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Corporate

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Normative Justifications For Lax (Or No) Corporate Fiduciary Duties: A Tale Of Problematic Principles, Imagined Facts And Inefficient Outcomes, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr. Jan 2011

Normative Justifications For Lax (Or No) Corporate Fiduciary Duties: A Tale Of Problematic Principles, Imagined Facts And Inefficient Outcomes, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Corporate fiduciary duty standards are at an all-time low in this country. Ironically, the deterioration in standards has come to full maturity during the last two decades, a period of significant and notorious corporate managerial failures.

The deterioration in the standards by which we measure the appropriateness of the actions of corporate managers has been fueled by influential judges' and scholars' ("Advocates"'), who vigorously-and seemingly quite effectively-argue in favor of a lax fiduciary duty regime for corporate managers.

Normative justifications for lax corporate fiduciary duty standards, however, are weak. The justifications fail to provide a persuasive reason to abandon the ...


Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost Apr 2007

Managers’ Fiduciary Duties In Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos In Delaware (And Elsewhere), Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders has long occupied courts and commentators interested in corporate governance. Creditors holding fixed claims to the corporation's assets generally prefer corporate decision making that minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for risk, because, as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing the risk of loss with creditors.

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a fiduciary duty on the corporation's managers-its officers and directors-to maximize the value of the shareholders' interests in the firm. In this ...


The Ethical Obligation Of Transactional Lawyer To Act As Gatekeepers, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Eugene R. Gaetke Oct 2003

The Ethical Obligation Of Transactional Lawyer To Act As Gatekeepers, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Eugene R. Gaetke

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Recent examples of managerial misconduct at major corporations have called into question the adequacy of the gatekeeper role provided by transactional lawyers representing corporations. That role is governed by Model Rule 1.13(b), which obligates the lawyer for a corporation to take remedial action if the lawyer knows that corporate managers are engaged in actions that amount to a "violation of a legal obligation" to the corporation or that are unlawful and likely to result in substantial injury to the corporation. In addition, Model Rule 1.2(d) forbids a lawyer from lending assistance to any action by corporate ...


A Positive Analysis Of The Common Law Of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr. Jan 1996

A Positive Analysis Of The Common Law Of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The purpose of this Article is to offer a positive analysis of the common law of corporate managers' fiduciary duties. The Article attempts to explain the present shape of these corporate fiduciary duties by reference to Pareto criteria.

A particular state of affairs ("state B") is considered to be Pareto superior to another state of affairs ("state A") if at least one person in state B is better off than he or she is in state A and no one in state B is worse off than he or she is in state A. Since in a move from state ...


Corporate Fiduciary Principles For The Post-Contractarian Era, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr. Jan 1996

Corporate Fiduciary Principles For The Post-Contractarian Era, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The impact of the law and economics movement on legal scholarship, legal analysis, and, ultimately, on the rules under which our society operates is substantial. The proponents of this movement ("Contractarians") articulate their positions skillfully and apply their principles broadly across the entire spectrum of our laws, including, of course, the area of corporate law.

The purpose of this Article is to propose, explain, and defend broad and unifying principles to guide the development of fiduciary duties of corporate managers in the post-Contractarian period. These principles are based on Pareto criteria, which are demonstrably appealing to society and provide workable ...


Intracorporate Plurality In Criminal Conspiracy Law, Sarah N. Welling May 1982

Intracorporate Plurality In Criminal Conspiracy Law, Sarah N. Welling

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The concept of conspiracy currently plays a significant role in three areas of substantive law: antitrust, civil rights, and criminal law. Although the role of conspiracy in these substantive areas of law differs in many ways, all three require that the conspiracy consist of a plurality of actors. Determining what constitutes a plurality of actors when all the alleged conspirators are agents of a single corporation poses a continuing problem.

This problem raises two distinct questions. The first is whether, when one agent acts alone within the scope of corporate business, the agent and the corporation constitute a plurality. The ...


Definition Of Control In Secondary Distributions, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr. Nov 1976

Definition Of Control In Secondary Distributions, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Act) generally subjects the sale of securities by a person "controlling an issuer" to the same rules that govern the sale of securities by an issuer. Accordingly, before a "control" person may sell the securities he holds in the controlled corporation he must either register them with the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) or qualify for an exemption from the registration requirement. While the Act clearly requires that a "control" person either register or qualify for an exemption, it fails to define "control." Thus, the task of defining has fallen to ...


Limited Liability For Corporate Shareholders: Myth Or Matter-Of-Fact, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr. Jan 1975

Limited Liability For Corporate Shareholders: Myth Or Matter-Of-Fact, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

One of the most important and firmly entrenched concepts of modern corporate law is the concept of limited liability. The digests abound with ringing phrases granting the owners of corporations immunity from liability beyond their initial investment. There are, however, numerous cases in which the courts have denied the owners of corporations the protection of limited liability and have held the owners liable for an obligation incurred by the corporation. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the theories under which the owners of corporations have been held liable for the contractual obligation of corporations.