Law Commons^™

Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, And Complete Capital Markets, Charles K. Whitehead, Ronald J. Gilson

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The traditional law and finance focus on agency costs presumes that the premise that diversified public shareholders are the cheapest risk bearers is immutable. In this Essay, we raise the possibility that changes in the capital markets have called this premise into question, drawn into sharp relief by the recent private equity wave in which the size and range of public companies being taken private expanded significantly. In brief, we argue that private owners, in increasingly complete markets, can transfer risk in discrete slices to counterparties who, in turn, can manage or otherwise diversify away those risks they choose to …

European Law On Capital Markets – Quo Vadis?, Daniela Huemer

Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers

The occurrence of more than a dozen accounting scandals in the United States over the past few years have deeply shaken the capital market and have led some to believe that “corporate and legal culture has lost all sense of right and wrong.” Scandals at companies such as Enron and Worldcom have cost thousands of employees their jobs and caused thousands of investors to lose their investments completely. Similar scandals have happened in Europe as well, such as at Parmalat and Lernout & Hauspie, which has caused an increasing reluctance among investors to trust companies with their dollars.

These circumstances …

The Petrochina Syndrome: Regulating Capital Markets In The Anti-Globalization Era, Stephen F. Diamond

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.