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Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Making Subchapter S Work, Glenn E. Coven Jul 1986

Making Subchapter S Work, Glenn E. Coven

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Start-Up Costs, Section 195 And Clear Reflection Of Income: A Tale Of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform And A Touch Of Basics, John W. Lee Jul 1986

Start-Up Costs, Section 195 And Clear Reflection Of Income: A Tale Of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform And A Touch Of Basics, John W. Lee

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Limiting Losses Attributable To Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense Of The Traditional System Against The At-Risk Concept, Glenn E. Coven Jan 1986

Limiting Losses Attributable To Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense Of The Traditional System Against The At-Risk Concept, Glenn E. Coven

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply To Professor Seligman, George W. Dent Jan 1986

Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply To Professor Seligman, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

Professor Joel Seligman's article, Equal Protection in Share- holder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Contro- versy,' is an impressive accomplishment in many respects. It confirms his status as premier historian of our securities laws and markets.2 It also provides a powerful analysis of, and the first se- rious argument against, dual class capitalization, and proposes a thoughtful solution to the problems it raises. Despite these formi- dable assets, some of Professor Seligman's conclusions are debata- ble. First, Professor Seligman argues that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can impose on the National Associa- tion of Securities Dealers …


Unprofitable Mergers: Toward A Market-Based Legal Response, George W. Dent Jan 1986

Unprofitable Mergers: Toward A Market-Based Legal Response, George W. Dent

Faculty Publications

The reams of commentary on corporate mergers, acquisitions, and tender offers have focused largely on protection of shareholders of acquired (or target) companies from both the depredations of acquiring (or raider) companies and the cupidity of their own managements in either negotiating the terms or obstructing the accomplishment of transactions. Virtually no attention has been paid to the plight of shareholders of acquiring companies devastated by unwise acquisitions. This oversight is surprising: some acquisitions have been spectacular disasters, destroying hundreds of millions of dollars in the value of the acquiring company's stock.1 Nor are these isolated cases: on average, acquisitions …