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Full-Text Articles in Law

Discourse Norms As Default Rules: Structuring Corporate Speech To Multiple Stakeholders, David Yosifon Jan 2011

Discourse Norms As Default Rules: Structuring Corporate Speech To Multiple Stakeholders, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

This Article analyzes corporate speech problems through the framework of corporate law. The focus here is on the "discourse norms" that regulate corporate speech to various corporate stakehold-ers, including shareholders, workers, and consumers. I argue that these "discourse norms" should be understood as default terms in the "nexus-of-contracts" that comprises the corporation. Having reviewed the failure of corporate law as it bears on the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders such as workers and consumers, I urge the adoption of prescriptive discourse norms as an approach to reforming corporate governance in a socially useful manner.


Beyond The Berle And Means Paradigm: Private Equity And The New Capitalist Order, Stephen F. Diamond Jan 2011

Beyond The Berle And Means Paradigm: Private Equity And The New Capitalist Order, Stephen F. Diamond

Faculty Publications

The chapter will proceed in five parts. First, I will attempt to describe the world as managers of private equity funds as well as some of their critics see it. Second, I will summarize the structure and mechanics of PE funds, including the importance of leverage to their success. Third, I will discuss what I have referred to here as the separation of ownership and control problem, including its modern formulation as an "agency" problem, first clearly formulated by Berle and Means. Fourth, I will critically assess the "counter-attack" on PE funds from labor and the left, which I believe …


Consumer Interest In Corporate Law, David Yosifon Nov 2009

Consumer Interest In Corporate Law, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

This Article provides a comprehensive assessment of the consumer interest in dominant theories of the corporation and in the fundamental doctrines of corporate law. In so doing, the Article fills a void in contemporary corporate law scholarship, which has failed to give sustained attention to consumers in favor of exploring the interests of other corporate stakeholders, especially shareholders, creditors, and workers. Utilizing insights derived from the law and behavioralism movement, this Article examines, in particular, the limitations of the shareholder primacy norm at the heart of prevailing "nexus of contracts" and "team production" theories of the firm. The Article concludes …