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Full-Text Articles in Law
Escaping Entity-Centrism In Financial Services Regulation, Anita K. Krug
Escaping Entity-Centrism In Financial Services Regulation, Anita K. Krug
Articles
In the ongoing discussions about financial services regulation, one critically important topic has not been recognized, let alone addressed. That topic is what this Article calls the “entity-centrism” of financial services regulation. Laws and rules are entity-centric when they assume that a financial services firm is a stand-alone entity, operating separately from and independently of any other entity. They are entity-centric, therefore, when the specific requirements and obligations they comprise are addressed only to an abstract and solitary “firm,” with little or no contemplation of affiliates, parent companies, subsidiaries, or multi-entity enterprises. Regulatory entity-centrism is not an isolated phenomenon, as …
Assessing Transnational Private Regulation Of The Otc Derivatives Market: Isda, The Bba, And The Future Of Financial Reform, Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Andrew Verstein
Assessing Transnational Private Regulation Of The Otc Derivatives Market: Isda, The Bba, And The Future Of Financial Reform, Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Andrew Verstein
Articles
For the last twenty years, the dominant narrative of the over-the-counter derivatives market has been one of absent regulation, deregulation, and regulatory conflict, predictably resulting in disaster. This Article challenges this narrative, arguing that the global derivatives market has been subject to pervasive and harmonized regulation by what should be recognized as transnational private regulators. Recognizing the reality of widespread transnational private regulation of derivatives has significant implications, which this Article explores. Appreciating the actual regulatory status quo is essential if policymakers are to correctly diagnose problems, avoid past regulatory errors, and plan effective remedies. There are also advantages to …
How Insurance Substitutes For Regulation, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue
How Insurance Substitutes For Regulation, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
Legal regulation of behavior requires information. Acquiring information about the regulated party's conduct, setting benchmarks by which that conduct is measured, and establishing the correct scale of payoffs for violating or following regulation are costly and require expertise and motivation. Thus, economic theories of rulemaking are often based on the relative information advantages that different regulatory bodies have and how that information can be harnessed to enhance incentives and thereby improve welfare. Government regulators, on average, do not have informational advantages. They are not paid for performance and thus may lack adequate incentives. They are not disciplined by market forces …
The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias
The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias
Articles
Enforcement of law is at the core of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care” that the laws are faithfully executed, and it is a primary mechanism for effecting national regulatory policy. Yet questions about how presidents oversee agency enforcement activity have received surprisingly little scholarly attention. This Article provides a positive account of the President’s role in administrative enforcement, explores why presidential enforcement has taken the shape it has, and examines the bounds of the President’s enforcement power. It demonstrates that presidential involvement in agency enforcement, though extensive, has been ad hoc, crisis-driven, and frequently opaque. The Article thus …
Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand
Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand
Articles
Like firms in the United States, many Canadian firms voluntarily restrict trading by corporate insiders beyond the requirements of insider trading laws (i.e., super-compliance). Thus, we aim to understand the determinants of firms’ private insider trading policies (ITPs), which are quasi-contractual devices. Based on the assumption that firms that face greater costs from insider trading (or greater benefits from restricting insider trading) ought to be more inclined than other firms to adopt more stringent ITPs, we develop several testable hypotheses. We test our hypotheses using data from a sample of firms included in the Toronto Stock Exchange/Standard and Poor’s (TSX/S&P) …