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Full-Text Articles in Law
Bad And Not-So-Bad Arguments For Shareholder Primacy, Lynn A. Stout
Bad And Not-So-Bad Arguments For Shareholder Primacy, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
In 1932, the Harvard Law Review published a debate between two preeminent corporate scholars on the subject of the proper purpose of the public corporation. On one side stood the renowned Adolph A. Berle, coauthor of the classic The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Berle argued for what is now called "shareholder primacy"—the view that the corporation exists only to make money for its shareholders. According to Berle, "all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation. . . [are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable …
Stakeholder Protection In Germany And Japan, Mark J. Loewenstein
Stakeholder Protection In Germany And Japan, Mark J. Loewenstein
Publications
This Essay considers the stakeholder debate in the context of the German and Japanese legal systems. Although, nominally, corporations in those countries must operate in the interests of shareholders, in fact nonshareholder constituencies have considerable influence on corporate decision makers. Of equal importance, weak securities markets and ineffective or nonexistent legal protections for shareholders are also important factors in strengthening the position of nonshareholder constituencies and freeing directors to consider their interests. Thus, the stakeholder debate is more of an issue in the United States and Britain, where more shareholder-centic models flourish.
A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, Nina A. Mendelson
A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Some commentators defend limited shareholder liability for torts and statutory violations as efficient, even though it encourages corporations to overinvest in and to externalize the costs of risky activity. Others propose pro rata unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts. Both approaches, however, fail to account fully for qualitative differences among shareholders. Controlling shareholders, in particular, may have lower information costs, greater influence over managerial decisionmaking, and greater ability to benefit from corporate activity. This Article develops a control-based approach to shareholder liability. It first explores several differences among shareholders. For example, a controlling shareholder can more easily curb managerial risk …