Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Series

Business Organizations Law

Scholarly Works

Shareholders

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Dual Class Stock In Comparative Context, Christopher Bruner Jan 2020

Dual Class Stock In Comparative Context, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

Review of the article by Marc T. Moore, Designing Dual Class Sunsets: The Case for a Transfer-Centered Approach, University College London Faculty of Laws Working Paper No. 9/2019, available at SSRN.


Distributed Ledgers, Traceable Shares, And The Division Of Power In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner Jan 2018

Distributed Ledgers, Traceable Shares, And The Division Of Power In Corporate Law, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

Review of Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. __ by George S. Geis (forthcoming 2018)


Corporate Governance In An Age Of Separation Of Ownership From Ownership, Usha Rodrigues Jan 2011

Corporate Governance In An Age Of Separation Of Ownership From Ownership, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

The shareholder empowerment provisions enacted as part of the recent bailout legislation are internally incoherent because they fail to address the short-termist realities of shareholder ownership today. Ownership has separated from ownership in modern corporate America: individual investors now largely hold stock through mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds. The incentives of these short-term financial intermediaries only imperfectly reflect the interests of their long-term holders - an imbalance only exacerbated by the bailout’s corporate governance legislation. The bailout’s focus on shareholder empowerment tactics - such as proxy access, say-on-pay, and increased disclosure - makes little sense if shareholders are …


Let The Money Do The Governing: The Case For Reuniting Ownership And Control, Usha Rodrigues Apr 2004

Let The Money Do The Governing: The Case For Reuniting Ownership And Control, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Part I of the Article outlines the problems with the current method of board selection and functioning. Management or management-sympathetic board members often select the board nominees, who share social ties with other board members. Boards tend to avoid "rocking the boat" by questioning management's recommendations, and because of the way the proxy process is structured, shareholders cannot effectively use their votes to oust unsatisfactory board members.

Part II analyzes the SEC's recent proposals for reform, which center on granting shareholders more opportunities to nominate candidates to the board. These proposals attempt to give shareholders a greater voice in the …


Notes: Director’S Statutory Action In New York, Sidney Kwestel Jan 1961

Notes: Director’S Statutory Action In New York, Sidney Kwestel

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.