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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Law
"Least Restrictive Means”: Burwell V. Hobby Lobby, Noah Marks
"Least Restrictive Means”: Burwell V. Hobby Lobby, Noah Marks
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Law Firm Selection And The Value Of Transactional Lawyering, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Law Firm Selection And The Value Of Transactional Lawyering, Elisabeth De Fontenay
Faculty Scholarship
Following the contraction in demand for law firms’ services during the Great Recession, “Big Law” was widely diagnosed as suffering from several maladies that would spell its ultimate demise, including excessive fees, excessive size, increased competition from in-house counsel, the commoditization of legal work, and the decline in demand for “relationship firms.” While each of these market pressures is only too real for certain segments of the law-firm population, their threat to the most elite U.S. law firms has been largely misunderstood. Even as many firms reduce their fees and contract in size, we should expect certain firms to continue …
Corporate Law And The Limits Of Private Ordering, James D. Cox
Corporate Law And The Limits Of Private Ordering, James D. Cox
Faculty Scholarship
Solomon-like, the Delaware legislature in 2015 split the baby by amending the Delaware General Corporation Law to authorize forum-selection bylaws and to prohibit charter or bylaw provisions that would shift to the plaintiff defense costs incurred in connection with shareholder suits that were not successfully concluded. The legislature acted after the Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund. v. Chevron Corp ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, broadly empowered the board vis-à-vis the shareholders through the board’s power to amend the bylaws. Repeatedly the analysis used by each court referenced the contractual relationship the shareholders had through the articles of …
Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott
Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …
Keynote Reflections: The Public Governance Duty, Steven L. Schwarcz
Keynote Reflections: The Public Governance Duty, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Firms must take ever greater risks to try to innovate and create value in our increasingly competitive and complex global economy. Corporate governance law generally delegates control over excessive risk-taking to the firm’s investors, principally its risk-seeking shareholders. But this does not cover the type of risk-taking that led to the global financial crisis and that is becoming ever more common - risk-taking that could have systemic consequences to the financial system. I argue for a “public governance duty,” requiring managers of systemically important firms to assess the impact of risk-taking on the public as well as on investors, and …
Agency In The Alternatives: Common-Law Perspectives On Binding The Firm, Deborah A. Demott
Agency In The Alternatives: Common-Law Perspectives On Binding The Firm, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter in a forthcoming book examines the external aspects of agency law in the context of unincorporated firms, that is, the capacity of actors associated a firm to bind it to the legal consequences of interactions with third parties. The chapter focuses in particular on the impact of acts done by a representative for which the representative lacked actual authority. The chapter differentiates the terminology and concepts associated with partnership law from the common law of agency, in particular, a partner's capacity to bind the firm albeit the partner lacks actual authority, which the chapter terms the partner's "positional …
Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through An Agency Lens, Deborah A. Demott
Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through An Agency Lens, Deborah A. Demott
Faculty Scholarship
Both praise and controversy surround director-adopted bylaws that affect shareholders' litigation rights. Recent bylaws specify an exclusive forum for litigation of corporate governance claims, limit shareholder claims to resolution through arbitration, and (most controversially) impose a one-way regime of fee shifting on shareholder litigants. To one degree or another, courts have legitimated each development, while commentators differ in their assessments. This Article brings into clear focus issues so far blurred in debates surrounding these types of bylaws. Focusing on forum-selection bylaws, and on Delaware precedents, I argue that beginning from the standpoint of common law agency reveals the attenuated and …
Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking And The Decline Of Personal Blame, Steven L. Schwarcz
Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking And The Decline Of Personal Blame, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
Government agencies and prosecutors are being criticized for seeking so few indictments against individuals in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis and its resulting banking failures. This article analyzes why — contrary to a longstanding historical trend — personal liability may be on the decline, and whether agencies and prosecutors should be doing more. The analysis confronts fundamental policy questions concerning changing corporate and social norms. The public and the media perceive the crisis’s harm as a “wrong” caused by excessive risk-taking. But that view can be too simplistic, ignoring the reality that firms must take greater risks to …
Addressing Agency Costs Through Private Litigation In The U.S: Tensions, Disappointments, And Substitutes, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Addressing Agency Costs Through Private Litigation In The U.S: Tensions, Disappointments, And Substitutes, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Faculty Scholarship
Many scholars argue that over the past seventy years, shareholder representative litigation has acted as an important policing mechanism of managerial abuses at U.S. public companies. Different types of representative litigation have had their moment in the sun – derivative suits early on, followed by federal securities class actions, and most recently merger litigation – often producing benefits for shareholders, but posing difficult challenges as well. In particular, the benefits are qualified by another concern, the litigation agency costs that surround shareholder suits. This form of agency costs arises since the suits are invariably representative with no requirement that the …
Corporate Risk-Taking And The Decline Of Personal Blame, Steven L. Schwarcz
Corporate Risk-Taking And The Decline Of Personal Blame, Steven L. Schwarcz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.