Law Commons^™

The Disparate Treatment Of Rights In U.S. Trade, Desirée Leclercq

Fordham Law Review

Rights advocates are increasingly urging U.S. trade negotiators to include new binding and sanctionable provisions that would protect human rights, women’s rights, and gender equality. Their efforts are understandable. Trade agreements have significant advantages as a process for advancing international rights. Even though Congress and the executive incorporate international environmental standards and labor rights into U.S. trade agreements, they have refused to incorporate gender rights and broader human rights. The rationale behind the United States’s disparate treatment of rights in trade has received almost no scholarly attention. That is a mistake. Using labor rights as a case study, this Article …

Avoiding Market Definition Under Section 1 Of The Sherman Act, Johnny Shaw

Fordham Law Review

The 2018 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. American Express Co. was at odds with a trend among antitrust commentators and enforcement authorities away from dependence on formal market definition as part of plaintiffs’ burden of proof. Reliance on market definition as a dispositive issue has been ubiquitous in antitrust cases, but the costs from errors, inefficiency, and uncertainty inherent in that approach are glaring. The issue is ripe for clarification, and this Note suggests a new rule to that end. The proposed rule aims to delineate a set of cases in which formal market definition can confidently be …

Amazon And Platform Antitrust, Ben Bloodstein

Fordham Law Review

With its decision in Ohio v. American Express, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time embraced the recently developed, yet increasingly prolific, concept of the two-sided platform. Through advances in technology, platforms, which serve as intermediaries allowing two groups to transact, are increasingly ubiquitous, and many of the biggest tech companies operate in this fashion. Amazon Marketplace, for example, provides a platform for third-party vendors to sell directly to consumers through Amazon’s web and mobile interfaces. At the same time that platforms and their scholarship have evolved, a burgeoning antitrust movement has also developed which focuses on the …

Disagreeing Over Agreements: A Cross-Sectional Analysis Of No-Poaching Agreements In The Franchise Sector, Catherine E. Schaefer

Fordham Law Review

In October 2016, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division announced its intent to proceed criminally against parties to no-poaching agreements, or agreements between or among employers not to hire each other’s workers. Consequently, a wave of class action antitrust lawsuits has raised questions about the legality of no-poaching or no-hire provisions that certain franchised food businesses use. Fast-food restaurant chains, including McDonald’s, Carl’s Jr., and Pizza Hut, have recently found themselves embroiled in such litigation. This Note examines prior antitrust litigation involving no-poaching agreements between companies and discusses the differences and similarities between these cases and the cases involving franchised …

Constraining Monitors, Veronica Root

Fordham Law Review

Part I of this Article explains the failure of recent attempts by courts and legislators to constrain monitor behavior. Part II then argues that one reason for the lack of monitorship regulation lies in the reluctance of bar associations to oversee quasi-legal behavior. It then explains why reputation appears to be the primary factor reigning in monitor behavior today. Part III discusses implications of this Article’s findings. Specifically, it discusses concerns regarding the disclosure of information, the boundaries of the relationship between a monitor and other parties, and the ways a monitor’s identity might be utilized as a sanctioning mechanism. …

Constraining Monitors, Veronica Root

Fordham Law Review

Part I of this Article explains the failure of recent attempts by courts and legislators to constrain monitor behavior. Part II then argues that one reason for the lack of monitorship regulation lies in the reluctance of bar associations to oversee quasi-legal behavior. It then explains why reputation appears to be the primary factor reigning in monitor behavior today. Part III discusses implications of this Article’s findings. Specifically, it discusses concerns regarding the disclosure of information, the boundaries of the relationship between a monitor and other parties, and the ways a monitor’s identity might be utilized as a sanctioning mechanism. …

Antitrust Jurisprudence In The Second Circuit, Saul P. Morgenstern, Jennifer B. Patterson, Terri A. Mazur

Fordham Law Review

A running thread through Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence is a willingness to examine market participants’ real-world conduct and the consequences of that conduct in seeking out the balance between incentivizing robust competition and protecting the market—and ultimately consumers—from distortions caused by anticompetitive conduct. This Article collects and describes rulings that reflect such themes in Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence. The court’s long history in this substantive space, its likely continued exposure to critical antitrust questions, and the importance of this area of the law to our national economy assure that others will be examining and shedding further light on the Second …

How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, Barak Orbach

Fordham Law Review

During the first seven decades following the enactment of the Sherman Act, competition was the uncontroversial goal of antitrust. The introduction of the consumer welfare standard led to the dissipation of “competition” as the goal of U.S. competition laws. This Essay explores how antitrust lost the goal of competition and argues that this goal should be restored. The Essay reevaluates several influential antitrust propositions. First, while “consumer welfare” was offered as a remedy for reconciling contradictions and inconsistencies in antitrust, the adoption of the consumer welfare standard sparked an enduring controversy, causing confusion and doctrinal uncertainty. In effect, the consumer …

Welfare Standards In U.S. And E.U. Antitrust Enforcement , Roger D. Blair, D. Daniel Sokol

Fordham Law Review

The potential goals of antitrust are numerous. Goals matter to antitrust. We believe that it is total welfare rather than consumer welfare that should drive antitrust analysis. We use this Article as an opportunity to explore both a comparative analysis of welfare standards across E.U. and U.S. competition systems and the impact of welfare standards on global antitrust systemwide welfare.

In this Article, we analyze two types of situations in which there would be a different outcome based on the goal implemented. One scenario involves resale price maintenance (RPM). For RPM, we argue that even if there were a different …

Foreword: Antitrust’S Pursuit Of Purpose, Barak Orbach

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, And The Goals Of Competition Law, David A. Hyman, William E. Kovacic

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Economics And Politics: Perspectives On The Goals And Future Of Antitrust, Jonathan B. Baker

Fordham Law Review

This Article examines the roles of economics and politics in U.S. antitrust from several perspectives. It explains why the modern debate over the economic welfare standard that enforcers and courts should pursue is unsatisfying. It connects economics with politics by describing antitrust’s economic goals as the product of a mid-twentieth century political understanding about the nature of economic regulation that continues to be accepted. To protect that understanding, it explains, antitrust rules should now be implemented using a qualified consumer welfare standard. It identifies contemporary political tensions that threaten to create regulatory gridlock or even to undermine that political understanding …

Reframing The (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare And Total Welfare, Alan J. Meese

Fordham Law Review

This Article critiques the role that the partial equilibrium trade–off paradigm plays in the debate over the definition of “consumer welfare” that courts should employ when developing and applying antitrust doctrine. The Article contends that common reliance on the paradigm distorts the debate between those who would equate “consumer welfare” with “total welfare” and those who equate consumer welfare with “purchaser welfare.” In particular, the model excludes, by fiat, the fact that new efficiencies free up resources that flow to other markets, increasing output and thus the welfare of purchasers in those markets. Moreover, the model also assumes that both …

Trusts And The Origins Of Antitrust Legislation, Wayne D. Collins

Fordham Law Review

Between 1888 and 1890, thirteen states and the federal government enacted antitrust legislation criminalizing combinations among competitors intended to control prices in the marketplace. These laws were a reaction to the increasing formation of horizontal combinations, large and small, throughout the economy in the wake of dramatically changing economic conditions since the Civil War. Through most of this period, combinations struggled to find structures that would enable them to operate effectively. Simple combinations of independent firms, although neither criminal nor tortious, were often undermined because state common law refused to enforce the contractual arrangements that would prevent members from deviating …

A Traditional And Textualist Analysis Of The Goals Of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft From Consumers, And Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande

Fordham Law Review

This Article ascertains the overall purpose of the antitrust statutes in two very different ways. First, it performs a traditional analysis of the legislative history of the antitrust laws by analyzing relevant legislative debates and committee reports. Second, it undertakes a textualist or “plain meaning” analysis of the purpose of the antitrust statutes, using Justice Scalia’s methodology. It does this by analyzing the meaning of key terms as they were used in contemporary dictionaries, legal treatises, common law cases, and the earliest U.S. antitrust cases, and it does this in light of the history of the relevant times.

Both approaches …

The Goals Of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, Joshua D. Wright, Douglas H. Ginsburg

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Essence Of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers And Small Suppliers From Anticompetitive Conduct, John B. Kirkwood

Fordham Law Review

The goals of antitrust law continue to be debated because there is no single goal that is unambiguously correct. There is one goal, however, that now commands wider support than any other: protecting consumers and small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct—conduct that creates market power, transfers wealth from consumers or small suppliers, and fails to provide them with compensating benefits. This goal is the predominant objective in the legislative histories, it is broadly supported by the American people, it is easier to administer than a total welfare standard, and it is now espoused by the majority of courts.

Proponents of total …

Implementing Antitrust’S Welfare Goals, Herbert Hovenkamp

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust’S Democracy Deficit, Harry First, Spencer Weber Waller

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.

Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?, Maurice E. Stucke

Fordham Law Review

What, if anything, are the implications of the happiness economics literature on competition policy? This Article first examines whether competition policy should promote (or at least not impede) citizens’ opportunities to increase well–being. It next surveys the happiness literature on five key issues: (i) What constitutes well–being; (ii) How do you measure well–being; (iii) What increases well–being; (iv) Do people want to be happy; and (v) Can and should the government promote total well–being? Although the happiness literature does not provide an analytical framework for analyzing routine antitrust issues, this does not mean that competition officials should discount or ignore …

Merger Settlement And Enforcement Policy For Optimal Deterrence And Maximum Welfare, Steven C. Salop

Fordham Law Review

Merger enforcement today relies on settlements more than litigation to resolve anticompetitive concerns. The impact of settlement policy on welfare and the proper goals of settlement policy are highly controversial. Some argue that gun–shy agencies settle for too little, while others argue that agencies use their power to delay to extract overreaching settlement terms, even when mergers are not welfare reducing. This Article uses decision theory to throw light on this controversy. The goal of this Article is to formulate and analyze agency merger enforcement and settlement commitment policies in the face of imperfect information, litigation costs, and delay risks …

Against Goals, Eleanor M. Fox

Fordham Law Review

No abstract provided.