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Dangerous Diagnoses, Risky Assumptions, And The Failed Experiment Of "Sexually Violent Predator" Commitment, Deirdre M. Smith
Dangerous Diagnoses, Risky Assumptions, And The Failed Experiment Of "Sexually Violent Predator" Commitment, Deirdre M. Smith
Faculty Publications
In its 1997 opinion, Kansas v. Hendricks, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law that reflected a new model of civil commitment. The targets of this new commitment law were dubbed “Sexually Violent Predators” (SVPs), and the Court upheld indefinite detention of these individuals on the assumption that there is a psychiatrically distinct class of individuals who, unlike typical recidivists, have a mental condition that impairs their ability to refrain from violent sexual behavior. And, more specifically, the Court assumed that the justice system could reliably identify the true “predators,” those for whom this unusual and extraordinary deprivation of liberty …
Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, Dmitry Bam
Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, Dmitry Bam
Faculty Publications
In this article, I argue that the recusal procedure used in state and federal courts for nearly all of American history is unconstitutional. For centuries, recusal procedure in the United States has largely resembled that of England before American independence. To this day, in most American courtrooms, the judge hearing the case decides whether recusal is required under the applicable substantive recusal rules. If the judge determines that she can act impartially, or that her impartiality could not reasonably be questioned, the judge remains on the case. And although the judge’s decision is typically subject to appellate review — with …
Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under The Due Process Clause, Dmitry Bam
Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under The Due Process Clause, Dmitry Bam
Faculty Publications
It is virtually impossible to discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. without hearing some variant of the following response: “I can’t believe it was as close as it was.” And it does not matter whether you are chatting with your next-door neighbor who had never thought about judicial ethics in his life or discussing the case with a judicial-recusal expert. Nearly everyone seems to agree: Caperton was an “easy” case and that four justices dissented is an indication that there is something terribly wrong. Not only has Caperton elevated the issue of judicial impartiality …