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Articles 91 - 97 of 97
Full-Text Articles in Law
Jurisprudenta In Materia Concurentei. Obligatia De A Solicita O Hotarare Preliminara., Emanuela Matei
Jurisprudenta In Materia Concurentei. Obligatia De A Solicita O Hotarare Preliminara., Emanuela Matei
Emanuela A. Matei
No abstract provided.
Ending Patent Exceptionalism & Structuring The Rule Of Reason: The Supreme Court Opens The Door For Both, Robin C. Feldman
Ending Patent Exceptionalism & Structuring The Rule Of Reason: The Supreme Court Opens The Door For Both, Robin C. Feldman
Robin C Feldman
Is There A Market For Organic Search Engine Results And Can Their Manipulation Give Rise To Antitrust Liability?, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, James Ratliff
Is There A Market For Organic Search Engine Results And Can Their Manipulation Give Rise To Antitrust Liability?, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, James Ratliff
Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Google has been accused of manipulating its organic search results to favor its own services. We explore possible choices of relevant antitrust markets that might make these various antitrust allegations meaningful. We argue that viewing Internet search in isolation ignores the two-sided nature of the search-advertising platform and the feedback effects that link the provision of organic search results to consumers on the one hand, and the sale to businesses of advertising on the other. We conclude that the relevant market in which Google competes with respect to Internet search is at least as broad as a two-sided search-advertising market. …
Antitrust Settlements, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Antitrust Settlements, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Daniel L. Rubinfeld
The Hidden Costs Of Free Goods: Implications For Antitrust Enforcement, Michal Gal, Daniel Rubinfeld
The Hidden Costs Of Free Goods: Implications For Antitrust Enforcement, Michal Gal, Daniel Rubinfeld
Michal Gal
Today a growing number of goods and services are provided in the marketplace free of charge; indeed, free or the appearance of free, have become part of our ecosystem. More often than not, free goods and services provide real benefits to consumers and are clearly pro-competitive. Yet free goods may also create significant costs. We show that despite the fact that the consumer does not pay a direct price, there are indirect prices that reflect the opportunity cost associated with the consumption of free goods. These indirect costs can be overt or covert, in the same market in which the …
Measuring Benchmark Damages In Antitrust Litigation, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Justin Mccrary
Measuring Benchmark Damages In Antitrust Litigation, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Justin Mccrary
Justin McCrary
We compare the two dominant approaches to estimation of benchmark damages in antitrust litigation, the forecasting approach and the dummy variable approach. We give conditions under which the two approaches are equivalent and present the results of a small simulation study.
Network Nepotism And The Market For Content Delivery, Tejas N. Narechania