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Business Organizations Law

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2008

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Articles 1 - 30 of 107

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Undercivilization Of Corporate Law, A. Christine Hurt Dec 2008

The Undercivilization Of Corporate Law, A. Christine Hurt

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Dystopian Potential Of Corporate Law, D. Gordon Smith Dec 2008

The Dystopian Potential Of Corporate Law, D. Gordon Smith

Faculty Scholarship

The community of corporate law scholars in the United States is fragmented. One group, heavily influenced by economic analysis of corporations, is exploring the merits of increasing shareholder power vis-a-vis directors. Another group, animated by concern for social justice, is challenging the traditional, shareholder-centric view of corporate law, arguing instead for a model of stakeholder governance. The current disagreement within corporate law is as fundamental as in any area of law, and the debate is more heated than at any time since the New Deal. This paper is part of a debate on the audacious question, Can Corporate Law Save ...


Allocating Business Profits For Tax Purposes: A Proposal To Adopt A Formulary Profit Split, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing, Michael C. Durst Dec 2008

Allocating Business Profits For Tax Purposes: A Proposal To Adopt A Formulary Profit Split, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing, Michael C. Durst

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

The current system of taxing the income of multinational firms in the United States is flawed across multiple dimensions. The system provides an artificial tax incentive to earn income in low-tax countries, rewards aggressive tax planning, and is not compatible with any common metrics of efficiency. The U.S. system is also notoriously complex; observers are nearly unanimous in lamenting the heavy compliance burdens and the impracticality of coherent enforcement. Further, despite a corporate tax rate one standard deviation above that of other OECD countries, the U.S. corporate tax system raises relatively little revenue, due in part to the ...


Corporate Ethics In A Devilish System, Kent Greenfield Dec 2008

Corporate Ethics In A Devilish System, Kent Greenfield

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

Prepared for a roundtable on corporate ethics at the University of Maryland School of Law, this essay argues that discussions of corporate ethics that focus on mere compliance with law are too narrow. While an emphasis on legal compliance is indeed crucial, a dedication to legality standing alone is hardly a robust sense of ethics, corporate or otherwise. Whether one takes guidance from religious norms or from secular philosophers, there are significant areas of agreement as to what amounts to ethical behavior: acting with due care for others; taking responsibility for the effect of one's actions; being honest; considering ...


The Disaster At Bhopal: Lessons For Corporate Law?, Kent Greenfield Dec 2008

The Disaster At Bhopal: Lessons For Corporate Law?, Kent Greenfield

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

Prepared for a conference at New England Law School marking the upcoming twenty-fifth anniversary of the disaster at Bhopal, this essay asks whether we have anything still to learn from what occurred in the early morning hours in Bhopal on December 3, 1984, and in the hours, days, and weeks that followed. Is there reason to believe, for example, that corporations have a tendency to create the context in which such disasters are more likely? More recent corporate behavior poses the same question, whether it pertains to environmental destruction, injuries to consumers, collusion with illegal governmental activities, or financial malfeasance ...


The Impact Of "Going Private" On Corporate Stakeholders, Kent Greenfield Dec 2008

The Impact Of "Going Private" On Corporate Stakeholders, Kent Greenfield

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

As capital markets in the United States increasingly "go private," it is unclear how the privatization of corporate finance will affect non-shareholder stakeholders of firms, most centrally employees, communities, and the environment. Some scholars and public policy experts believe that concern for such stakeholders should not hold any relevance in the discussion of corporate law in general, and thus may be presumed to believe the same about a conversation about privatization. In such a view, these concerns lie outside the realm of corporate governance law; they therefore should be of no great moment in the debate over whether public policy ...


Troubled Projects, Workouts And Debt Restructurings, Richard Blumenreich Nov 2008

Troubled Projects, Workouts And Debt Restructurings, Richard Blumenreich

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.


Partnership Allocations: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, Steven M. Friedman Nov 2008

Partnership Allocations: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, Steven M. Friedman

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.


The Taxation Of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating The Revenue Effects Of Taxing Profit Interests As Ordinary Income, Michael S. Knoll Nov 2008

The Taxation Of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating The Revenue Effects Of Taxing Profit Interests As Ordinary Income, Michael S. Knoll

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In this Article, I estimate the tax revenue effects of taxing private equity carried interests as ordinary income rather than as long-term capital gain as under current law. Under reasonable assumptions, I conclude that the expected present value of additional tax collections would be between 1 percent and 1.5 percent of capital invested in private equity funds, or between $2 billion and $3 billion a year. That estimate, however, makes no allowance for changes in the structure of such funds or the composition of the partnerships, which might substantially reduce tax revenues below those estimates.


Dysfunctional Deference And Board Composition: Lessons From Enron, Bernard S. Sharfman, Steven J. Toll Oct 2008

Dysfunctional Deference And Board Composition: Lessons From Enron, Bernard S. Sharfman, Steven J. Toll

NULR Online

No abstract provided.


Embattled Ceos, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock Oct 2008

Embattled Ceos, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In this paper, we argue that chief executive officers of publicly-held corporations in the United States are losing power to their boards of directors and to their shareholders. This loss of power is recent (say, since 2000) and gradual, but nevertheless represents a significant move away from the imperial CEO who was surrounded by a hand-picked board and lethargic shareholders. After discussing the concept of power and its dimensions, we document the causes and symptoms of the decline in CEO power in several areas: share ownership composition and shareholder activism; governance rules and the board response to shareholder activism; regulatory ...


Obedience As The Foundation Of Fiduciary Duty, Rob Atkinson Oct 2008

Obedience As The Foundation Of Fiduciary Duty, Rob Atkinson

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch Oct 2008

Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

Securities class actions are on the chopping block-again. Traditional commentators continue to view class actions with suspicion; they see class suits as nonmeritorious byproducts of self-interest and the attorneys who bring them as rent-seekers. Their conventional approach has popularized securities class actions' negative effects. High-profile commissions capitalizing on this rhetoric, such as the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, have recently recommended eliminating or severely curtailing securities class actions. But this approach misses the point: in the ongoing push and pull of securities regulation, corporations are winning the battle.

Thus, understanding the full picture and texture of securities class actions necessitates ...


Insource The Shareholding Of Outsourced Employees: A Global Stock Ownership Plan, Robert C. Hockett Oct 2008

Insource The Shareholding Of Outsourced Employees: A Global Stock Ownership Plan, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

With the American economy stalled and another federal election campaign season well underway, the “outsourcing” of American jobs is again on the public agenda. Latest figures indicate not only that claims for joblessness benefits are up, but also that the rate of American job-exportation has more than doubled since the last electoral cycle. This year’s political candidates have been quick to take note. In consequence, more than at any time since the early 1990s, continued American participation in the World Trade Organization, in the North American Free Trade Agreement, and in the processes of global economic integration more generally ...


Linkage And The Deterrence Of Corporate Fraud, Miriam Baer Oct 2008

Linkage And The Deterrence Of Corporate Fraud, Miriam Baer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior Of Angel Investors, Darian M. Ibrahim Oct 2008

The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior Of Angel Investors, Darian M. Ibrahim

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Changing The Paradigm Of Stock Ownership From Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence From Brazil And Consequences For Emerging Countries, Erica Gorga Sep 2008

Changing The Paradigm Of Stock Ownership From Concentrated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence From Brazil And Consequences For Emerging Countries, Erica Gorga

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

This paper analyzes micro-level dynamics of changes in ownership structures. It investigates a unique event: changes in ownership patterns currently taking place in Brazil. It builds upon empirical evidence to advance theoretical understanding of how and why concentrated ownership structures can change towards dispersed ownership.

Commentators argue that the Brazilian capital markets are finally taking off. The number of listed companies and IPOs in the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) has greatly increased. Firms are migrating to Bovespa’s special listing segments, which require higher standards of corporate governance. Companies have sold control in the market, and the stock market ...


The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia Jul 2008

The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

Global regulation of international business transactions presents a particular form of the moral hazard problem. Global firms use economic and political power to manipulate state and state-controlled multilateral regulation to preserve their opportunity to externalize the social costs of global economic activity with impunity. Unless other actors can effectively counter this at the national and global regulatory levels, globalization re-creates the conditions for under-regulated or “robber baron” capitalism at the global level. This model of economic activity has been rejected at the national level by the same modern democratic capitalist states which currently dominate globalization, creating a crisis of legitimacy ...


An Overview Of Brazilian Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson De Carvalho, Érica Gorga Jul 2008

An Overview Of Brazilian Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson De Carvalho, Érica Gorga

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

We provide the first detailed picture of firm-level corporate governance practices in an emerging market. We report on the corporate governance practices of Brazilian public companies, based primarily on an extensive 2005 survey of 116 companies. Most firms have a controlling shareholder or group. Board independence is an area of weakness. The boards of most Brazilian private firms are comprised entirely or almost entirely of insiders or representatives of the controlling family or group. Many firms have no independent directors. Financial disclosure is a second area of weakness. Only a minority of firms provide a statement of cash flows or ...


Insuring Corporate Crime, Miriam Baer Jul 2008

Insuring Corporate Crime, Miriam Baer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Business Taxes And International Competitiveness, Michael S. Knoll May 2008

Business Taxes And International Competitiveness, Michael S. Knoll

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Around the world, policymakers are obsessed with the competitiveness of their domestic companies and domestically based multinational corporations (MNCs). Such concerns frequently influence policy, especially tax policy. In this paper, I develop a theory of how taxes affect the international competitiveness of businesses. I then use that theory to evaluate basic tax policy decisions, such as the choice between residence- and source-based taxation and the level of tax rates, and to understand the impact various provisions in the U.S. Internal Revenue Code are likely to have on the competitiveness of U.S.-based corporations and MNCs.


Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, And Corporate Control: Evidence From Hershey's Kiss-Off, Jonathan Klick, Robert H. Sitkoff May 2008

Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, And Corporate Control: Evidence From Hershey's Kiss-Off, Jonathan Klick, Robert H. Sitkoff

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In July 2002 the trustees of the Milton Hershey School Trust announced a plan to diversify the Trust’s investment portfolio by selling the Trust’s controlling interest in the Hershey Company. The Company’s stock jumped from $62.50 to $78.30 on news of the proposed sale. But the Pennsylvania Attorney General, who was then running for governor, opposed the sale on the ground that it would harm the local community. Shortly after the Attorney General obtained a preliminary injunction, the trustees abandoned the sale and the Company’s stock dropped to $65.00. Using standard event study ...


Corporate Taxation And International Charter Competition, Mitchell Kane, Edward B. Rock May 2008

Corporate Taxation And International Charter Competition, Mitchell Kane, Edward B. Rock

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Corporate Charter competition has become an increasingly international phenomenon. The thesis of this article is that this development in the corporate law requires a greater focus on the corporate tax law. We first demonstrate how a tax system’s capacity to distort the international charter market depends both upon its approach to determining corporate location and the extent to which it taxes foreign source corporate profits. We also show, however, that it is not possible to remove all distortions through modifications to the tax system alone. We present instead two alternative methods for preserving an international charter market. The first ...


Entrepreneurs On Horseback: Reflections On The Organization Of Law, Darian M. Ibrahim, D. Gordon Smith Apr 2008

Entrepreneurs On Horseback: Reflections On The Organization Of Law, Darian M. Ibrahim, D. Gordon Smith

Faculty Publications

“Law and entrepreneurship” is an emerging field of study. Skeptics might wonder whether law and entrepreneurship is a variant of that old canard, the Law of the Horse. In this Essay, we defend law and entrepreneurship against that charge and urge legal scholars to become even more engaged in the wide-ranging scholarly discourse regarding entrepreneurship. In making our case, we argue that research at the intersection of entrepreneurship and law is distinctive. In some instances, legal rules and practices are tailored to the entrepreneurial context, and in other instances, general rules of law find novel expression in the entrepreneurial context ...


Five Decades Of Corporation Law - From Conglomeration To Equity Compensation, Richard A. Booth Apr 2008

Five Decades Of Corporation Law - From Conglomeration To Equity Compensation, Richard A. Booth

Working Paper Series

This brief essay recounts developments in corporation law over the last fifty years. It begins with the rise of finance capitalism and the conglomerate corporation which was followed by the emergence of hostile takeovers in the late 1970s and 1980s. One of the key events in this saga was the February 1, 1983 decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. that effectively permitted the at-will elimination of minority stockholders through cashout mergers. Takeovers were also facilitated by two major financial developments: (1) the growth of institutional investors coupled with the growing taste of diversified investors for ...


Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge V. Ford, Lynn A. Stout Apr 2008

Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge V. Ford, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

What is the purpose of a corporation? To many people, the answer to this question seems obvious: corporations exist to make money for their shareholders. Maximizing shareholder wealth is the corporation's only true concern, its raison d'être. Devoted corporate officers and directors should direct all their efforts toward this goal.

Some find this picture of the corporation as an engine for increasing shareholder wealth to be quite attractive. Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman famously praised this view of corporate purpose in his 1970 New York Times essay, "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." To ...


The Reform Of Corporate Taxation In The European Union, Nina Winkler Apr 2008

The Reform Of Corporate Taxation In The European Union, Nina Winkler

Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers

The Commission of the European Communities is currently drafting a proposal for an EU Directive to implement the first comprehensive corporate tax strategy for the Internal Market. The adoption of a common consolidated corporate tax base for EU multinational enterprises is one of today’s most highly debated issues on Brussels’ political agenda. Since the reform would affect all international companies conducting business in the Internal Market, it should also be of great interest for non-EU corporate and tax law scholars and lawyers. The paper critically evaluates the key advantages and disadvantages of the concept of an EU consolidated tax ...


Lender Control Liability Functional Examination: The Firm And Heuristics, Sergio A. Muro Mar 2008

Lender Control Liability Functional Examination: The Firm And Heuristics, Sergio A. Muro

Cornell Law School J.S.D. Student Research Papers

Lender control is criticized due to problems arising out of conflict of interests among different priority claimholders. Recently, it has been defended as a way to make the reorganization process more efficient. This paper builds on previous research on the theory of the firm to show that lender control generates inefficiencies even in situations where there is only one layer of legal claimants. Specifically, the paper demonstrates that departing from the nexus of explicit contracts paradigm, used by both previous critics and supporters of lender control, allows to understand other sources of lender control inefficiencies based on its inability to ...


Reclaiming Corporate Law In A New Gilded Age, Kent Greenfield Mar 2008

Reclaiming Corporate Law In A New Gilded Age, Kent Greenfield

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

Corporate law matters. Traditionally seen as the narrow study of the relationship between managers and shareholders, corporate law has frequently been relegated to the margins of legal discussion and political debate. The marginalization of corporate law has been especially prevalent among those who count themselves as progressives. While this has not always been true, in the last generation or so progressives have focused on constitutional law and other areas of so-called public law, and have left corporate law to adherents of neoclassical law and economics. To the extent that the behavior of businesses has been a matter of concern, that ...


Fiduciary Duties For Activist Shareholders, Iman Anabtawi, Lynn A. Stout Mar 2008

Fiduciary Duties For Activist Shareholders, Iman Anabtawi, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Corporate law and scholarship generally assume that professional managers control public corporations, while shareholders play only a weak and passive role. As a result, corporate officers and directors are understood to be subject to extensive fiduciary duties, while shareholders traditionally have been thought to have far more limited obligations. Outside the contexts of controlling shareholders and closely held firms, many experts argue shareholders have no duties at all.

The most important trend in corporate governance today, however, is the move toward "shareholder democracy." Changes in financial markets, in business practice, and in corporate law have given minority shareholders in public ...