities, Morton A. Harris

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Recent Developments Affecting Real Estate And Partnerships, Stefan F. Tucker

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.

Individual And Collective Sovereignty In The Corporate Enterprise (Reviewing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fishel, The Economic Structure Of Corporate Law (1991) And Robert N. Bellah Et Al., The Good Society (1991), Lyman P. Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

Not available.

Untenable Status Of Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under The Securities Exchange Act, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

United States securities markets operate under a system of supervised self-regulation created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). That system includes substantive regulation of the traders and the issuers of securities traded in those markets through the use of listing standards.

These listing standards have a unique status. They are part of a self-regulatory system, but are not classic self-regulation. The markets do not govern the traders of which it consists; rather, it governs outsiders—the issuers. The markets and the Securities and Exchange Commissions have sought to control issuers in ways not clearly related to trading in …

The Corporate Officer's Independent Duty As A Tonic For The Anemic Law Of Executive Compensation, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

History repeats itself in the law as in other arenas. In the law of executive compensation, such a repetition may be imminent. Ever since the advent of the large industrial corporation in the United States, there has been periodic outrage at payments made to its top executives. This repetition suggests that the law has failed to keep pace with the observed problems. Part I of this Article describes the current and historic uproar over executive compensation in large corporations in the United States. Part II provides the economic background of the process of negotiating executive compensation. Part III analyzes the …

An Improved Choice: The Virginia Limited Liability Company, James J. Wheaton

Faculty Publications

When the General Assembly adopted the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act (the "Act")' in 1991, Virginia joined just four other states in recognizing the potential of a relatively obscure business entity, the limited liability company ("LLC"). The LLC concept has spread rapidly since the adoption of the Virginia Act early last year. Three other states enacted LLC legislation in 1991, and in just the first few months of 1992, six more states followed the trend.

[...]

Although the number of LLCs formed in Virginia since the Virginia Act took effect last July displays the willingness of Virginia attorneys to recommend …

Countervailing Power—Different Rules For Different Markets? Conduct And Context In Antitrust Law And Economics, Barbara Ann White

All Faculty Scholarship

The focus of modern applications of economic reasoning to antitrust concerns has been on the more subtle efficiency or procompetitive dimensions of the scrutinized conduct. When any of these characteristics are discovered, the courts tend to find no antitrust violation.

Two major difficulties arise with this approach. First, efficiency or procompetitive aspects can almost always be uncovered in any corporate enterprise, creating the potential for legitimizing almost all business behavior. Second, the legal conclusions courts reach are typically couched in terms of the business practice itself; therefore, once upheld, that practice is implicitly validated for other unrelated marketplace scenarios. Indiscriminate …

Corporate Law Through An Antitrust Lens, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Coordinating Sanctions For Corporate Misconduct: Civil Or Criminal Punishment, David Yellen, Carl J. Mayer

Articles

No abstract provided.

Corporate Law After The Eighties: Reflections On The Relationship Between Management, Shareholders, And Stakeholders, Peter J. Henning

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

Reinsurance: Bad Faith Considerations And Insolvency Dilemma, Hui-Ju Hsieh

LLM Theses and Essays

Reinsurance is insurance that an insurance company purchases from another insurance company. The original insurance company is called the reinsured, and the insurance company that is contracted is called the reinsurer. The main purpose of reinsurance is to disperse or spread the risk of loss. The reinsurance relationship is frequently characterized as an exercise of fiduciary responsibility based upon an undertaking of utmost good faith between contracting parties. However, disputes arise; most litigation involving reinsurance has been between reinsurers and persons not party to the reinsurance agreement. This paper’s first major area of discussion is the relationship between the reinsurer …

Union Raids, Union Democracy, And The Market For Union Control, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In this article, Professor Schwab compares the union member-leader relationship to the corporate shareholder-manager relationship and examines what can be learned from the voluminous literature regarding corporate control about problems of internal union democracy. Specifically, he questions whether a viable market for union control does or could exist that might induce leaders to act in the interests of their members. He analyzes the structural weaknesses in the market for union control and the legal factors inhibiting a union takeover market. Schwab concludes that a weak market does exist, despite the nonprofit nature of unions that limits the ability of leaders …

"Reasonable Expectations" Define Board Power To Liquidate A Solvent Close Corporation In Bankruptcy, Shelby D. Green

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Article will argue that, in the absence of contrary provisions in the articles of incorporation, the power of the board of directors of a solvent close corporation to file a voluntary petition for liquidation in bankruptcy must be determined by the theory of “reasonable expectations.” This doctrine not only addresses wrongdoing by those in control, but also defines the power and rights of close corporation participants. Part II briefly considers the uses of bankruptcy in recent years and comments on the peculiar occasion of a solvent corporation deciding to liquidate in bankruptcy. Part III summarizes the facts and identifies …

Filling Gaps In The Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, Charles R.T. O'Kelley

Scholarly Works

This Article develops a more refined transaction-cost based theory which explains: why rational investors in jointly owned, closely held firms initially choose corporate form; why they leave the contractual gaps that they do; and how efficiency-minded judges should respond to postharmony disputes made possible by the form chosen and the gaps left. My theory takes into account not only the possibility that investors should have chosen partnership law, but also the advantages and disadvantages of organizing production as an implicit team, via long-term contracts between separate businesses or as a sole proprietorship. In explicating this theory of form choice, the …

When Is A Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit To Serve"?, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

The recently enacted Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 provides that, in an SEC enforcement action, a federal court may enjoin or "disbar" the defendant from serving in the future as an officer or director of a public company. A court may enter such an order if it finds that the defendant is "substantially unfit" to serve as a corporate executive; the Act, however, does not define "substantial unfitness." In this Article Professor Jayne Barnard provides a framework for defining this term and identifying the defendants to which the Remedies Act should apply. Professor Barnard begins …

The Political Ecology Of Takeovers: Thoughts On Harmonizing The European Corporate Governance Environment, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

Economic policy debate in the United States during the 1980s focused on the dynamics of bidder and target tactics in hostile takeovers. Confronted with the largest transactions in business history, financial economists took advantage of developments in econometric techniques to conduct virtually real time studies of the impact on firm value of each new bidder tactic and target defense. For courts and lawyers, hostile takeovers subjected standard features of corporate law to the equivalent of a stress x-ray, revealing previously undetected doctrinal cracks. Congress held seemingly endless hearings on the subject, although managing to enact only relatively innocuous tax penalties …

Government Liability For Economic Losses: The Case Of Regulatory Failure, David S. Cohen

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Compensation claims against provincial and federal governments are largely a product of the second half of the 20th century. The initial surge of cases after the enactment of the federal Crown Liability Act in 1953--mirrored also in developments at the provincial level-- were typically "private" tort claims. Indeed a significant percentage of claims against the federal government continue to be nothing more than automobile accident, occupier liability claims and lawsuits arising out of similar relatively minor bureaucratic error. Recently, however, as a result of both the imagination of litigators and the growth of the regulatory state, claims against governments have …

Corporate Law: What Is The Impact Of New Ali Proposals On Shareholder Litigation, John C. Coffee Jr., Michael P. Dooley

Faculty Scholarship

When the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project meets this month, one of the most hotly debated agenda items is likely to be its new rules governing shareholder litigation, which are now up for final approval.

The proposed change means that corporate boards will now have to prove in court that a decision to dismiss a shareholder claim alleging self-dealing was in the corporation's best interest. In addition, the requirement for a formal "demand" on the board by shareholders will be uniform, rather than subject to excuse, as it is under Delaware law and in the majority of states.

Drafters …

The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: Some Comments On The Latest Draft Of Rupa, J. Dennis Hynes

Publications

No abstract provided.

Responsibility Of Investment Bankers To Shareholders, Ted J. Fiflis

Publications

No abstract provided.

Benign Restraint: The Sec's Regulation Of Execution Systems, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

To the handful of traders who founded the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1792 – and perhaps even to the securities traders of the 1960's – today's securities markets would be virtually unrecognizable. New communications and data processing technologies, the globalization of investment portfolios, and a surge in trading volume have created new needs and possibilities. As a result, revolutionary advances have occurred in the design and performance of execution systems: the technologies (computers, telephones, modems) and formats (auction-based stock exchanges, dealer-based "over-the-counter" markets, computerized single price auctions) that traders use to conduct trades. These advances enable trades on …

The Economic Structure Of The Post-Contractual Corporation, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Preaching To Managers, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Public Values And Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Corporate Takeover Of Teaching Hospitals, Maxwell Gregg Bloche

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article explores the potential and the dangers of this novel form of collaboration between academic medicine and the for-profit world. The author focuses on those arrangements--purchases and leasing agreements--by which investor-owned corporations operate, for a profit, hospitals that serve as major medical teaching and research sites. He begins by reviewing how the evolving needs of academic medical centers and for-profit hospital chains have generated mutual interest in such arrangements. The author then considers some frequently expressed ethical, economic, and other public policy objections to the provision of hospital services by for-profit firms. Opponents of the acquisition and leasing of …

Bargaining And The Division Of Value In Corporate Reorganization, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Taxation Of Business Rent, George Mundstock

Articles

No abstract provided.