Law Commons^™

Halliburton, Basic And Fraud On The Market: The Need For A New Paradigm, Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

Summary: Halliburton, Basic and Fraud on the Market: The Need for a New Paradigm

If defrauded securities plaintiffs cannot bring a class-action lawsuit, there often will be no effective remedy since the amount at stake for individual plaintiffs is not sufficient to warrant the substantial costs of litigation. To surmount the problem of individualized reliance and establish commonality, federal courts for twenty-five years have been employing the Basic fraud-on-the-market theory which posits that, in an efficient market, investors rely on the integrity of the market price.

While class certification at one time was a matter of course, today it is …

Gambling On Our Financial Future: How The Federal Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is A Safer Bet To Prevent Another Financial Collapse, Brian M. Mccall

Brian M McCall

Remic Tax Enforcement As Financial-Market Regulator, Bradley T. Borden, David J. Reiss

David J Reiss

Lawmakers, prosecutors, homeowners, policymakers, investors, news media, scholars and other commentators have examined, litigated, and reported on numerous aspects of the 2008 Financial Crisis and the role that residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) played in that crisis. Big banks create RMBS by pooling mortgage notes into trusts and selling interests in those trusts as RMBS. Absent from prior work related to RMBS securitization is the tax treatment of RMBS mortgage-note pools and the critical role tax enforcement should play in ensuring the integrity of mortgage-note securitization.

This Article is the first to examine federal tax aspects of RMBS mortgage-note pools formed …

Securitization And Systemic Risk Amid Deregulation And Regulatory Failure

Patricia A. McCoy

During the recent housing boom, private-label securitization without regulation was unsustainable. Without regulation, securitization allowed mortgage industry actors to gain fees and to put off risks. The ability to pass off risk allowed lenders and securitizers to compete for market share by lowering their lending standards, which activated more borrowing. Lenders who did not join in the easing of lending standards were crowded out of the market. Meanwhile, the mortgages underlying securities became more exposed to growing default risk, but investors did not receive higher rates of return. Artificially low risk premia caused the asset price of houses to go …

The Trouble With Stockjobbers: The South Sea Bubble, The Press And The Legislative Regulation Of The Markets, Benedict Sheehy

Benedict Sheehy

Abstract: The South Sea Bubble Act of 1721 is often taken as the first securities legislation. Further it is understood to be a response to a stock market scandal. In fact, the Act was enacted prior to the scandal and indeed the likely cause of the collapse of the stock bubble itself. This article reviews the historical context, including the finance of government of the era, the development of the South Sea Company and its bubble, the legislation, burst and subsequent effects. It places securities legislation in its historical context as part of a broader movement in corporate law, shifting …

Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance Of Predatory Lending

Patricia A. McCoy

Today, Wall Street finances up to eighty percent of subprime home loans through securitization. The subprime sector, which is designed for borrowers with blemished credit, has been dogged by predatory lending charges, many of which have been substantiated. As subprime securitization has grown, so have charges that securitization turns a blind eye to financing abusive loans. In this paper, we examine why secondary market discipline has failed to halt the securitization of predatory loans.

When investors buy securities backed by predatory loans, they face a classic lemons problem in the form of credit risk, prepayment risk, and litigation risk. Securitization …