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University of Michigan Law School

Marriage

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Doma: An Unconstitutional Establishment Of Fundamentalist Christianity, James M. Donovan Jan 1997

Doma: An Unconstitutional Establishment Of Fundamentalist Christianity, James M. Donovan

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

According to the text of the Act, DOMA's purposes are "to define and protect the institution of marriage," where marriage is defined to exclude same-sex partners. To be constitutionally valid under the Establishment Clause, this notion that heterosexual marriages require "protection" from gay and lesbian persons must spring from a secular and not religious source. This Article posits that DOMA has crossed this forbidden line between the secular and the religious. DOMA, motivated and supported by fundamentalist Christian ideology, and lacking any genuine secular goals or justifications, betrays the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.


The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter For An Expanded Law Of Privacy?, Robert G. Dixon Jr. Dec 1965

The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter For An Expanded Law Of Privacy?, Robert G. Dixon Jr.

Michigan Law Review

The comments that follow are divided into a brief review, for purposes of perspective, of the elusive nature of "privacy" as developed in American law to date, and an attempted rigorous analysis of the privacy aspects of Griswold. A final section suggests that effectuation of the new constitutional right of marital privacy necessarily or derivatively implies a corollary right of access to birth control information and devices-a right which should have been more clearly articulated by the Court.


The Right Of Privacy: Emanations And Intimations, Robert B. Mckay Dec 1965

The Right Of Privacy: Emanations And Intimations, Robert B. Mckay

Michigan Law Review

When Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren wrote in 1890 of "The Right to Privacy," they sought a means of protecting against unwelcome newspaper attention to social activities in the Warren household. Addressing their argument to the private law of torts, they presumably did not anticipate constitutional protection for other rights under the claim of privacy. Nevertheless, seventy· five years later that concept, now called the "right of privacy," was used by the Supreme Court of the United States in Griswold v. Connecticut to describe a constitutional right. Some members of the Court said the new right was within the "penumbra ...


Nine Justices In Search Of A Doctrine, Thomas I. Emerson Dec 1965

Nine Justices In Search Of A Doctrine, Thomas I. Emerson

Michigan Law Review

To the ordinary layman, Griswold v. Connecticut seemed easy. But to the lawyer it was somewhat more difficult. The lawyer's problem with the case was that the issues did not readily fit into any existing legal pigeonhole. Actually, there were five possibilities. The case could have been dealt with under the equal protection clause, the first amendment, substantive due process, the right of privacy, or, in extremis, the ninth amendment. In order to strike down the statute under any of these doctrines, however, the Court would be forced to enter uncharted waters. Whatever course the Court took, its action ...


Privacy In Connecticut, Arthur E. Sutherland Dec 1965

Privacy In Connecticut, Arthur E. Sutherland

Michigan Law Review

Occasionally a judgment of our Supreme Court, delivered in a superficially petty case, suddenly before our startled eyes displays fundamentals of our constitutional theory. Thus, in Griswold v. Connecticut, holding unconstitutional an 1879 Connecticut statute forbidding all persons to use contraceptive devices, the Court found it necessary to discover a "right of privacy" latent in the Bill of Rights and incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The outcome of the case is satisfying; all nine Justices joined in saying, in one way or another, that Connecticut's statute was nonsense. I am happy to see this ...


Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental And Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, Paul G. Kauper Dec 1965

Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental And Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, Paul G. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

The varying theories followed in the several opinions in the Griswold case can be fully understood and appreciated only in the context of the tortuous but fascinating history of the judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.