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Full-Text Articles in Law

Can Taxes Mitigate Corporate Governance Inefficiencies?, Noam Noked Nov 2017

Can Taxes Mitigate Corporate Governance Inefficiencies?, Noam Noked

William & Mary Business Law Review

Policymakers have long viewed tax policy as an instrument to influence and change corporate governance practices. Certain tax rules were enacted to discourage pyramidal business structures and large golden parachutes, and to encourage performance-based compensation. Other proposals, such as imposing higher taxes on excessive executive compensation, have also attracted increasing attention.

Contrary to this view, this Article contends that the ability to effectively mitigate corporate governance inefficiencies through the use of corrective taxes is very limited, and that these taxes may cause more harm than benefit. There are a few reasons for the limited effectiveness of corrective taxes. Importantly, the ...


You Can’T Stop What You Can’T See: Complementary Risk Mitigation Through Compensation Disclosure, Matt Reeder Feb 2017

You Can’T Stop What You Can’T See: Complementary Risk Mitigation Through Compensation Disclosure, Matt Reeder

William & Mary Business Law Review

Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires regulators to help prevent the next financial crisis by monitoring executive compensation arrangements to prevent them from becoming excessive or leading to “material financial loss.” A now-pending rule seeks to do just this. This Article argues that the rule is well-conceived inasmuch as it limits the total portion of compensation that can be based on risk-inducing incentives, ties incentive-based compensation to longer-term performance, places a ceiling on potential incentivebased earnings, provides for downward adjustment and clawbacks, prohibits many hedging behaviors, and institutionalizes governance mechanisms and oversight policies. But, by placing a number of ...


Executive Compensation And Income Inequality, Daniel J. Morrissey Feb 2013

Executive Compensation And Income Inequality, Daniel J. Morrissey

William & Mary Business Law Review

This Article explores the connection between exorbitant executive compensation and the growing income inequality in our country. It discusses the traditional legal attempts to rein in corporate remuneration as well as the more recent “Say-on-Pay” right given to shareholders in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010. The Article concludes that negative stockholder votes can be evidence that directors have breached their fiduciary duties by granting overly generous pay hikes to their top officials.


The Post-Tarp Movement To Regulate Banker Pay, Eric D. Chason Jan 2011

The Post-Tarp Movement To Regulate Banker Pay, Eric D. Chason

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Executive Compensation And Tax Neutrality: Taxing The Investment Component Of Deferred Compensation, Eric D. Chason Jan 2010

Executive Compensation And Tax Neutrality: Taxing The Investment Component Of Deferred Compensation, Eric D. Chason

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing The Fruit Of The Tree In Its Proper Season, Eric D. Chason Jan 2006

Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing The Fruit Of The Tree In Its Proper Season, Eric D. Chason

Faculty Publications

Executive pensions (or deferred compensation) grabbed headlines after Enron's collapse and fresh concerns over ever-increasing executive pay. They also grabbed the attention of Congress, which reformed executive pensions legislatively in 2004 with § 409A of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 409A merely tightens and clarifies the doctrines that had already governed executive pensions, leaving the basic economics of executive pensions unchanged. Executives can still defer taxation on current compensation until actual payment is made in the future. Deferral still comes at the same price to the employer, namely the deferral of its deduction for the compensation expense. Thus, the timing ...


The Manager's Share, David I. Walker Nov 2005

The Manager's Share, David I. Walker

William & Mary Law Review

It is sometimes argued in the corporate governance literature that the total share of corporate value that can be extracted by a manager is fixed and independent of the avenues through which value is extracted. Shareholders need not worry about an activity such as insider trading, the story goes, because any profits achieved by a manager through insider trading will simply offset conventional compensation. This Article challenges that idea and argues that whether one views the manager's share as being capped by external market forces, set by an optimal principal/agent contract, or limited by saliency and outrage in ...


Executive Compensation Planning For Privately-Held Businesses, Jeffrey R. Capwell Nov 2004

Executive Compensation Planning For Privately-Held Businesses, Jeffrey R. Capwell

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.


Executive Compensation: When Is Reasonable Compensation Unreasonable?, Richard A. Williamson Dec 1972

Executive Compensation: When Is Reasonable Compensation Unreasonable?, Richard A. Williamson

William & Mary Annual Tax Conference

No abstract provided.