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Full-Text Articles in Law

Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy Meyer Jan 2010

Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy Meyer

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Scholars have long understood that the instability of power has ramifications for compliance with international law. Scholars have not, however, focused on how states’ expectations about shifting power affect the initial design of international agreements. In this paper, I integrate shifting power into an analysis of the initial design of both the formal and substantive aspects of agreements. I argue that a state expecting to become more powerful over time incurs an opportunity cost by agreeing to formal provisions that raise the cost of exiting an agreement. Exit costs - which promote the stability of legal rules - have distributional implications. Before ...


Soft Law As Delegation, Timothy Meyer Jan 2009

Soft Law As Delegation, Timothy Meyer

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This article examines one of the most important trends in international legal governance since the end of the Second World War: the rise of "soft law," or legally non-binding instruments. Scholars studying the design of international agreements have long puzzled over why states use soft law. The decision to make an agreement or obligation legally binding is within the control of the states negotiating the content of the legal obligations. Basic contract theory predicts that parties to a contract would want their agreement to be as credible as possible, to ensure optimal incentives to perform. It is therefore odd that ...


Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, And The Paradox Of Compliance, William S. Laufer Oct 1999

Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, And The Paradox Of Compliance, William S. Laufer

Vanderbilt Law Review

The evolution of corporate criminal law is explained by the shifting risks of liability and loss between corporations and their agents in accommodating the illogic of vicarious liability. A vivid example of the effects of this risk shifting is seen with the recent emergence of the good citizen corporation movement. This movement encourages prosecutors with vast discretion to leverage indictments and convictions of subordinate agents, resort to civil and administrative actions against large and medium-sized corporations in place of crimial indictments, compromise agent indemnification, and enforce corporate rate self-regulation through elaborate plea agreements. Not surprisingly , organizations tend to conceive of ...


Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, And The Paradox Of Compliance, William S. Laufer Oct 1999

Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, And The Paradox Of Compliance, William S. Laufer

Vanderbilt Law Review

The evolution of corporate criminal law is explained by the shifting risks of liability and loss between corporations and their agents in accommodating the illogic of vicarious liability. A vivid example of the effects of this risk shifting is seen with the recent emergence of the good citizen corporation movement. This movement en- courages prosecutors with vast discretion to leverage indictments and convictions of subordinate agents, resort to civil and administrative actions against large and medium-sized corporations in place of criminal indictments, compromise agent indemnification, and enforce corporate self-regulation through elaborate plea agreements. Not surprisingly, organizations tend to conceive of ...


The Computer's Role In Simplifying Compliance With State And Local Taxation, Ray Westphal May 1986

The Computer's Role In Simplifying Compliance With State And Local Taxation, Ray Westphal

Vanderbilt Law Review

I recently polled several tax managers of large corporations that engage in a multi-state business and asked them whether their companies could stay in reasonable compliance with state and local tax law without using the computer. All said that it would be impossible to meet the compliance requirements of the states and localities without heavy dependence on computers. This reliance on the computer is not surprising given the amount of data that firms must reference to keep up with the thousands of taxing jurisdictions throughout the United States. The many different types of taxes that governmental bodies impose further complicate ...