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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Radical Thought From Marx, Nietzsche, And Freud, Through Foucault, To The Present: Comments On Steven Lukes’S In Defense Of "False Consciousness", Bernard E. Harcourt
Radical Thought From Marx, Nietzsche, And Freud, Through Foucault, To The Present: Comments On Steven Lukes’S In Defense Of "False Consciousness", Bernard E. Harcourt
Faculty Scholarship
Steven Lukes offers a precise, succinct, and forceful defense of the idea of "false consciousness" in his provocative essay by that name, In Defense of "False Consciousness" People can be systematically mistaken about their own best interest, Lukes contends – or, in his words, "they can have systematically distorted beliefs about the social order and their own place in it that work systematically against their interests." It is not just that sometimes people knowingly but regretfully make compromises, nor simply that they face no alternative choices; people are at times factually mistaken about what will promote their best interest. "There …
Attachments And Associated Reasons, Joseph Raz
Attachments And Associated Reasons, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
The paper will unfold in 5 parts dealing with five questions: first, does the partiality of attachments present an obstacle to their being or giving practical reasons? Second, given a value-based approach to practical reasons, can universal values generate reasons that are specific to their subjects, reasons – say – towards my friends that only I have? Third, do attachments affect what we do independently of any reasons that they provide? Fourth, in what ways do attachments constitute or provide normative reasons, and briefly, how do attachment-related reasons relate to other practical reasons? Finally, I turn to the question of …
Value: A Menu Of Questions, Joseph Raz
Value: A Menu Of Questions, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
The paper considers some questions arising out of reflection on Finnis's writings about value, exemplifying them by consideration of the putative value of knowledge. They include the role of harmony, and of self-evidence, in identifying or constituting values, and the ways in which values can provide reasons.
Reasons: Explanatory And Normative, Joseph Raz
Reasons: Explanatory And Normative, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
‘A reason’ has two meanings: explanatory reasons are facts that contribute to an explanation (of anything explained); normative reasons are facts that favour and guide responses, in one’s emotions, beliefs, actions, etc., to how things are. The two kinds of reasons are connected by their connection to the capacity of Reason, or rationality, and by the normative/explanatory nexus, i.e. by the fact that normative reasons can explain the response that they favour. Normative reasons are — potentially — explanatory reasons, but the explanations they provide are of a special kind that presupposes their normative character. The chapter builds on …