What Is The Probability Your Vote Will Make A Difference?, Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver, Aaron S. Edlin
Dec 2008
What Is The Probability Your Vote Will Make A Difference?, Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
One of the reasonable motivations for voting is that one vote can make a difference, as Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan [2007] showed. In a presidential election, the probability that your vote is decisive is equal to the probability that your state is necessary for an electoral college win, times the probability the vote in your state is tied in that event. We computed these probabilities a week before the 2008 presidential election, using state-by-state election forecasts based on the latest polls. The states where a single vote was most likely to matter are New Mexico, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Colorado, …
Vote For Charity's Sake, Aaron S. Edlin, Andrew Gelman, Noah Kaplan
Sep 2008
Vote For Charity's Sake, Aaron S. Edlin, Andrew Gelman, Noah Kaplan
Aaron Edlin
In a battleground state like Colorado or New Mexico, voting in the presidential election may be equivalent to giving $30,000 - $50,000 to others in expected value, and as such is an extremely efficient form of charity.
The Choose-Your-Charity Tax: A Way To Incentivize Greater Giving, Aaron S. Edlin
Jan 2006
The Choose-Your-Charity Tax: A Way To Incentivize Greater Giving, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
Why don’t people give more to charity? One reason is that the problems will be there whether individuals give or not. Here is a policy--inspired by the matching grants that charities use so effectively--that could actually make a real difference.
Optimal Penalties In Contracts, Aaron S. Edlin, Alan Schwartz
Apr 2003
Optimal Penalties In Contracts, Aaron S. Edlin, Alan Schwartz
Aaron Edlin
Reviews the literature on breach of contract and contract penalties and presents in a coherent framework. Critiques the grounds on which courts validate liquidated damage provisions or invalidate penalties.
Two-Part Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria With N Firms: Sufficient Conditions For Existence And Optimality, Aaron S. Edlin, Mario Epelbaum
Oct 1993
Two-Part Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria With N Firms: Sufficient Conditions For Existence And Optimality, Aaron S. Edlin, Mario Epelbaum
Aaron Edlin
We explore the interactions among firms with increasing returns regulated to break even by pricing with two-part tariffs. We provide conditions for existence and for efficiency of general equilibria with n-firms. This involves finding hookup fees that are voluntarily paid and cover the firms' losses from marginal cost pricing-a problem that because of both substitution and income effects is complicated by multiple firms using two-part tariffs, but that must be solved to ensure the continuity of demands necessary to prove break-even equilibria exist.
Is College Financial Aid Equitable And Efficient?, Aaron S. Edlin
Aug 1993
Is College Financial Aid Equitable And Efficient?, Aaron S. Edlin
Aaron Edlin
No abstract provided.