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Full-Text Articles in Law
Framing Elite Consensus, Ideology And Theory And A Classcrits Response, Athena D. Mutua
Framing Elite Consensus, Ideology And Theory And A Classcrits Response, Athena D. Mutua
Journal Articles
This short paper, really a thought piece, builds upon the examination begun in the Foreword of the ClassCrits VI Symposium which sought to outline a ClassCrits critique of neoclassical economic principles. It argues that neoliberal practices, theory and ideology, built on the scaffold of neoclassical economic ideas, frame an elite consensus that makes elites feel good but which are ethically, intellectually, and structurally problematic for the social well-being of most Americans. It does so, in part, by chronicling a number of recent practices of large corporations, including for example, the practice of inversion. Again, this paper takes as its specific …
Ranks And Rivals: A Theory Of Competition, Avishalom Tor, Stephen M. Garcia, Richard Gonzalez
Ranks And Rivals: A Theory Of Competition, Avishalom Tor, Stephen M. Garcia, Richard Gonzalez
Journal Articles
Social comparison theories typically assume a comparable degree of competition between commensurate rivals on a mutually important dimension. In contrast, however, the following set of studies reveals that the degree of competition between such rivals depends on their proximity to a standard. Studies 1-3 test the prediction that individuals become more competitive and less willing to maximize profitable joint gains when they and their commensurate rivals are highly ranked (e.g., #2 vs. #3) than when they are not (e.g., #202 vs. #203). Studies 4-6 then generalize these findings, showing that the degree of competition increases not only for high ranks …
The Fable Of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, And Legal Policy, Avishalom Tor
The Fable Of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, And Legal Policy, Avishalom Tor
Journal Articles
Legal scholars have recently advanced a behavioral approach to the law and economics school of thought, replacing the traditionally assumed rational actor with an empirically based, boundedly rational decision maker. In response, advocates of traditional law and economics have asserted that boundedly rational behavior is of little significance for the analysis of economic activities in market environments, most notably because competitive pressures will eliminate such behavior. This article argues, however, that bounded rationality has important effects on the market even under conditions of intense competition. Through a study of the competition among new entrants into industry, this analysis examines the …