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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Long-Term Effects Of Short Selling And Negative Activism, Peter Molk, Frank Partnoy Jan 2022

The Long-Term Effects Of Short Selling And Negative Activism, Peter Molk, Frank Partnoy

UF Law Faculty Publications

We investigate the long-term effects of short selling and “negative activism,” where activists seek to profit from declines in the share prices of targeted firms. We show that negative activism is associated with significant and declining long-term share returns and operating performance, as well as an increase in securities litigation and regulatory actions against targeted firms. We explore the policy implications of this new evidence, including ways that policy makers and market participants might take advantage of the potential benefits of short selling negative activism. Our message is straightforward: resist impulses to curb short selling, and instead embrace attempts to …


Institutional Investors As Short Sellers?, Peter Molk, Frank Partnoy Jan 2019

Institutional Investors As Short Sellers?, Peter Molk, Frank Partnoy

UF Law Faculty Publications

Short selling has the potential to improve the efficiency and fairness of equity markets. Yet institutional investors face both private and regulatory constraints to short selling. We document these obstacles and consider the potential benefits of removing them. We advocate that institutional investors engage in more short selling as part of overall net-long equity strategies, such as a leveraged passive equity index combined with an actively managed short position of a size comparable to the amount of leverage.


The Ownership Of Health Insurers, Peter Molk Jan 2016

The Ownership Of Health Insurers, Peter Molk

UF Law Faculty Publications

Spending by private health insurers exceeds $800 billion and is expected to rise. The Affordable Care Act provides $2 billion in subsidies to jump-start health insurers owned by their policyholders in an attempt to bring these costs under control. Firms with this corporate ownership structure have succeeded in other insurance markets, where Nationwide, Northwestern Mutual, and State Farm are just a few prominent examples. However, the potential of policyholder ownership in health insurance, which is dominated by investor and nonprofit ownership, is poorly understood. This Article applies theories of corporate ownership and control to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of …


The Lessons From Libor For Detection And Deterrence Of Cartel Wrongdoing, Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, D. Daniel Sokol Oct 2012

The Lessons From Libor For Detection And Deterrence Of Cartel Wrongdoing, Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

In late June 2012, Barclays entered into a $453 million settlement with UK and U.S. regulators due to its manipulation of Libor between 2005 and 2009. Among the agencies that investigated Barclays is the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (as well as other antitrust authorities and regulatory agencies from around the world). Participation in a price fixing conduct, by its very nature, requires the involvement of more than one firm.

We are cautious to draw overly broad conclusions until more facts come out in the public domain. What we note at this time, based on public information, is that the …


Executive Trade Secrets, Tom C.W. Lin Jan 2012

Executive Trade Secrets, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

The law discriminates among a corporation’s secrets. In the eyes of the law, commercial secrets of corporations are legitimate secrets that deserve legal protection and nondisclosure, but personal secrets of executives are not as deserving of legal protection and nondisclosure. This divergent treatment of secrets has resulted in a legal landscape of perplexing, paradoxical paths for corporations and executives concerning executive disclosures — a precarious landscape that has left corporations and investors dangerously susceptible to revelations of private facts that shock market valuation and institutional stability.

This Article explores this divergent treatment of secrets in the context of public corporations …


The Corporate Governance Of Iconic Executives, Tom C.W. Lin Nov 2011

The Corporate Governance Of Iconic Executives, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Essay explores the special corporate governance challenges posed by iconic executives. Iconic executives are complex, bittersweet figures in corporate governance narratives. They are alluring, larger-than-life corporate figures who often govern freely. Iconic executives frequently rule like monarchs over their firms, offering lofty promises to shareholders, directors, and managers under their reign. But like many stories of powerful and influential figures, the narratives of iconic executives also contain adversity and danger. Part of the acquiescence and enchantment with such figures is rooted in the virtuous promises embodied by their presence, promises of unity, accountability, and effectiveness in corporate governance. Unfortunately, …


Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee Apr 2010

Fiduciary Exemption For Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, And The Hobson's Choice During A National Crisis, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article is written as two discrete, independently accessible topical sections. The first topical section, presented in Part I of this Article, is a case study of Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the impact of a flawed merger execution on the board’s subsequent decisions. The second topical section, presented Parts II-IV of this Article, advances a theoretical basis for fiduciary exemption during a public crisis. The financial crisis of 2008 was the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression. It nearly resulted in a collapse of the global capital markets. A key event in the history of …


Too Big To Fail, Too Blind To See, Tom C.W. Lin Jan 2010

Too Big To Fail, Too Blind To See, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

Too Big to Fail by Andrew Ross Sorkin offers a meticulous re-telling of one of the most important periods in recent history. As regulators, bankers, lawyers, scholars, and other interested parties sift through the rubble in search of knowledge about the crash, Too Big to Fail serves both as a chronicle of the recent past and a cautionary tale for the immediate future. Acknowledging past missteps, uncovering root causes, and correcting systemic shortcomings to prevent similar failure is arguably the key economic and regulatory challenge of our time. Part I of this Essay summarizes key episodes of the financial crisis …


Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol Jan 2009

Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

The legal origins literature overlooks a key area of corporate governance-the governance of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). There are key theoretical differences between SOEs and publicly-traded corporations. In comparing the differences of both internal and external controls of SOEs, none of the existing legal origins allow for effective corporate governance monitoring. Because of the difficulties of undertaking a cross-country quantitative review of the governance of SOEs, this Article examines, through a series of case studies, SOE governance issues among postal providers. The examination of postal firms supports the larger theoretical claim about the weaknesses of SOE governance across legal origins. In …


Undressing The Ceo: Disclosing Private, Material Matters Of Public Company Executives, Tom C.W. Lin Jan 2009

Undressing The Ceo: Disclosing Private, Material Matters Of Public Company Executives, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

Disclosing material private matters of public company executives is a difficult and complex but sometimes necessary act. Advocates that favor more disclosure and advocates that favor more privacy both have many legitimate arguments and concerns. This article argues that when viewed in the context of contemporary capital markets, the enhanced role of the executive, and the modern media, additional disclosure from executives about material, private matters is desirable. In support of this argument, this article proposes a principle-based approach for executive disclosure that affords companies and executives reasonable deference on what to disclose and how to disclose it, while simultaneously …


The Myth Of The Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, Lynn M. Lopucki Jan 2004

The Myth Of The Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, Lynn M. Lopucki

UF Law Faculty Publications

Most bankruptcy scholars who have considered the residual owner approach have come away with a healthy skepticism. But despite its theoretical difficulties, the residual owner approach persists. I attribute this persistence to an empirical assumption that usually remains implicit. In spite of the theoretical difficulties in identifying the single residual owners of bankrupt firms, the scholars who employ residual owner approaches believe that in reality, residual owners exist and can be easily identified inmost cases. Parties may bluster about the uncertainty of firm value and other parties may be compelled to compromise with them in order to avoid an expensive, …