Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Publication Year
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 22 of 22
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Rise And Fall Of Clean Air Act Climate Policy, Nathan Richardson
The Rise And Fall Of Clean Air Act Climate Policy, Nathan Richardson
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
The Clean Air Act has proven to be one of the most successful and durable statutes in American law. After the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, there was great hope that the Act could be brought to bear on climate change, the most pressing current environmental challenge of our time. Massachusetts was fêted as the most important environmental case ever decided, and, upon it, the Environmental Protection Agency under President Obama built a sweeping program of greenhouse gas regulations, aimed first at emissions from road vehicles, and later at fossil fuel power plants. It was the most …
The Progressive Idea Of Democratic Administration, William J. Novak
The Progressive Idea Of Democratic Administration, William J. Novak
Articles
The first thing to acknowledge about administration is that administration is coincident with governance. Far from being a modern invention or some kind of radical departure from an original political or legal tradition, administration is among the oldest practices of governments. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive of government without administration. Laws need to be enforced, legislation needs to be implemented, and collective goods need to be secured. Governance is mostly a matter of actions and practices, making administration perhaps the most truly reflective aspect of legal and political culture.
Grasping For Energy Democracy, Shelley Welton
Grasping For Energy Democracy, Shelley Welton
Michigan Law Review
Until recently, energy law has attracted relatively little citizen participation. Instead, Americans have preferred to leave matters of energy governance to expert bureaucrats. But the imperative to respond to climate change presents energy regulators with difficult choices over what our future energy sources should be, and how quickly we should transition to them—choices that are outside traditional regulatory expertise. For example, there are currently robust nationwide debates over what role new nuclear power plants and hydraulically fractured natural gas should play in our energy mix, and over how to maintain affordable energy for all while rewarding those who choose to …
The Uncertain Effects Of Senate Confirmation Delays In The Agencies, Nina A. Mendelson
The Uncertain Effects Of Senate Confirmation Delays In The Agencies, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
As Professor Anne O’Connell has effectively documented, the delay in Senate confirmations has resulted in many vacant offices in the most senior levels of agencies, with potentially harmful consequences to agency implementation of statutory programs. This symposium contribution considers some of those consequences, as well as whether confirmation delays could conceivably have benefits for agencies. I note that confirmation delays are focused in the middle layer of political appointments—at the assistant secretary level, rather than at the cabinet head—so that formal functions and political oversight are unlikely to be halted altogether. Further, regulatory policy making and even agenda setting can …
Election Law's Lochnerian Turn, Ellen D. Katz
Election Law's Lochnerian Turn, Ellen D. Katz
Articles
This panel has been asked to consider whether "the Constitution [is] responsible for electoral dysfunction."' My answer is no. The electoral process undeniably falls well short of our aspirations, but it strikes me that we should look to the Supreme Court for an accounting before blaming the Constitution for the deeply unsatisfactory condition in which we find ourselves.
Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, Jack M. Beermann
Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, Jack M. Beermann
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
There is a documented increase in the volume of regulatory activity during the last ninety days of presidential administrations when the President is a lame duck, having either been defeated in a bid for re-election or being at the end of the second term in office. This includes an increase in the number of final rules issued as compared to other periods. The phenomenon of late-term regulatory activity has been called “midnight regulation,” based on a comparison to the Cinderella story in which the magic wears off at the stroke of midnight. This Article looks closely at one species of …
The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias
The President's Enforcement Power, Kate Andrias
Articles
Enforcement of law is at the core of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care” that the laws are faithfully executed, and it is a primary mechanism for effecting national regulatory policy. Yet questions about how presidents oversee agency enforcement activity have received surprisingly little scholarly attention. This Article provides a positive account of the President’s role in administrative enforcement, explores why presidential enforcement has taken the shape it has, and examines the bounds of the President’s enforcement power. It demonstrates that presidential involvement in agency enforcement, though extensive, has been ad hoc, crisis-driven, and frequently opaque. The Article thus …
The $1.75 Trillion Lie, Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman
The $1.75 Trillion Lie, Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
A 2010 study commissioned by the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration claims that federal regulations impose annual economic costs of $1.75 trillion. This estimate has been widely circulated, in everything from op-ed pages to Congressional testimony. But the estimate is not credible. For costs of economic regulations, the estimate reflects a calculation that rests on a misunderstanding of the definition of the relevant data, flunks an elementary question on the normal distribution, pads the analysis with several years of near-identical data, and fails to recognize the difference between correlation and causation. For costs of environmental regulation, …
Disclosing 'Political' Oversight Of Agency Decision Making, Nina A. Mendelson
Disclosing 'Political' Oversight Of Agency Decision Making, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
Scholars and courts have divided views on whether presidential supervision enhances the legitimacy of the administrative state. For some, that the President can supervise administrative agencies is key to seeing agency action as legitimate, because of the President's accountability to the electorate. Others, however, have argued that such supervision may simply taint, rather than legitimate, an agency action. The reality is that presidential supervision of agency rulemaking, at least, appears to be both significant and opaque. This Article presents evidence from multiple presidential administrations suggesting that regulatory review conducted by the White House's Office of Management and Budget is associated …
Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley
Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
Prof. Bagley notes that reshaping captured agencies using the structural reforms suggested by Prof. Barkow may be politically infeasible and offers an alternative solution for eliminating interest-group capture. First, he suggests establishing a body within the Executive Branch that proactively investigates and documents capture dynamics. Second, he suggests creating legislative mechanisms that will encourage Congressional action on the body’s recommendations, and perhaps, more provocatively, requiring the Executive Branch to enact any such recommendations in the absence of Congress’s formal objection.
Regulating Robocalls: Are Automated Calls The Sound Of, Or A Threat To, Democracy, Jason C. Miller
Regulating Robocalls: Are Automated Calls The Sound Of, Or A Threat To, Democracy, Jason C. Miller
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
African-American voters receive a phone message implying that they are not registered to vote. Others hear "an almost threatening male voice," a "fake New York accent," factual distortions about legislation, false endorsements from controversial groups, calls promoting one candidate claiming to be from his opponent, and a constant barrage of annoying phone calls designed to make voters think a different candidate was sponsoring them. These messages were delivered through automated political telephone calls, also known as robocalls. Robocalls are cheap and efficient--one can deliver a pre-recorded message through 100,000 automated phone calls in one hour for only $2000. Consequently, robocalls …
La Follette'S Folly: A Critique Of Party Associational Rights In Presidential Nomination Politics, Alan Martinson
La Follette'S Folly: A Critique Of Party Associational Rights In Presidential Nomination Politics, Alan Martinson
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Every four years, observers of the presidential nomination season decry the undue influence of those states that hold their primaries first, particularly Iowa and New Hampshire. Currently, Democratic Party rules protect the position of these states. In 2008, two states disregarded party rules in order to move their primaries to a more influential position in the primary season. As punishment for disobeying the rules, the national party diluted the influence of the delegates from these states at the national convention. Legislative solutions to the problems of the current nomination process appear unlikely. Moreover, Supreme Court jurisprudence places no limits on …
Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson
Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson
Michigan Law Review
It is widely believed that insulating an administrative agency from the influence of elected officials, whatever its other benefits orjustifications, reduces the agency's responsiveness to the preferences of political majorities. This Article argues, to the contrary, that a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political control alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking. An elected politician, though responsive to majoritarian preferences, will almost always deviate from the majority in one direction or the other Therefore, even if the average policy position of a given elected official tends to track the policy views of the median voter …
Campaign Finance Reform And The Social Inequality Paradox, Yoav Dotan
Campaign Finance Reform And The Social Inequality Paradox, Yoav Dotan
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The recent landmark decision by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC opens the way for new and more decisive regulation of the vast amounts of private and corporate money poured into the political system. However, the theoretical grounds for campaign finance regulation - as reflected in the Court's opinion - remain highly perplexing. The purpose of the current article is to tie together the evolving constitutional principle of equality in election with modern process theory and to apply them to the field of campaign finance. The inherent tension between the stringent requirement for political equality on the one hand …
Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies And Personnel Before A New President Arrives, Nina A. Mendelson
Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies And Personnel Before A New President Arrives, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
This Article examines executive branch agency actions concluded just before a new President takes office, such as "midnight" rulemaking and late-term hiring and promotion, which Professor Mendelson collectively refers to as "agency burrowing." Congress, the media, and some commentators have portrayed such activities as unsavory power grabs that undermine the President-elect's ability to direct the functions of administrative agencies. Rather than dismissing agency burrowing out of hand, however, Professor Mendelson argues for a more nuanced approach. In some cases, burrowing can make positive contributions to the democratic responsiveness of agencies, agency accountability, and the "rule of law." A fuller analysis …
Why Is This Man A Moderate?, Richard A. Epstein
Why Is This Man A Moderate?, Richard A. Epstein
Michigan Law Review
A Review of William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics
Revitalizing Regulation, Daniel A. Farber
Revitalizing Regulation, Daniel A. Farber
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector by David Osborne and Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of the American Regulatory State by Susan Rose-Ackerman
The Role Of The Democratic And Republican Parties As Organizers Of Shadow Interest Groups, Jonathan R. Macey
The Role Of The Democratic And Republican Parties As Organizers Of Shadow Interest Groups, Jonathan R. Macey
Michigan Law Review
This article advances a new theory to explain the relationship between political parties and interest groups. Among the as yet unanswered questions that I resolve are: (1) why many politicians -both Republicans and Democrats - develop a reputation for "party loyalty" despite the parties' inability to employ any meaningful sanctions against politicians who deviate from the party line; (2) why candidates for public office run in contested primaries when running as an independent generally would be a less costly mechanism for getting on the ballot; (3) why the two major U.S. political parties continue to attract resources from contributors and …
A Historical Survey Of The International Regulation Of Propaganda, Elizabeth A. Downey
A Historical Survey Of The International Regulation Of Propaganda, Elizabeth A. Downey
Michigan Journal of International Law
This article traces international efforts to regulate propaganda through the pre- and post-UN periods, charting its development from a rather peripheral concern of international law to its important role in the currently evolving law of international communication.
Industry Influence In Federal Regulatory Agencies, Michigan Law Review
Industry Influence In Federal Regulatory Agencies, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies by Paul J. Quirk
Regulation Of Campaign Funding And Spending For Federal Office, Roscoe L. Barrow
Regulation Of Campaign Funding And Spending For Federal Office, Roscoe L. Barrow
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This article will detail significant data on campaign funding and spending, describe the major laws for regulating campaign funding and spending, analyze the constitutional issues raised by these laws, and propose changes to render the laws safer from attack on grounds of unconstitutionality and more effective in achieving a viable election process.
Cary: Politics And The Regulatory Agencies, Donald C. Cook
Cary: Politics And The Regulatory Agencies, Donald C. Cook
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Politics and the Regulatory Agencies by William L. Cary