Law Commons^™

Corporations As Private Regulators, Wentong Zheng

UF Law Faculty Publications

The growing trend of corporations imposing restrictions on suppliers, contractors, and customers beyond the requirements of existing laws requires rethinking the nature and impact of corporations' private regulatory power. This trend, which this Article refers to as "Corporations as Private Regulators" (CPR), represents a paradigmatic shift in how corporations participate in the making of public policies. This Article conceptualizes the corporate CPR power as the exercise of a right of refusal to deal with counterparties. This right of refusal could be theorized as a new form of property right, whose allocation has important implications for both rights and wealth. The …

The Rise Of Business Trusts In Sustainable Neo-Innovative Economies, Lee-Ford Tritt, Ryan Scott Teschner

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article is organized as follows: Part I provides a basic understanding of business trusts in the United States. Next, Part II explores the differences between business trusts in the United States and those in Singapore. Finally, Part III discusses how historical and cultural influences may have shaped the success—or lack thereof—of the business trust form in Singapore and in the United States.

Corporate Charter Competition, Lynn M. Lopucki

UF Law Faculty Publications

The corporate charter competition has dominated the corporate law literature for four decades. This Article draws on the theoretical and empirical insights from that vast literature to present a systems analysis of the competition. The analysis shows the competition to be a system composed of three subsystems, joined by the internal affairs doctrine. The subsystems are those by which (1) corporations choose incorporation states, (2) states decide what packages to offer, and (3) states and stakeholders choose the courts that interpret and enforce corporate law. The analysis suggests that the standard account of charter competition should be revised in five …

Protecting Llc Owners While Preserving Llc Flexibility, Peter Molk

UF Law Faculty Publications

LLC statutes allow owners to restrict or completely waive standard governance protections required of other business forms. Corporate law mandatory stalwarts like fiduciary duties can be entirely eliminated in an LLC. This flexible approach has the potential to generate the most efficient governance relationships: tailored negotiation among LLC investors can produce an optimal set of governance terms that corporate law’s mandatory protections cannot. Yet when owners lack sophistication or bargaining power, contractual freedom allows for opportunistic terms that misprice capital, reduce investment, and inefficiently allocate capital across LLCs. A series of cases involving opportunistic conduct have brought this problem to …

More Ways To Protect Llc Owners And Preserve Llc Flexibility, Peter Molk

UF Law Faculty Publications

This online companion to Protecting LLC Owners While Preserving LLC Flexibility considers several alternative approaches that might unify LLCs’ twin goals of owner protection and governance flexibility. I examine self-regulation, private certification, investor-led market forces, lawyers in their gatekeeping capacity, and mandated disclosure systems. Ultimately, each of these alternatives proves less satisfying than a system that bifurcates LLC law based on the presumed sophistication of LLC owners.

A Rule-Based Method For Comparing Corporate Laws, Lynn M. Lopucki

UF Law Faculty Publications

Part I explains the processes for specifying a Scenario. It introduces the Scenario that will serve as the illustration in the remainder of this Article—a comparison of the liability of directors for the exercise of poor judgment in a Delaware corporation with the corresponding liability in a United Kingdom public limited company. Part II explains and illustrates the necessity of selecting specific entity types for comparison. Part III describes and illustrates the method for resolving the Scenario in both jurisdictions. Part IV explains and illustrates the novel process for close comparison—the extraction, juxtaposition, and comparison of decisional rules from the …

How Do Llc Owners Contract Around Default Statutory Protections?, Peter Molk

UF Law Faculty Publications

Limited liability companies are built on the idea of contractual freedom. Unlike other business organization forms, most owner protections apply only by default to LLCs, which are free to waive or modify them as desired. This freedom promises economic efficiency if parties are sophisticated but raises the potential for opportunism by relatively more sophisticated managers and majority owners. While companies ranging from small landscape firms to Chrysler and Fidelity organize as LLCs, remarkably little is known about whether or how LLCs use this contractual flexibility. I analyze the operating agreements of 283 privately owned LLCs organized under Delaware and New …

Llcs And The Private Ordering Of Dispute Resolution, Peter Molk, Verity Winship

UF Law Faculty Publications

An emerging question in U.S. business law is how the organizational documents of a business entity set the rules for resolving internal disputes. This practice is routine in commercial contracts, which may specify where or how disputes must be resolved. Recent use of litigation provisions in corporation charters and bylaws have sparked controversy, ultimately leading to legislative action to preserve shareholder suits from contractual waiver. Yet despite accounting for the majority of business organizations and sharing features with corporations, non-corporate business entities and their internal dispute resolution process have been largely ignored. How do these non-corporate entities set ex ante …

Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism And The Chinese Firm, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Wentong Zheng

UF Law Faculty Publications

Chinese state capitalism has been treated as essentially synonymous with state-owned enterprises (SOEs). But drawing a stark distinction between SOEs and privately owned enterprises (POEs) misperceives the reality of China’s institutional environment and its impact on the formation and operation of large enterprises of all types. We challenge the “ownership bias” of prevailing analyses of Chinese firms by exploring the blurred boundary between SOEs and POEs in China. We argue that the Chinese state has less control over SOEs and more control over POEs than its ownership interest in the firms suggests. Our analysis indicates that Chinese state capitalism can …

The Puzzling Lack Of Cooperatives, Peter Molk

UF Law Faculty Publications

Some of the most recognizable companies, including Land O'Lakes, REI, the Associated Press, Ace Hardware, and State Farm Insurance, are organized as cooperatives--firms owned by their suppliers, workers, or customers. Yet aside from isolated areas of the economy, cooperatives constitute only a small portion of American enterprise, which is otherwise dominated by investor-owned firms. Conventional wisdom assumes that firms either start as cooperatives or convert to cooperatives when cooperatives offer the highest ongoing benefits to owners, and it explains the lack of cooperatives by suggesting that cooperatives usually do not maximize ongoing benefits. This Article looks at entrepreneurs' and brokers' …

When Subchapter S Meets Subchapter C, Martin J. Mcmahon Jr., Daniel L. Simmons

UF Law Faculty Publications

It is often said that “an S corporation is a corporation that is taxed like a partnership.” This statement is incorrect. An S corporation resembles a partnership only in that it generally does not pay income taxes and its income and losses pass through to the shareholders and retain their character as they pass through. Also, like a partnership, basis adjustments to an S corporation shareholder's stock reflect allocations of income, expense, loss, and distributions. However, no other rules of subchapter K governing partnership taxation apply to S corporations. Most of the rules governing the relationship between an S corporation …

The New Investor, Tom C. W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

A sea change is happening in finance. Machines appear to be on the rise and humans on the decline. Human endeavors have become unmanned endeavors. Human thought and human deliberation have been replaced by computerized analysis and mathematical models. Technological advances have made finance faster, larger, more global, more interconnected, and less human. Modern finance is becoming an industry in which the main players are no longer entirely human. Instead, the key players are now cyborgs: part machine, part human. Modern finance is transforming into what this Article calls cyborg finance.

This Article offers one of the first broad, descriptive, …

The Lessons From Libor For Detection And Deterrence Of Cartel Wrongdoing, Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

In late June 2012, Barclays entered into a $453 million settlement with UK and U.S. regulators due to its manipulation of Libor between 2005 and 2009. Among the agencies that investigated Barclays is the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (as well as other antitrust authorities and regulatory agencies from around the world). Participation in a price fixing conduct, by its very nature, requires the involvement of more than one firm.

We are cautious to draw overly broad conclusions until more facts come out in the public domain. What we note at this time, based on public information, is that the …

Now You See It, Now You Don’T: The Comings And Goings Of Disregarded Entities, Martin J. Mcmahon Jr.

UF Law Faculty Publications

While state law recognizes an LLC as a distinct type of entity, an LLC is not a distinct entity for federal tax purposes. An LLC that has two or more owners is treated as either a corporation or a partnership, while an LLC with a single owner will be disregarded for federal income tax purposes unless it elects to be treated as a corporation. In addition to single-member LLCs, the Code and Regulations recognize a second type of disregarded entity – the qualified subchapter S subsidiary (commonly called a QSub). The first part of this Article examines the tax consequences …

Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page

UF Law Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation, shaped the understanding of Standard Oil’s standards of liability for decades. U.S. Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920, upheld the 1901 merger that created "the Corporation," as U.S. Steel was known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its …

Executive Trade Secrets, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

The law discriminates among a corporation’s secrets. In the eyes of the law, commercial secrets of corporations are legitimate secrets that deserve legal protection and nondisclosure, but personal secrets of executives are not as deserving of legal protection and nondisclosure. This divergent treatment of secrets has resulted in a legal landscape of perplexing, paradoxical paths for corporations and executives concerning executive disclosures — a precarious landscape that has left corporations and investors dangerously susceptible to revelations of private facts that shock market valuation and institutional stability.

This Article explores this divergent treatment of secrets in the context of public corporations …

The Corporate Governance Of Iconic Executives, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Essay explores the special corporate governance challenges posed by iconic executives. Iconic executives are complex, bittersweet figures in corporate governance narratives. They are alluring, larger-than-life corporate figures who often govern freely. Iconic executives frequently rule like monarchs over their firms, offering lofty promises to shareholders, directors, and managers under their reign. But like many stories of powerful and influential figures, the narratives of iconic executives also contain adversity and danger. Part of the acquiescence and enchantment with such figures is rooted in the virtuous promises embodied by their presence, promises of unity, accountability, and effectiveness in corporate governance. Unfortunately, …

A Behavioral Framework For Securities Risk, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This article provides the first critical analysis and redesign of the existing securities risk disclosure framework given new insights from the emerging, interdisciplinary field of behavioral economics. Disclosure is the principle at the heart of federal securities regulation. Beneath that core principle of disclosure is the basic assumption that the reasonable investor is the idealized über-rational person of neoclassical economic theory. Therefore, once armed with the requisite information investors presumably can protect themselves through rational choice. Descriptively, however, real investors are not like their rational, neoclassical kin. This article examines this incongruence between the idealized rational investor and the imperfect …

Bond Limited Liability, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

Limited liability is considered a “birthright” of corporations. The concept is entrenched in legal theory, and it is a fixed reality of the political economy. But it remains controversial. Scholarly debate has been engaged in absolute terms of defending the rule or advocating its abrogation. Though compelling, these polar positions, often expressed in abstract arguments, are associated with disquieting effects. Without limited liability, efficiency may be severely compromised. With it, involuntary tort creditors bear some of the cost of an enterprise. Most other proposals for reforming limited liability have been incremental, such as modifying veil piercing. However, neither absolutism nor …

Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

The legal origins literature overlooks a key area of corporate governance-the governance of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). There are key theoretical differences between SOEs and publicly-traded corporations. In comparing the differences of both internal and external controls of SOEs, none of the existing legal origins allow for effective corporate governance monitoring. Because of the difficulties of undertaking a cross-country quantitative review of the governance of SOEs, this Article examines, through a series of case studies, SOE governance issues among postal providers. The examination of postal firms supports the larger theoretical claim about the weaknesses of SOE governance across legal origins. In …

Undressing The Ceo: Disclosing Private, Material Matters Of Public Company Executives, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

Disclosing material private matters of public company executives is a difficult and complex but sometimes necessary act. Advocates that favor more disclosure and advocates that favor more privacy both have many legitimate arguments and concerns. This article argues that when viewed in the context of contemporary capital markets, the enhanced role of the executive, and the modern media, additional disclosure from executives about material, private matters is desirable. In support of this argument, this article proposes a principle-based approach for executive disclosure that affords companies and executives reasonable deference on what to disclose and how to disclose it, while simultaneously …

Corporate Ethics, Agency, And The Theory Of The Firm, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

This conference paper suggests that the problem of corporate ethics cannot be reduced to the autonomous person. Although the greatest influence on action and choice is one's moral constitution, it does not follow that the agent's behavior is the same within or without the firm. Ethics is a function of corporate form. The theory of agency cannot dismiss the firm as a fiction or metaphorical shorthand since that which does not exist should not be able to cause ethical breakdowns in corporate action. Thus, the theory of the firm, which emphasizes profit and wealth maximization, should incorporate a richer, more …

Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle Over Waiver Of The Attorney-Client Privilege, Michael L. Seigel

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article addresses a topic that is the subject of an on-going and heated contest between the business lobby and its lawyers, on the one side, and the U.S. Department of Justice on the other. The fight is over federal prosecutors' escalating practice of requesting that corporations accused of criminal wrongdoing waive their attorney-client privilege as part of their cooperation with the government. The Department of Justice views privilege waiver as a legitimate and critical tool in its post-Enron battle against white collar crime. The business lobby views it as encroaching on corporations' fundamental right to protect confidential attorney-client communications. …

Coolhunting The Law, Mark Fenster

UF Law Faculty Publications

In this essay, I want to use the image of the "coolhunter" to consider what Victor Fleischer has called the "branding moments" in a corporation's legal life -- specifically, those events, most notably in initial public offerings, in which a company, with the assistance of counsel, uses its legal infrastructure and corporate transactions to further its brand. This essay is a small effort to use Fleischer's work to think through these issues by focusing, in turn, on branding, on the various audiences for these branding moments, on the relationship between the brand and transparency norms, and, finally, on the role …

The Non-Merger Virtual Merger: Is Corporate Law Ready For Virtual Reality?, Stuart R. Cohn

UF Law Faculty Publications

The term virtual mergers describes the relatively recent phenomenon of companies entering into contractual arrangements that are functionally, but not legally, equivalent to mergers prescribed by corporate statutes. Virtual mergers usually involve the shared use of assets contributed by each of the companies. A central element of the transaction is that the two companies remain legally independent, each with its own directors, officers, and shareholders. The arrangements can usually be terminated by either party, allowing each company to return to the status quo ante or exercise buyout rights if contractually provided.

Although virtual mergers have occurred among public companies in …

Exalting The Corporate Form Over Environmental Protection The Corporate Shell Game And The Enforcement Of Water Management Law In Florida, Mary Jane Angelo, Charles Lobdell, Tara Boonstra

UF Law Faculty Publications

Current laws in Florida afford substantial protection to the “people behind the corporations” (corporate principals) and generally do not allow environmental permitting agencies such as the water management districts to consider such people in their permitting or enforcement efforts. This article poses the question “Do existing corporate law principles of limited liability defeat the important public policy of water resource protection in Florida?” First, in Parts II and III, this article introduces the problem and provides an overview of Florida water management district permitting and enforcement authorities and processes. Next, in Part IV, this article explores the existing legal authorities …

Corporate Natural Law: The Dominance Of Justice In A Codified World, Stuart R. Cohn

UF Law Faculty Publications

One tends to think of corporate law as quite formalistic, bound by corporate statutes, articles of incorporation, bylaws, and customary rules of commercial conduct. While many aspects of corporate law are indeed so rule-bound, the truth is that the major issues facing directors, officers and shareholders, ranging from fiduciary duties to minority rights, are generally determined by much more amorphous principles of equity. Hence the notion of “corporate natural law.”

Demise Of The Director's Duty Of Care: Judicial Avoidance Of Standards And Sanctions Through The Business Judgment Rule, Stuart R. Cohn

UF Law Faculty Publications

Courts love the so-called business judgment rule. It dispenses quickly and easily with derivative actions against corporate directors and officers, and other challenges to corporate conduct. Unfortunately, the business judgment rule has come to mask its underlying premise, i.e. that there must have been a business judgment made. This article examines the dominance of the business judgment rule over the underlying requirement of the duty of care and suggests reform measures that will bring the duty of care back to its appropriate role in determining the merits of management decision-making processes.

Tender Offers And The Sale Of Control: An Analogue To Determine The Validity Of Target Management Defense Measures, Stuart R. Cohn

UF Law Faculty Publications

The hostile tender offer phenomenon has spawned wholesale defensive measures adopted by target company management. In recent years, confrontations like those of Occidental Petroleum-Mead Corporation and American Express-McGraw-Hill have resulted in target management causing the eventual withdrawal of the tender offer by employing a variety of defensive measures known colloquially as “scorched earth” tactics. The “urge to merge” among major corporations will continue to produce unsolicited, nonnegotiated tender offers at varying scales of size. Consequently, strategies and techniques have been created at a pace faster than the process of litigation, causing a discernible lag between the ingenuity of corporate management …

Stock Appreciation Rights And The Sec: A Case Of Questionable Rulemaking, Stuart R. Cohn

UF Law Faculty Publications

A stock appreciation rights (SARs) program is a form of deferred incentive compensation. Grantees are awarded SAR-units representing an equal number of the grantor’s equity shares currently being traded in public markets. SARs provide grantees the benefit of stock ownership without equity interest, investment, or risk of loss. Stock appreciation rights programs offer various advantages over other forms of executive compensation and have grown rapidly in number. These advantages include the availability of benefits without the requirement of monetary payments, the utilization of SARs as an interest-free form of financing the purchase of stock under tandem stock option programs, the …