Law Commons^™

Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding And Online Auction Ipos, A. Christine Hurt

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Political Uncertainty And The Market For Ipos, Jay B. Kesten, Murat C. Mungan

Faculty Scholarship

This Article presents a simple theory and model of the effects of political uncertainty on the market for IPOs. Our model generates four central predictions: (i) increased political uncertainty reduces the frequency of IPOs; (ii) firms that choose to conduct an IPO during periods of political uncertainty are, on average, of higher quality and generate greater return on investment in the secondary market; (iii) political uncertainty increases the cost of capital for IPO firms; but (iv) underpricing is less pronounced during periods of heightened political uncertainty. We demonstrate that each of these predictions is consistent with available empirical evidence.

Our …

The Way We Pay Now: Understanding And Evaluating Performance-Based Executive Pay, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last ten years, performance-based equity pay, and particularly performance shares, have displaced stock options as the primary instrument for compensating executives of large, public companies in the U.S. This article examines that transformation, analyzing the structure and incentive properties of these newly important instruments and evaluating the benefits and risks from an investor’s perspective. Notable observations include the following: Although technically “stock” instruments, performance shares mimic the incentive characteristics of options. But performance shares avoid the tax, accounting, and other constraints that have led to uniform grants of non-indexed, at the money options. Performance share plans can be …

Se(C)(3): A Catalyst For Social Enterprise Crowdfunding, Dana Brakman Reiser, Steven Dean

Faculty Scholarship

The emerging consensus among scholars rejects the notion of tax breaks for social enterprises, concluding that such prizes will attract strategic claimants, ultimately doing more harm than good The SE(c)(3) regime proposed by this Article offers entrepreneurs and investors committed to combining financial returns and social good with a means of broadcasting that shared resolve. Combining a measured tax benefit for mission-driven activities with a heightened burden on shareholder financial gains, the revenue-neutral SE(c)(3) regime would provide investors and funding platforms with a low-cost means of screening out "greenwashed" ventures.

Time To Lift The Veil Of Inequality In Health Care Coverage: Using Corporate Law To Defend The Affordable Care Act, Seema Mohapatra

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Unsophisticated Sentencing, Miriam Baer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Incorporating Legal Claims, Maya Steinitz

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in commercial litigation funding. Whereas the judicial, legislative, and scholarly treatment of litigation finance has regarded litigation finance first and foremost as a form of champerty and sought to regulate it through rules of legal professional responsibility (hereinafter, the "legal ethics paradigm"), this Article suggests that the problems created by litigation finance are all facets of the classic problems created by "the separation of ownership and control" that have been a focus of business law since the advent of the corporate form. Therefore, an "incorporation paradigm," offered here, is more appropriate. "Incorporating …

Phishing & Vat Fraud In Co2 Permits: Dice In The Eu-Ets Now; Dice In Power Tomorrow, Richard Thompson Ainsworth

Faculty Scholarship

In accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC of October 13, 2003, trade in greenhouse gas emissions commenced in the European Union (EU) on January 1, 2005. The EU-Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) was born.

The EU has a Value Added Tax (VAT). VAT is a transaction-based levy on all trade in goods and services. Each Member State has a VAT as a condition of membership. Until January 3, 2017 transactions in CO2 permits are taxed as services. After this date they are exempt as financial instruments.

This change in VAT treatment of CO2 permits is directly attributable to rampant fraud in the market. …

Appraisal Arbitrage And The Future Of Public Company M&A, Minor Myers, Charles R. Korsmo

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Delaware’S Implied Contractual Covenant Of Good Faith And “Sibling Rivalry” Among Equity Holders, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

An obligation of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every common law contract and is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C”). The terminology differs: Some jurisdictions refer to an “implied covenant;” others to an “implied contractual obligation;” still others to an “implied duty.” But whatever the label, the concept is understood by the vast majority of U.S. lawyers as a matter of commercial rather than entity law. And, to the vast majority of corporate lawyers, “good faith” does not mean contract law but rather conjures up an important aspect of a corporate director’s duty of loyalty.

Nonetheless, …

Series Of Unincorporated Business Entities: The Mobius Strip And Klein Bottle Of Business Entity Law, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Back in the day – say, 1990 – limited liability companies (LLCs) were the cutting edge of business entity law. Today, LLCs dominate entity formation, and the cutting edge has moved further out – to the notion of a “series,” a quasi-separate, quasi-person existing within an LLC.

Business lawyers are generally familiar with series of stocks and bonds, but those series have nothing to do with the LLC series discussed in this article. To avoid confusion, this article refers to protected series, which, as we will see, are the Mobius strips or Klein bottles of entity law.

Intermediary Influence, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

Ronald Coase and others writing in his wake typically assume that institutional arrangements evolve to minimize transaction costs. This Article draws attention to a powerful, market-based force that operates contrary to that core assumption: Intermediary influence." The claim builds on three observations: (1) many transaction costs now take the form of fees paid to specialized intermediaries, (2) intermediaries prefer institutional arrangements that yield higher transaction fees, and (3) intermediaries are often well positioned to promote self-serving arrangements. As a result, high-fee institutional arrangements often remain entrenched even in the presence of more-efficient alternatives.

This Article uses numerous case studies from …

Toward A Critical Corporate Law Pedagogy And Scholarship, André Douglas Pond Cummings, Steven A. Ramirez, Cheryl L. Wade

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, the publicly held corporation has assumed a central position in both the economic and political spheres of American life. Economically, the public corporation has long acted as the key institution within American capitalism. Politically, the public corporation now can use its economic might to sway electoral outcomes as never before. Indeed, individuals who control public firms wield more economic might and political power today than ever before. These truths profoundly shape American society. The power, control, and role of the public corporation under law and regulation, therefore, hold more importance than at any other time period.

Even …

Innovation And The Role Of Public-Private Collaboration In Contract Governance: Governing Global Finance: Towards Contractual Governance, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

The global financial crisis demonstrated the vulnerability, if not failure, of existing governance structures for financial markets. Even if it is true that financial crises cannot be avoided, there may be room for improving existing structures. This chapter suggests that such an improvement might lie in switching from exclusive, hierarchical, and coercive forms of governance to inclusive, horizontal, cooperative ones—and uses the shorthand ‘contractual governance’ for the latter. Starting from the presumption that new forms of governance are frequently born in crisis, the chapter analyses several responses to the crisis and asks whether they display features of alternative forms of …

Correcting Corporate Benefit: How To Fix Shareholder Litigation By Shifting The Doctrine On Fees, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

The current controversy in corporate law concerns whether firms can discourage litigation by shifting its cost to shareholders. But corporate law courts have long engaged in fee-shifting—from shareholder plaintiffs to the corporation—under the “corporate benefit” doctrine. This Article examines fee-shifting in share-holder litigation, arguing that current practices are unsound from the perspective of both doctrine and public policy. Unfortunately, the fee-shifting bylaws recently enacted in response to the problem of excessive shareholder litigation fare no better. The Article therefore offers a different approach to fee-shifting, articulating three specific reforms of the corporate benefit doctrine to quell the current crisis in …

Strengthening Charity Law: Replacing Media Oversight With Advance Rulings For Nonprofit Fiduciaries, Linda Sugin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article considers three urgent challenges facing the charitable community and its state regulators: too little fiduciary duty law for nonprofits, the rise of media enforcement of wrongdoing in charities, and an inherent tension in the state’s dual role as enforcer and protector of the nonprofit sector. It analyzes whether the scarcity of law is really a problem by comparing nonprofit organizations with business organizations and concludes that charities lack the selfenforcement mechanisms of businesses and therefore need more government guidance. It evaluates whether the media has made governmental supervision obsolete and expresses skepticism about the press displacing state oversight. …

"Least Restrictive Means”: Burwell V. Hobby Lobby, Noah Marks

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Law Firm Selection And The Value Of Transactional Lawyering, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

Following the contraction in demand for law firms’ services during the Great Recession, “Big Law” was widely diagnosed as suffering from several maladies that would spell its ultimate demise, including excessive fees, excessive size, increased competition from in-house counsel, the commoditization of legal work, and the decline in demand for “relationship firms.” While each of these market pressures is only too real for certain segments of the law-firm population, their threat to the most elite U.S. law firms has been largely misunderstood. Even as many firms reduce their fees and contract in size, we should expect certain firms to continue …

Corporate Law And The Limits Of Private Ordering, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

Solomon-like, the Delaware legislature in 2015 split the baby by amending the Delaware General Corporation Law to authorize forum-selection bylaws and to prohibit charter or bylaw provisions that would shift to the plaintiff defense costs incurred in connection with shareholder suits that were not successfully concluded. The legislature acted after the Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund. v. Chevron Corp ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, broadly empowered the board vis-à-vis the shareholders through the board’s power to amend the bylaws. Repeatedly the analysis used by each court referenced the contractual relationship the shareholders had through the articles of …

Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …

Keynote Reflections: The Public Governance Duty, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Firms must take ever greater risks to try to innovate and create value in our increasingly competitive and complex global economy. Corporate governance law generally delegates control over excessive risk-taking to the firm’s investors, principally its risk-seeking shareholders. But this does not cover the type of risk-taking that led to the global financial crisis and that is becoming ever more common - risk-taking that could have systemic consequences to the financial system. I argue for a “public governance duty,” requiring managers of systemically important firms to assess the impact of risk-taking on the public as well as on investors, and …

The Value Of Soft Variables In Corporate Reorganizations, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

When a company is worth more as a going concern than on a liquidation basis, what creates that additional value? Is it the people, management decisions, the simple synergies of the operating business, or some combination of these types of soft variables? And perhaps more importantly, who owns or has an interest in these soft variables? This article explores these questions under existing legal doctrine and practice norms. Specifically, it discusses the characterization of soft variables under applicable law and in financing documents, and it surveys related judicial decisions. It also considers the overarching public policy and Constitutional implications of …

Agency In The Alternatives: Common-Law Perspectives On Binding The Firm, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter in a forthcoming book examines the external aspects of agency law in the context of unincorporated firms, that is, the capacity of actors associated a firm to bind it to the legal consequences of interactions with third parties. The chapter focuses in particular on the impact of acts done by a representative for which the representative lacked actual authority. The chapter differentiates the terminology and concepts associated with partnership law from the common law of agency, in particular, a partner's capacity to bind the firm albeit the partner lacks actual authority, which the chapter terms the partner's "positional …

Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through An Agency Lens, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

Both praise and controversy surround director-adopted bylaws that affect shareholders' litigation rights. Recent bylaws specify an exclusive forum for litigation of corporate governance claims, limit shareholder claims to resolution through arbitration, and (most controversially) impose a one-way regime of fee shifting on shareholder litigants. To one degree or another, courts have legitimated each development, while commentators differ in their assessments. This Article brings into clear focus issues so far blurred in debates surrounding these types of bylaws. Focusing on forum-selection bylaws, and on Delaware precedents, I argue that beginning from the standpoint of common law agency reveals the attenuated and …

Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking And The Decline Of Personal Blame, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Government agencies and prosecutors are being criticized for seeking so few indictments against individuals in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis and its resulting banking failures. This article analyzes why — contrary to a longstanding historical trend — personal liability may be on the decline, and whether agencies and prosecutors should be doing more. The analysis confronts fundamental policy questions concerning changing corporate and social norms. The public and the media perceive the crisis’s harm as a “wrong” caused by excessive risk-taking. But that view can be too simplistic, ignoring the reality that firms must take greater risks to …

Addressing Agency Costs Through Private Litigation In The U.S: Tensions, Disappointments, And Substitutes, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

Many scholars argue that over the past seventy years, shareholder representative litigation has acted as an important policing mechanism of managerial abuses at U.S. public companies. Different types of representative litigation have had their moment in the sun – derivative suits early on, followed by federal securities class actions, and most recently merger litigation – often producing benefits for shareholders, but posing difficult challenges as well. In particular, the benefits are qualified by another concern, the litigation agency costs that surround shareholder suits. This form of agency costs arises since the suits are invariably representative with no requirement that the …

Corporate Risk-Taking And The Decline Of Personal Blame, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Does Google Content Degrade Google Search? Experimental Evidence, Michael Luca, Tim Wu, Sebastian Couvidat, Daniel Frank

Faculty Scholarship

While Google is known primarily as a search engine, it has increasingly developed and promoted its own content as an alternative to results from other websites. By prominently displaying Google content in response to search queries, Google is able to use its dominance in search to gain customers for this content. This may reduce consumer welfare if the internal content is inferior to organic search results. In this paper, we provide a legal and empirical analysis of this practice in the domain of online reviews. We first identify the conditions under which universal search would be considered anticompetitive. We then …

Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven D. Solomon

Faculty Scholarship

Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …

Loser Pays: The Latest Installment In The Battle-Scarred, Cliff-Hanging Survival Of The Rule 10b-5 Class Action, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

When I was an upper-year student at Yale Law School in the late 1960s, I was sometimes as undermotivated as contemporary upper-year law students regularly appear to be. But there was then an appropriate role model for us: a graduate student, brimming with efficiency and self-discipline, who occupied a carrel in the law library, seemingly working day and night on a special research project. He had piled law review articles and cases a foot or more about his carrel, and anyone walking by could see that he seemed obsessed with something called Rule 10b-5. I had dimly heard of this …