Law Commons^™

China's Turn Against Law, Carl F. Minzner

Faculty Scholarship

Chinese authorities are reconsidering legal reforms they enacted in the 1980s and 1990s. These reforms had emphasized law, litigation, and courts as institutions for resolving civil grievances between citizens and administrative grievances against the state. But social stability concerns have led top leaders to question these earlier reforms. Central Party leaders now fault legal reforms for insufficiently responding to (or even generating) surging numbers of petitions and protests.

Chinese authorities have now drastically altered course. Substantively, they are de-emphasizing the role of formal law and court adjudication. They are attempting to revive pre-1978 Maoist-style court mediation practices. Procedurally, Chinese authorities …

Judicial Disciplinary Systems For Incorrectly Decided Cases: The Imperial Chinese Heritage Lives On, Carl F. Minzner

Faculty Scholarship

Local Chinese courts commonly use responsibility systems (mubiao guanli zeren zhi, zeren zhuijiu zhi) to evaluate and discipline judges. Judges receive sanctions under these systems for a wide range of behavior, such as illegal or unethical dealings with parties and lawyers, inappropriate courtroom behavior, and neglect of duty.

Many local court Chinese responsibility systems also discipline judges for simple legal error. Judges may face sanctions linked to the number of cases that are reversed on appeal, simply because the interpretation of law made by a higher court differs from that of the original trial judge. Sanctions include monetary fines and …

Riots And Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control Of Local Agents In China, Carl F. Minzner

Faculty Scholarship

Chinese cadre responsibility systems are a core element of Chinese law and governance. These top-down personnel systems set concrete target goals linked to official salaries and career advancement. Judges and courts face annual targets for permissible numbers of mediated, reversed, and closed cases; Communist Party secretaries and government bureaus face similar targets for allowable numbers of protests, traffic accidents, and mine disasters. For many local Chinese officials, these targets have a much more direct impact on their behavior than do formal legal and regulatory norms.

This Article argues that Chinese authorities are dependent on responsibility systems, particularly their use of …

Xinfang: An Alternative To Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, Carl F. Minzner

Faculty Scholarship

Formal legal institutions are almost entirely absent from the lives of most Chinese citizens. A range of petitioning institutions and practices operate as a dysfunctional proxy for formal legal channels. Deeply rooted in imperial Chinese history, these practices and institutions have survived into the present in the form of citizen petitioning efforts directed at numerous “letters and visits” (xinfang) bureaus distributed throughout Chinese government organs, including the courts.

This Article examines the historical origins and regulatory basis for the modern xinfang system. It outlines the characteristic tactics of Chinese petitioners who seek to use the system to resolve their grievances. …