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Full-Text Articles in Law
Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch
Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
The Modern Corporation and Private Property highlighted the evolving separation of ownership and control in the public corporation and the effects of that separation on the allocation of power within the corporation. This essay explores the implications of intermediation for those themes. The article observes that intermediation, by decoupling economic ownership and decision-making authority within the shareholder, creates a second layer of agency issues beyond those identified by Berle and Means. These agency issues are an important consideration in the current debate over shareholder empowerment. The article concludes by considering the hypothetical shareholder construct implicit in the Berle and Means …
Shareholder Ownership And Primacy, Julian Velasco
Shareholder Ownership And Primacy, Julian Velasco
Journal Articles
According to the traditional view, the shareholders own the corporation. Until relatively recently, this view enjoyed general acceptance. Today, however, there seems to be substantial agreement among legal scholars and others in the academy that shareholders do not own corporations. In fact, the claim that shareholders do own corporations often is dismissed as merely a “theory,” a “naked assertion,” or even a “myth.” And yet, outside of the academy, views on the corporation remain quite traditional. Most people - not just the public and the media, but also politicians, and even bureaucrats and the courts - seem to believe that …
The Essential Unity Of Shareholders And The Myth Of Investor Short-Termism, George W. Dent
The Essential Unity Of Shareholders And The Myth Of Investor Short-Termism, George W. Dent
Faculty Publications
The separation of ownership and control publicized by Berle and Means in 1932 persists today. Domination of public companies by self-serving and ineffective executives costs America billions of dollars every year and contributed to the current economic meltdown. Repeated efforts to solve this problem--including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, expanded disclosure duties, and more stringent requirements for director independence--have had little benefit and have sometimes made matters worse. The flaws in our corporate governance system are a growing problem for America’s economy as disillusioned investors increasingly place their capital in other countries.
Nonetheless, proposals for greater shareholder power have encountered criticisms: various …