Law Commons^™

Up Close And Personal With Delaware, Darian M. Ibrahim, Brian J. Broughman

Darian M. Ibrahim

No abstract provided.

Delaware’S Familiarity, Brian J. Broughman, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

No abstract provided.

Delaware's Familiarity, Brian J. Broughman, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

No abstract provided.

Delaware's Capital Jury Selection: Inadequate Voir Dire And The Problem Of Automatic Death Penalty Jurors, Adam M. Gershowitz

Adam M. Gershowitz

No abstract provided.

Delaware Is Not A State: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition In Bankruptcy, G. Marcus Cole

G. Marcus Cole

Over the last twelve years, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware has experienced exponential growth in the number of bankruptcy filings for large corporate debtors. This relatively recent rise in Delaware bankruptcy venue cannot, on its face, be explained by Delaware's eighty-five-year preeminence in the race for corporate charters, since the advantages most often postulated for Delaware's dominance in corporate law do not carry over to corporate bankruptcy. The state has limited influence over federal bankruptcy law and virtually no control over the selection of federal bankruptcy judges.

This rise of Delaware bankruptcy venue, or Delawarization …

Thoughts On Those Transperfect Ads, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii

Robert Bartlett

In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …

Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …

Cost-Based And Rules-Based Regulatory Competition: Markets For Corporate Charters In The U.S. And The E.U., Marco Ventoruzzo

Marco Ventoruzzo

Regulatory competition in corporate law is increasing in Europe and, not differently from what happens in the US, a market for corporate charters is developing in Europe. This article examines the differences between the US corporate law market, and the European one - to the extent that one exists. The basic idea is that, in Europe, there is a stronger competition for the (first) incorporation of rather small, closely-held corporations; while in the US a small closely-held corporation usually incorporates locally, where its shareholders and directors are located, and reincorporates - often in Delaware - when it is growing and, …

How Delaware Law Made Appeal To Revive Gm Ignition Switch Suit A Non-Starter, Paul Regan

Paul L Regan

Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis Of Venue Choice In Bankruptcy , Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.

Kenneth Ayotte

We analyze a sample of large Chapter 11 cases to determine which factors motivate the choice of filing in one court over another when a choice is available. We focus in particular on the Delaware court, which became the most popular venue for large corporations in the 1990s. We find no evidence of agency problems governing the venue choice or affecting the outcome of the bankruptcy process. Instead, firm characteristics and court characteristics, particularly a court's level of experience, are the most important factors. We find that court experience manifests itself in both a greater ability to reorganize marginal firms …

Can Peltz Score?: What’S Behind The May 13 Dupont Vs. Trian Contest, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

The Compromise Verdict: How The Court’S Resolution Of New Jersey V. Delaware Iii Implicitly Advanced Environmental Litigation, Joel M. Pratt

Joel M Pratt

New Jersey and Delaware have often fought over their territorial boundaries in the Delaware River. Three times, they have litigated cases in the Supreme Court under the Court’s original jurisdiction to hear cases or controversies between states. In 1905, a Compact negotiated by the states and confirmed by Congress settled the first case between the two states. The second case between the two states led the Supreme Court to issue a Decree confirming the boundaries of the two states. The third case, which began in 2005, asked the Court to decide the scope of each state’s power to regulate development …

The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, Sheri Johnson, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans, Martin T. Wells

Sheri Lynn Johnson

For the last five years, we have conducted an empirical study of the “modern era” of capital punishment in Delaware. By “modern era,” we refer to the time period after the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v.Georgia, which invalidated all then-existing state death penalty regimes. Some readers might ask, “Why Delaware?” They might observe that it is a small state and is not a significant national player in terms of death sentences imposed or death row inmates executed. While both are true, several features of Delaware’s capital punishment system intrigue us. First, Delaware has a high death sentencing rate. …

The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, Sheri Johnson, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans, Martin T. Wells

John H. Blume

For the last five years, we have conducted an empirical study of the “modern era” of capital punishment in Delaware. By “modern era,” we refer to the time period after the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v.Georgia, which invalidated all then-existing state death penalty regimes. Some readers might ask, “Why Delaware?” They might observe that it is a small state and is not a significant national player in terms of death sentences imposed or death row inmates executed. While both are true, several features of Delaware’s capital punishment system intrigue us. First, Delaware has a high death sentencing rate. …

Widener Adds Support For A State-Sponsored Law School, Erin Daly

Erin Daly

No abstract provided.

Assessing The Legal Toolbox For Sea Level Rise Adaptation In Delaware: Options And Challenges For Regulators, Policymakers, Property Owners, And The Public, Kenneth Kristl

Kenneth T Kristl

Sea level rise is a real and growing issue in the State of Delaware. Over the next 90 years, a significant percentage—between 8 and 11 percent—of Delaware is at risk of being inundated. The threat of inundation has the potential to trigger reactions from some property owners that will seek to protect their interests. Thousands of these resulting individual, ad hoc decisions and non-decisions will make it difficult to carry out a unified strategy to adapt to the massive economic and geographic impacts sea level rise will likely cause in the State. It therefore behooves regulators, policy makers, property owners, …

A Delaware Response To Delaware's Choice, Lawrence Hamermesh, Norman Monhait

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

This article is an invited response to Professor Subramanian’s article “Delaware’s Choice.” The article expresses skepticism, for two primary reasons, about the need for the change to Delaware’s takeover statute that Professor Subramanian proposes. First, there is uncertainty that the constitutionality of that statute would be evaluated today under a test as demanding as the one that was applied when the statute was upheld in the late 1980s. Second, citing an earlier article by A. Gilchrist Sparks and Helen Bowers, we question whether a constitutional evaluation of the takeover statute should be limited to data on tender offers that are …

M&A Under Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation Statute: A Hypothetical Tour, Frederick Alexander, Lawrence Hamermesh, Frank Martin, Norman Monhait

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Noting the enthusiastic initial response to Delaware’s 2013 public benefit corporation statute, this Article presents a series of hypotheticals as vehicles for comment on issues that are likely to arise in the context of mergers and acquisitions of public benefit corporations. The Article first examines appraisal rights, concluding that such rights will be generally available to stockholders in public benefit corporations, and noting the potential for ambiguity in defining “fair value” where the corporation’s purposes extend to public purposes as well as private profit. Next, the Article examines whether and to what extent “Revlon” duties and limitations on deal protection …

Consent In Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Recent Delaware case law explores and extends what the author describes as the “doctrine of corporate consent,” under which a stockholder is deemed to consent to changes in the corporate relationship that are adopted pursuant to statutory authority (such as by directors adopting bylaws). This essay examines whether and to what extent there may be limits on the application of the doctrine of corporate consent, and whether fee-shifting bylaws exceed those limits.

Justice Joseph T. Walsh: Teacher, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

Wasting The Corporate Waste Doctrine: Why Waste Claims Are Obsolete In Delaware Corporate Law And Why The Waste Doctrine Is The Wrong Solution To The Problem Of Executive Compensation, Kris S. Swift

Kris S. Swift

Abstract

Kristen S. Swift

This Note makes several points, drawn from Delaware litigation history, on the futility of pleading corporate waste in Delaware. At inception, the waste doctrine was a tool for shareholder protection and empowerment; however, as calculated business risk became encouraged and later formally protected by the business judgment rule, the waste doctrine evolved to protect officers and boards and now sets a nearly impossible benchmark for misconduct that would allow shareholders to recover on a waste claim. The waste doctrine is inextricably tied to how business risk-taking is perceived by Delaware courts and shifting attitudes toward risk …

10 Things That Tick Off The Chancellors, And The Ethical Issues They Raise, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

Damning Dictum: The Default Duty Debate In Delaware, Mohsen Manesh

Mohsen Manesh

Bizarrely, today even the most sophisticated business lawyer cannot answer a seemingly simple question: whether, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, the manager of a Delaware limited liability company (LLC) owes traditional fiduciary duties to its members as a default matter? This was not always the case. Until recently, this question was settled—settled at least in the Delaware Court of Chancery. But in November 2012, the Delaware Supreme Court cast doubt on a long line of chancery court precedent in Gatz Properties v. Auriga Capital. Given the broad freedom of contract available under LLC law, it …

Recent Developments In Delaware Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh, Faiza Saeed, Mark Gentile

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

The Law Of Corporate Purpose, David Yosifon

David G. Yosifon

Delaware corporate law requires corporate directors to manage firms for the benefit of shareholders, and not for any other constituency. Delaware jurists have been clear about this in their case law, and they are not coy about it in extra-judicial settings, such as speeches directed at law students and practicing members of the corporate bar. Nevertheless, the reader of leading corporate law scholarship is continually exposed to the scholarly assertion that the law is ambiguous or ambivalent on this point, or even that case law affirmatively empowers directors to pursue non-shareholder interests. It is shocking, and troubling, for corporate law …

Delaware's Non-Waivable Duties, Lyman P. Q. Johnson

Lyman P. Q. Johnson

This Article disputes the view - seemingly settled among scholars, judges, and lawyers - that recently - enacted statutes in Delaware legally permit fiduciary duties to be waived in noncorporate business associations. The argument is a rarity in business law because it is a constitutional argument, not one initially based on policy considerations or statutory interpretation, and it seeks to harmonize judicial review of fiduciary duties in noncorporate businesses with that in Delaware corporations, where waivers are not permitted. Delaware’s Constitution vests the Delaware Court of Chancery with general equity jurisdiction and powers of a kind that cannot be curtailed …

Good Faith In Revlon-Land, Christopher M. Bruner

Christopher M. Bruner

The Delaware Supreme Court has set a very high hurdle for plaintiffs challenging directors' good faith in the sale of a company. In Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan, the court held that unconflicted directors could be found to have breached the good faith component of their duty of loyalty in the transactional context only if they "knowingly and completely failed to undertake," and "utterly failed to attempt" to discharge their duties. In this essay I argue that the Lyondell standard effectively imports into the transactional context the exacting standard previously applied in the oversight context — a move clearly aimed …

How To Sufficiently Consider Efficiency, Competition, And Capital Formation In The Wake Of Business Roundtable, Ian D. Ghrist

Ian D. Ghrist

This article applies ideas from the Law and Economics movement to the D.C. Circuit's 2011 decision in Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission. The article lays out a framework for cost-benefit analysis that, if followed, should increase new rules' chances of surviving the heightened arbitrary and capricious review standard imposed by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996.

The Dodd-Frank Act comprises the broadest financial reforms since the 1930s. The Act, however, makes surprisingly few important decisions and instead, almost exclusively defers to agency rulemaking or the creation of a new organization. The Act mandates the promulgation of …

Executive Summary Of Special Report Submitted To The Honorable Jack Markell Governor, State Of Delaware, May 10, 2010, Independent Review Of The Earl Brian Bradley Case, Linda Ammons

Linda L. Ammons

No abstract provided.