Law Commons^™

Pay For Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation In Speculative Markets, Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman, Wei Xiong

Center for Contract and Economic Organization

We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets.

Contextual Analysis Of Tax Ownership, Alex Raskolnikov

Faculty Scholarship

Ownership is one of the most fundamental concepts in tax law, yet it remains remarkably confused. The uncertainty inhibits tax planning, leads to inconsistent responses from the government, and produces unexpected outcomes in the courts. There has been no shortage of scholarly attention to the issue, but most of the commentary has been either exceedingly narrow or focused on far-reaching reforms. As a result, the law of tax ownership lacks conceptual foundation. This article attempts to remedy the deficiency by proposing a comprehensive approach to tax ownership and demonstrating that the doctrine may (and should) be significantly clarified without a …

A Theory Of Corporate Scandals: Why The U.S. And Europe Differ, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

A wave of financial irregularity broke out in the United States in 2001-2002, culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. A worldwide stock market bubble burst over this same period, with the actual market decline on a percentage basis being somewhat more severe in Europe. Yet, no corresponding wave of financial scandals involving a similar level of companies broke out in Europe. Indeed, those scandals that did arise in Europe often had American roots (e.g., Vivendi, Ahold, Adecco, etc.). Given the higher level of public and private enforcement in the United States for securities fraud, this contrast seems perplexing.

What …

The 527 Problem ... And The Buckley Problem, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

In the world of campaign finance, 2004 was without a doubt the year of the 527 organization. No other aspect of campaign financing received as much press coverage or public attention as the rise of the 527s. Expenditures by 527s – named after the section of the Internal Revenue Code under which they are organized – active in federal elections amounted to at least $405 million, accounting for more than one-tenth of total federal election spending and perhaps twenty to twenty-five percent of spending in the presidential campaign. Federal Election Commission ("FEC") Chairman Scott E. Thomas recently observed that "[there …

Patents, Venture Capital, And Software Start-Ups, Ronald J. Mann, Thomas W. Sager

Faculty Scholarship

This paper analyzes the relation between the patenting behavior of startup firms and the progress of those firms through the venture capital cycle. Linking data relating to venture capital financing of software startup firms with data concerning the patents obtained by those firms, we find significant and robust positive correlations between patenting and several variables measuring the firm's performance (including number of rounds, total investment, exit status, receipt of late stage financing, and longevity). The data also show that (1) only about one in four venture-backed software firms acquired even one patent during the period of the study; (2) patenting …

Going-Private Decisions And The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis, Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

This article investigates whether the passage and the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) drove firms out of the public capital market. To control for other factors affecting exit decisions, we examine the post-SOX change in the propensity of public American targets to be bought by private acquirers rather than public ones with the corresponding change for foreign targets, which were outside the purview of SOX. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that SOX induced small firms to exit the public capital market during the year following its enactment. In contrast, SOX appears to have had little …

Can Lawyers Wear Blinders? Gatekeepers And Third-Party Opinions, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The question in the title may seem to answer itself. But it does not; indeed, the question has been framed to explain my difficulty with Professor Schwarcz's position on third-party opinions. Frankly, Steven Schwarcz has taken a bold, tough position. Addressing what he sees as issues of "first impression," he asks "what it means for lawyers to issue legal opinions that create negative externalities," and "[i]f lawyers issuing legal opinions owe a duty to the public as well as to the opinion recipient." These are large, possibly even imponderable questions, but he answers them crisply and succinctly in the manner …

Serial Entrepreneurs And Small Business Bankruptcies, Douglas G. Baird, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

Chapter 11 is thought to preserve the going-concern surplus of a financially distressed business – the extra value that its assets possess in their current configuration. Financial distress leads to conflicts among creditors that can lead to inefficient liquidation of a business with going-concern surplus. Chapter 11 avoids this by providing the business with a way of fashioning a new capital structure. This account of Chapter 11 fails to capture what is happening in the typical case. The typical Chapter 11 debtor is a small corporation whose assets are not specialized and rarely worth enough to pay tax claims. There …

Some Reflections On Two-Sided Markets And Pricing, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

We want to join Bob Pitofsky in thanking the participants in this symposium for their thoughtful contributions. The literature on two-sided markets, both analytical and policy oriented, has mushroomed and this timely set of essays represents a significant contribution. The first generation of this literature grew up around the credit card industry, largely as a result of the antitrust litigation that challenged a wide range of standard practices in that industry. However, the theoretical problems that were first uncovered in this context extend to many other activities as well. The full range of papers found in this symposium, which have …

Takeovers In The Boardroom: Burke Versus Schumpeter, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

We are delighted to participate in a 25th anniversary assessment of Martin Lipton's 1979 article, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom. This is a remarkably prescient article that demonstrates an uncanny ear for an emerging issue. From his vantage point inside targets' boardrooms – and, we assume, also from inside the nearby offices of investment bankers – Lipton spotted a gathering storm on the horizon and sought to channel the emerging issue of takeover policy in a direction that accorded with his own fundamental convictions as well as the interests of his clients. As every academic knows, early intervention …

The Post-Enron Identity Crisis Of The Business Lawyer, William H. Simon

Faculty Scholarship

The practices and institutions of business lawyering are undergoing a reassessment and revision as radical as anything that has occurred since the late nineteenth century, when the modern professional association and the modern corporate law firm were born. The pace of change has intensified,but its directions remain contested. The articles in this colloquium depict a corporate bar torn between competing role conceptions along a variety of dimensions.

Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

High levels of executive compensation have triggered an intense debate over whether compensation results primarily from competitive pressures in the market for managerial services or from managerial overreaching. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have advanced the debate with their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, which forcefully argues that current compensation levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking, not by arm's-length bargaining designed to create the optimum pay and performance nexus. This paper expresses three sorts of reservations with their analysis and advances its own proposals. First, enhancing shareholder welfare is not, as a …

Risk Management In Long-Term Contracts, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Long-term contracts are designed to manage risk. After a brief discussion of why it is unhelpful to invoke risk aversion for analyzing serious commercial transactions between sophisticated entities, this paper focuses on adaptation to changed circumstances. In particular, it considers the options to abandon and the discretion to change quantity. It then analyzes a poorly designed contract between Alcoa and Essex showing how the parties misframed their problem and designed a long-term contract that was doomed to fail.

Separation And The Function Of Corporation Law, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

I am delighted to participate in taking up Professor William Klein's suggestion that we could learn something by attempting a functional typology of corporation law. As a starting point, any typology must be animated by an underlying theory whose terms dictate the lines the typology draws. I want to focus my contribution at the level of the theory that might animate the architecture of this grid. To see what I mean by this, think of the Sesame Street version of Edward Levi's classic, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. The character points at a board on which there are pictures …

In The Shadow Of Delaware - The Rise Of Hostile Takeovers In Japan, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

Despite longstanding predictions to the contrary, hostile takeovers have arrived in Japan. This Essay explains why and explores the implications of this phenomenon, not only for Japanese corporate governance, but also for our understanding of corporate law development around the world today. Delaware law figures prominently in the recent Japanese events. A highprofile battle for corporate control has just generated a judicial standard for takeover defenses that might be called a Unocal rule with Japanese characteristics. Meanwhile, ministy-endorsed takeover guidelines have been formulated that are heavily influenced by the familiar "threat" and "proportionality" tests under Delaware law, along with many …

Conflicts Of Interest In Publicly-Traded And Closely-Held Corporations: A Comparative And Economic Analysis, Zohar Goshen

Faculty Scholarship

Conflicts of interest in corporate law can be addressed by two main alternatives: a requirement of a majority of the minority vote or the imposition of duties of loyalty and fairness. A comparison of Delaware, the UK, Canada, and Israel reveals that while the conflicts of interest problem within publicly-traded corporations receives different treatment in the different jurisdictions — either a fairness rule or a majority of the minority rule — closely-held corporations receive the same treatment of an imposition of duties of loyalty and fairness. This article explains this finding, demonstrating that determining which of these rules is adopted …