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Patricia A. McCoy

Banking and Finance

Securities Law

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Securitization And Systemic Risk Amid Deregulation And Regulatory Failure Apr 2009

Securitization And Systemic Risk Amid Deregulation And Regulatory Failure

Patricia A. McCoy

During the recent housing boom, private-label securitization without regulation was unsustainable. Without regulation, securitization allowed mortgage industry actors to gain fees and to put off risks. The ability to pass off risk allowed lenders and securitizers to compete for market share by lowering their lending standards, which activated more borrowing. Lenders who did not join in the easing of lending standards were crowded out of the market. Meanwhile, the mortgages underlying securities became more exposed to growing default risk, but investors did not receive higher rates of return. Artificially low risk premia caused the asset price of houses to go …


Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance Of Predatory Lending Feb 2007

Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance Of Predatory Lending

Patricia A. McCoy

Today, Wall Street finances up to eighty percent of subprime home loans through securitization. The subprime sector, which is designed for borrowers with blemished credit, has been dogged by predatory lending charges, many of which have been substantiated. As subprime securitization has grown, so have charges that securitization turns a blind eye to financing abusive loans. In this paper, we examine why secondary market discipline has failed to halt the securitization of predatory loans.

When investors buy securities backed by predatory loans, they face a classic lemons problem in the form of credit risk, prepayment risk, and litigation risk. Securitization …


Predatory Lending: What’S Wall Street Got To Do With It?, Dec 2003

Predatory Lending: What’S Wall Street Got To Do With It?,

Patricia A. McCoy

In this article, we examine the contention that the secondary market will exert sufficient market discipline to drive predatory home loan lenders from the subprime marketplace. Using a so‐called lemons model, we identify the potential risks that investors encounter if they buy securities backed by predatory home loans. We then explain how structured finance, deal provisions, pricing mechanisms, and legal protections shield investors from much of the risk that those loans entail.

While the secondary market does impose some discipline on the subprime home loan market, it is not enough to bring predatory lending to a halt. We provide rationales …